PEOPLE vs PARAGSA

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-44060; July 20, 1978

Topic:  Evidence; admissions and confessions; admission by silence; (Sec. 32, Rule 130)

FACTS:

Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 ½ year old girl, Mirasol Magallanes.  The information alleged that victim was alone in her house when the Benben entered, intimidated her with a hunting knife, forced her to lie in bed and there they had intercourse.  The deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on the door of victim’s house. Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that she had seen the accused exiting the house when she came knocking.  The victim did not reveal what happened to her until 6 days after the incident. 

Accused interposed the “Sweetheart defense”.  Defense claims in effect that there was no force or intimidation involved and that what Aunt Lita saw was not the aftermath of a rape, but was rather consensual sexual intercourse.  Accused also presented witnesses claiming that they were indeed sweethearts.

The CFI convicted Benben.  CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:

The main issue boils down to the question of who is more credible, the defense or the prosecution?  Thus, whether or not the evidence justifies a conviction.

HELD:

NO.  A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. The Supreme court noted the absence of intimidation considering that the act took place in the daytime, in her house where she is surrounded by her neighbors.  The victim could also have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and not 3 days after.

Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of the allegation that the victim and accused were sweethearts.  They did not bother to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications previously.  As to this silence, the Supreme Court explained:

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth … is applicable in criminal cases provided: 1) that he heard and understood the statement; 2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.

DECISION:  Acquittal.

AMERICAN WIRE AND CABLE CO. vs. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS

 

G.R. No. L-26557; February 18, 1970

FACTS:

• Petitioner American Wire and Cable Company (American) is the owner of the registered trademark DURAFLEX and Device for electric wires. 
  
  
• On June 1962, private respondent/applicant Central Banahaw (Central) sought to register the label DYNAFLEX for electric wires.
  
  
• Petitioner opposed on the ground that Central’s use of the trademark DYNAFLEX would confuse purchasers looking for DURAFLEX.  The mark sought to be registered allegedly having practically the same spelling, pronunciation and sound, and covering the same good, but had not been in use continuously, unlike DURAFLEX  which was in use since 1958.
  
  
• Director of Patents held that DYNAFLEX was not similar to DURAFLEX, since the logo design was dissimilar, the DURAFLEX logo being in all caps while DYNAFLEX was in miniscule, and thus gave Central’s application to trademark DYNAFLEX due course.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mark DYNAFLEX and Device is registrable as label for electric wires, class 20, considering that the trademark DURAFLEX and Globe representation also for electric wires, machines and supplies under class 20, has been registered more than 4 years earlier.

HELD:

NO, the mark sought to be registered failed to “dominancy test”

The pertinent law, Republic Act 166, as amended, on registrability of trademarks, prescribes:

SEC. 4. — The owner of a trademark, trade name or service-mark used to distinguish his goods, business or services from the goods, business or services of others shall have the right to register the same, unless it:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Consists of or comprises a mark or trade name which so resembles a mark or trade-name registered in the Philippines by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to or used in connection with the goods, business or services of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the determinative factor in a contest involving the registration of trademark is whether the use of such mark would likely cause confusion or mistake on the part of the buying public. The test of “likelihood” is the “dominancy test” or the assessment of the essential or dominant features in the competing labels to determine whether they are confusingly similar.  In fact, even their similarity in sound is taken into consideration, where the marks refer to merchandise of the same descriptive properties, for the reason that trade idem sonans constitutes a violation of trade mark patents.

The court found:

The similarity between the competing trademarks, DURAFLEX and DYNAFLEX, is apparent. Not only are the initial letters and the last half of the appellations identical, but the difference exists only in two out of the eight literal elements of the designations. Coupled with the fact that both marks cover insulated flexible wires under class 20; that both products are contained in boxes of the same material, color, shape and size; that the dominant elements of the front designs are a red circle and a diagonal zigzag commonly related to a spark or flash of electricity; that the back of both boxes show similar circles of broken lines with arrows at the center pointing outward, with the identical legend "Cut Out Ring" "Draw From Inside Circle", no difficulty is experienced in reaching the conclusion that there is a deceptive similarity that would lead the purchaser to confuse one product with the other.

The Director of Patents has predicated his decision mostly on the semantic difference and connotation of the prefixes "Dura" and "Dyna" of the competing trademarks, unfortunately forgetting that the buyers are less concerned with the etymology of the words as with their sound and the dominant features of the design.

The court further explained that "unlike the pharmacists or druggists, the dispensers of hardware or electrical supplies are not generally known to pay as much concern to the brand of articles asked for by the customer and of a person who knows the name of the brand but is not acquainted with it is appearance, the likelihood of the DYNAFLEX product being mistaken for DURAFLEX is not remote."

Thus the request to register this trademark must be denied.

GROTJAHN GMBH vs. ISNANI

 

August 10, 1994; G.R. No. 109272

Topic:  Effect when no employer-employee relationship exists/issue does not involve employer-employee relationship

FACTS:

Petitioner is a multinational corporation (employer).  Private respondent Lanchinebre (employee) worked as its sales representative from 1983 to mid-1992.  Employee obtained loans and cash advances, a total of P12,170.37 remained unpaid. 

In July 1992, Employee filed an illegal suspension case with the NLRC (NLRC Case).  Employer, on the other hand, filed a case for collection of Sum of Money at the RTC (Collection Case).  Employee moved to dismiss the collection case on the ground that the case was in the nature of a claim for employee compensation (Art 217 No.4 & 6) and was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.  The RTC under respondent judge dismissed the case.

Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the Collection Case.

HELD:

YES.  While the loans and cash advances were contracted between employee and employer during the subsistence of their relationship, it does not follow that Article 217 of the Labor Code covers their relationship.

The SC writes:

Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. …

xxx

Civil Case No. 92-2486 is a simple collection of a sum of money brought by petitioner, as creditor, against private respondent Romana Lanchinebre, as debtor. The fact that they were employer and employee at the time of the transaction does not negate the civil jurisdiction of the trial court. The case does not involve adjudication of a labor dispute but recovery of a sum of money based on our civil laws on obligation and contract.

xxx

Whether or not the subject loan was incurred by private respondent as an incident to her profession, occupation or business is a question of fact. In the absence of relevant evidence, the issue cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss.

Thus the relevant test in this instance is the test of relevance.  Specifically, whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs being sought by the parties.  If none, the case may be considered as intrinsically a civil dispute.

The order of the RTC was reversed and the collection case was reinstated.

THE CARS THAT TIME FORGOT 2

THE CENTRO L300

Two years ago I wrote a very short post on cars with timeless designs.  I wrote that I liked cars that change as little as possible or where one generation's appearance is stretched for the equivalent of more than 2 generations in ordinary models.  I gave the example of the Lada, the Mitsubishi L300, Pajero Mk1/Hyundai Galloper, Mercedes-Benz G-Class, Volkswagen Beetle and Land Rover Defender.

The reasons why I like this state of affairs is that car manufacturers can concentrate on incremental, under-the-hood improvements to their cars while minimizing cosmetic changes, thus maximizing the interchangeability of body panels and bolt-on parts as well as making the cars more upgradeable.

Just see the episode of Wheeler Dealers that I’ve included below to see what I mean.

Wheeler Dealers G Wagon Episode

In this episode, the presenters spruced up a 1996 Mercedes Benz G-Wagen with some contemporary body panels and made it as good as new.

For car manufacturers, this has its advantages and disadvantages as well.  For one, this means that they do not need to keep continuously investing in new tooling to make the parts of their vehicles—they just need to keep their existing equipment working for as long as they can—thus saving themselves money on manufacturing and development.  Drawbacks include lower replacement rates—there are indeed people who like to have the “newest” things so these people would prefer to have regularly updated designs—and indeed, a new facelift would spur purchases of new vehicles.  Furthermore, without regular facelifts, car manufacturers stand to get left behind in the styling department which means that consumers may get the impression that a company is simply old-fashioned.

There are conceivably ways to get around this limitation such as through good servicing (paid maintenance), sale of spare parts and cosmetic and technical upgrades.

The Centro L300

So now we look at the stories Mitsubishi L300, a van sporting its characteristic “box-type” design language—squared off and angular lines, square headlights and square grille.  Inside, it sports a 15 inch Bakelite steering wheel with a 5 speed transmission mounted on the steering column.  A tried and tested design that has survived unchanged since 1991.  It is a veritable dinosaur in the car scene.

L300 interior

Madalas makita ito sa pelikula noong 90s -BG
Posted by Kami ang Batang 90s on Thursday, 10 September 2015

The iconic L300 van

The original consumer version of the L300 had a van body style.  A body style made iconic by the numerous Filipino action movies using this type of vehicle as transportation for baddies and kidnap scenes as seen in the above meme.

This body style was eventually phased out and replaced by newer designs such as the Space Gear pictured below.

(Source: adpost.ph)

Since then the Mitsubishi L300 has been sold continuously in the Philippines as a cab and rolling chassis under the name L300 FB Exceed chassis.  Truck body builders such as Centro and Almazora would then build bodies for it.  One would commonly see pick up, container truck and passenger variants of it, among others.  

Optional Truck Bodies

But the van configuration has since passed into memory.

Until…

Yes, that’s right! Centro, an enterprising truck body builder, decided to breathe new life into this classic and timeless design.  

According to its president:  

We saw the upsurge in the nationwide demand in the shuttle segment of the mass transport industry, and realized that most of the reliable Japanese shuttle models have only 15 seats or less yet have a price tag of over P1 million.  We therefore saw the demand for a minibus converted from a Japanese chassis cab with over 15 seats yet costs less than P1 million. Our answer is the L300 XV with 17 seats and at an introductory price of only P898,000.

Good news indeed and I can see this being bought by some consumers who aren’t willing to part with upwards of a million pesos on a passenger van for home use.

Related:

The cars that time forgot

Since time immemorial

HOPI HEIRLOOM CORN:

THEORETICAL CROSSES WITH PHILIPPINE MAIZE STRAINS

Food security is something that should concern us as a people. Dependence on rice, without the corresponding ability to grow a sufficient amount of it, will render us vulnerable to international rice price increases and availability.  

Rice is notoriously unsuited to our geography—there simply aren’t enough, wide open flood plains.  Where they do exist, irrigation is inadequate. With our growing population, it is simply too difficult to support it using rice alone.  It is thus in our interest if we found a crop that we could use to partially replace rice.

How about corn?

The Philippines is self-sufficient in corn (zea Mays). We grow lots of it and it is the second most important crop here next to rice.

Corn here is generally used to make animal feed. Very little of it goes into our diet compared to rice. * I estimate that if more corn were used for human consumption (or if it would be used to replace rice altogether), then it’s very possible that we won't need to import rice from other countries.

Corn Fit for Human Consumption

Part of actually getting people to eat corn directly, rather than to grow it as an animal feed is to actually have varieties of corn fit for human consumption—this is where Hopi corn comes in!

This is also a flour corn, which means that this is very suitable for making corn flour or cornmeal.  It is also very good for gritting.  The corn we normally grow for feed is flint corn, which as the name implies is very hard and is simply not suitable for human consumption.

Desirable traits

The Hopi Indian tribe has been growing a specific variety of Maize (Zea mays) in the Arizona desert for thousands of years. Their agricultural techniques are very well suited to the dry and hot desert (with its occasional flashfloods!) climate of the American Southwest.

Hopi Corn

(Source: azcentral.com)

Years of selective breeding has created a corn variety which can withstand heat and flashfloods.  It grows a very deep root system and its seeds are necessarily rich in energy.  The Hopi grow their corn by burying the seed 1 feet deep in the arid soil.  The video below shows how the Hopi cultivate their corn.

(Source: this video was originally found in Encarta encyclopedia)

Amazingly, the plant is still able to sprout in spite of being buried so deep.  These adaptations give this strain a great many advantages specifically:  

1. Because the seed was buried so deeply, the roots have access to moisture locked deep within the subsoil.

2. Because the root system is buried so deep, the plant can withstand harsh winds and flashfloods that happen in the desert.

3. The roots do not compete for nutrients with other plants.

These are highly desirable traits which if crossed with Philippine varieties of corn could very well produce a very well-adapted hybrid.  Specifically, this can potentially be the basis of a maintenance-free strain of corn—one that doesn’t need irrigation or weeding and can withstand typhoons!

This hybrid will also fit in with the corn culture in the Philippines.  Philippine corn often grow corn during the dry season in a dried up rice paddy—the corn is harvested before the rains come and after which, rice will be replanted. Hopi corn will suit this kind of crop rotation superbly. The corn is planted deep in the soil, so the roots are getting their nutrients from the subsoil. This means that the corn will not compete for nutrients with the next crop of rice which has shallow root systems and thus get their nutrients from the topsoil. This way, the rice paddy's topsoil gets a full season's rest before the next crop.

El Niño

It goes without saying that the world is due for a massive drought caused by this weather anomaly called El Niño.  A corn variety such as this will be able to thrive in the changing climate that we are experiencing today.

Conclusion

I understand that rice is culturally ingrained in the Filipino psyche—we all understand that a meal isn’t a meal if there isn’t rice on the table—but sometimes, solving problems such as food security may require some dietary changes.  Corn, as a rice replacement holds some potential, indeed, the Philippines is already more successful in self-sufficiency when it comes to corn than with rice.  The introduction of corn which is fit for human consumption, and which contain traits that would suit it to adverse climates can go a long way to solving our food security problems.  To that end, I strongly recommend conducting hybridization experiments with Hopi heirloom corn.

-----

*Filipinos do have some tasty corn-based treats like roasted corn, binatog and a local favorite is baye-baye.  I hear Boholanos also mix corn into their rice as a filler.

REPUBLIC vs. CFI MANILA and MAYER STEEL PIPE CORP.

Citation:  G.R. No. 43747; September 2, 1992; Ponente:  Nocon

Doctrine:  Application of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction – The question of forfeiture of the properties sought to be imported is for the Collector of Customs to determine and then by the Commissioner of Customs.  Thereafter, appeals must be brought to the Court of Tax Appeals.

FACTS:

In November 13, 1975, the CFI of Manila issued an injunction enjoining the Collector of Customs (Collector) from enforcing an order to seize some packages of machinery from the Private Respondent, Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation. 

The complaint with the CFI alleged the lack of due process in the proceedings leading to the order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CFI has the jurisdiction to issue an injunction over the order of the Collector.

HELD:

The mandate of the law is very specific.  Section 2312 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides:

"SEC. 2312. Decision or Action by Collector in Protest And Seizure Cases. — When a protest in proper form is presented in a case where protest is required, the Collector shall issue an order for hearing within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the protest and hear the matter thus presented. Upon the termination of the hearing, the Collector shall render a decision within thirty (30) days, and if the protest is sustained, in whole or in part, he shall make the appropriate order, the entry reliquidated if necessary."

On the other hand, Section 2313 of the same law states:

Review by Commissioner. — The person aggrieved by the decision or action of the Collector in any matter presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen (15) days after notification in writing by the Collector of his action or decision, give written notice to the Collector and one copy furnished to the Commissioner of his desire to have the matter reviewed by the Commissioner. Thereupon the Collector shall forthwith transmit all the records of the proceedings to the Commissioner, who shall approve, modify or reverse the action or decision of the collector and take such steps and make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to his decision.

Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125 (An Act Creating the Court of Tax Appeals) also provides:

Jurisdiction — The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided —

x       x       x

(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected: fines forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of the law administered by the Bureau of Customs.

Clearly then, the question of seizure and forfeiture is for the Collector of Customs to determine in the first instance and then the Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court of first instance is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter.

Lastly, in the case of Enrile vs. Vinuya, it was held that “the prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance from assuming cognizance over such a matter.”

As regards to the allegation that there was violation of due process, the Court noted that there was a hearing with 6 witnesses and for the purposes of administrative proceedings.

Wherefore, the order of injunction issued by the CFI of Manila was annulled.

FUJIKI vs. MARINAY

Citation:  G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

Ponente:  Carpio; SECOND DIVISION

Doctrine: 

Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage – A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.  Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004.  Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost contact with one another.  In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier marriage being dissolved.

Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship.  The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in 2010.  Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled:  “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”.  In this case, petitioner prayed that:

(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing and venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.  Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment.  Notably, when the Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed.  Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that “[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:

YES.  Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.  Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”

The Supreme Court further held that:

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

x x x

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

x x x

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.  Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.