SPOUSES JAIME AND MATILDE POON v. PRIME SAVINGS BANK REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION AS STATUTORY LIQUIDATOR

G.R. No. 183794; June 13, 2016

Sereno. J., First Division

Topic: Contracts with a penal clause; Fortuitous Event

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CA

FACTS:

The petitioners owned a commercial building. They executed a 10-year contract of lease over building with respondent Prime Savings Bank for the latter to use it as a branch office. They agreed to a fixed monthly rental with an advance payment. The contract also provided:

Should the lease[d] premises be closed, deserted or vacated by the LESSEE, the LESSOR shall have the right to terminate the lease ...

x x x

The LESSOR shall thereupon have the right to enter into a new contract with another party. All advanced rentals shall be forfeited in favor of the LESSOR.

Three years later, the BSP placed respondent under receivership of the PDIC and eventually ordered its litigation. The respondent vacated petitioner’s building and PDIC then demanded return of the advance rentals. Petitioners refused to return the advanced rentals. Thus respondent commenced this case for rescission of contract and recovery of sum of money.

The RTC ruled in favor of Petitioners and ordered the partial rescission of the contract insofar as the advance payment was forfeited. It held that the PDIC’s closure of their business was a fortuitous event. The CA affirmed but applied Art. 1229 instead.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent may avail of the remedy of rescission.

2. Whether or not the closure of respondent’s business is a fortuitous event.

3. Whether or not the forfeiture of the advance rentals was a penal clause.

4. Whether or not the penalty may be equitably reduced.

HELD:

1. YES. Respondents are entitled to rescission. The legal remedy of rescission is by no means limited to the situations covered in Arts. 1381 and 1382. The New Civil Code actually uses the term “rescission” in two different contexts. The first refers to breach of contract under Art. 1191, also known as the remedy of “resolution”; the second is rescission by reason of lesion or economic prejudice under Art. 1381. The first is a principal action based on breach of a party, while the second is a subsidiary action. From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that respondent’s right of action rests on the alleged abuse of petitioner’s right under the contract on the theory that petitioner tenaciously enforced their right to forfeit the advanced rentals which was in bad faith since they knew that respondent was already insolvent. IN other words, respondents are seeking rescission under Art. 1191.

2. NO. The closure of respondent’s business was neither a fortuitous or unforeseen event. In this case, for it to be considered a fortuitous event, there has to be bad faith or arbitrariness on the part of the BSP. Instead, its decision to place respondent under receivership and liquidation was pursuant to R.A. No. 7653, moreover, respondent was partially accountable for closure of its banking business. Neither is this case, a case of unforeseen event under Art. 1267. After all, parties to a contract are presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable developments. It is only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstance therefore that equity demands assistance for the debtor. In Tagaytay Realty vs. Gacutan the requisites for the application of Art. 1267 are:

1. The event could not have been foreseen at the time of the execution of the contract.

2. It makes performance of the contract extremely difficult but not impossible.

3. It must not be due to the act of any of the parties.

4. The contract is for a future prestation.

The case explains that mere inconvenience, unexpected impediments, increased expenses or even pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement will not relieve the obligor from an undertaking that it has knowingly and freely contracted. In this case, the first and third requisites are lacking. Since the lease was for 10 years, the parties should have considered the possibility of closure of business.

3. YES. The forfeiture clause in the contract is penal in nature. A provision is a penal clause if it calls for the forfeiture of any remaining deposit still in the possession of the lessor without prejudice to any other obligation still owing, in the event of the termination or cancellation of the agreement by reason of the lessee’s violation of any of the terms and conditions thereof. This kind of agreement may be validly entered into the by the parties. In this case, it is evident that the stipulation on the forfeiture of advance rentals is a penal in the sense that it provides for liquidated damages. The penalty for the premature termination of the contract works both ways. The penalty was to compel respondent to complete the 10-year term of the lease. Petitioners, too were similarly obliged to ensure the peaceful use of the building by respondent for the duration of the lease under paid of losing the remaining advance rentals paid by the respondent.

4. YES. A reduction of the penalty agreed upon by the parties is warranted under Article 1229 of the New Civil Code.

The general rule is that courts have no power to ease the burden of obligations voluntarily assumed by parties, just because things did not turn out as expected at the inception of the contract. It must be noted that this case was initiated by the PDIC in furtherance of its statutory role as the fiduciary of Prime Savings Bank. As the state-appointed receiver and liquidator, the PDIC is mandated to recover and conserve the assets of the foreclosed bank on behalf of the latter's depositors and creditors. In other words, at stake in this case are not just the rights of petitioners and the correlative liabilities of respondent lessee. Over and above those rights and liabilities is the interest of innocent debtors and creditors of a delinquent bank establishment. These overriding considerations justify the 50% reduction of the penalty agreed upon by petitioners and respondent lessee in keeping with Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which provides for an equitable reduction of the penalty in some cases.

Under the circumstances, it is neither fair nor reasonable to deprive depositors and creditors of what could be their last chance to recoup whatever bank assets or receivables the PDIC can still legally recover. Strict adherence to the doctrine of freedom of contracts, at the expense of the rights of innocent creditors and investors, will only work injustice rather than promote justice in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 29 November 2007 and its Resolution dated 10 July 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75349 are hereby MODIFIED in that legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the monetary award computed from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

BARTOLOME vs. SSS and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES

 

Citation: G.R. No. 192531; November 12, 2014

Ponente: Velasco; THIRD DIVISION

Doctrine:

Repeal of laws

Relative; definition

Reversion of parental authority; death of adoptive parent

FACTS:

Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome (Bartolome) was the biological mother of John Colcol (John). John was a seaman and he died due to an accident while on duty. Bartolome sought to claim death benefits from the SSS as she was the sole heir and beneficiary of John.

Her request was denied. The SSS explained that she is “no longer considered the parent of JOHN as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on the documents you submitted to us.

Cornelio Colcol was John's great grandfather. The decree of adoption attained finality in February of 1985 while john was just 2 years old.

Based on these facts, the SSS claimed that Bartolome is no longer the legitimate parent of John and is thus not entitled to Employees compensation. That the legitimate parent is now Cornelio Colcol.

Respondents cite the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation which states:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the interpretation of the ECC stating that only legitimate parents may benefit from compensation is correct.

2. Whether or not Petitioner qualifies as a dependent parent notwithstanding her son's adoption by someone else.

HELD:

1. No. The interpretation is incorrect. Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code on employee's compensation provides that beneficiaries are the “dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.” The ECC on the other hand, interpreted this provision to state that only “legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support.”

This is unauthorized administrative legislation. Article 7 of the New Civil Code states that:

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.

Guided by this doctrine, We find that the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate parents.”

2. YES. The Supreme Court also noted that three years after the adoption decree, Cornelio died while John was still a minor. John's minority at the time of his adopter's death is a significant factor because under such circumstance, parental authority must be deemed to have reverted back to the biological parent. Adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption—who was then left to care for the adopted minor child if the adopter passed away?

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

The Supreme Court thus ordered the ECC to release the benefits to petitioner Bartolome.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and MONTEJO

G.R. No. 119976; September 18, 1995

Ponente:  Kapunan

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district of Leyte in order that she will be able to run for Congress of that district in the 1995 elections.  Her COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven months.  Private Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one year residency requirement as provided for in the Constitution.  In response, Marcos amended her COC changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood".  Marcos claimed that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." She further claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground that her original entry of "seven months" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake". 

The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos.  It held that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila, because that where she chose to live after she went back to the Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US.  It explained that while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she became a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of Manila and eventually became Governor of Manila.  This, according to the COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".

ISSUE:

1.  Whether or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.

2.  Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her husband in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan.

HELD: 

1.  YES.

The Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile.  The decision of the COMELEC however, shows that they confused the concept of "Domicile" with "actual residence".

                Domicile versus Residence

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence."  In a past case, the Court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."  Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements of:

1.  The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and

2.  Animus manendi - the intention of returning permanently

               

Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place.  It is mere physical presence.  Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.  If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.  Domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.

A person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a single domicile. Note however, that a person may abandon a domicile in favor of another.

                Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban

Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte.  The fact that she has a residence in Manila does not mean that she has lost her domicile in that province.  The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.  Applying this doctrine to the case of petitioner, the fact that she has registered to vote and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan do not unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile in Tacloban.  Even while residing in various places, petitioner kept close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

2.  NO

                The domicile of origin

Note further that when petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed that of her parents.  Hence, her domicile of origin was Tacloban.  Once acquired, domicile is retained until a new one is gained.  The domicile of origin is not easily lost.  To effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1.  An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2.  A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3.  Acts which correspond with the purpose.

                               

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. 

                Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin

Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile or residence does not suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband upon marriage.  This article clearly refers to actual residence and not domicile and merely establishes the default rule in fulfilling the obligation of the spouses "to live together" in article immediately preceding Art. 110.

When Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. Mr. Marcos had several places of residence at the time:  San Juan and Ilocos Norte.  Assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence.  She did not lose her domicile of origin.

This rule has changed with the advent of the Family code with the introduction of the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile".  This underscores the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.

Even assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her acts unequivocally show an intent to reestablish a domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as early as in 1992, already obtained her residence certificate in Tacloban.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

FUJIKI vs. MARINAY

Citation:  G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

Ponente:  Carpio; SECOND DIVISION

Doctrine: 

Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage – A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.  Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004.  Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost contact with one another.  In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier marriage being dissolved.

Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship.  The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in 2010.  Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled:  “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”.  In this case, petitioner prayed that:

(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing and venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.  Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment.  Notably, when the Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed.  Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that “[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:

YES.  Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.  Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”

The Supreme Court further held that:

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

x x x

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

x x x

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.  Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.

RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Citation:  G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014

Ponente:  Brion, SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:

On March 29, 2003, Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry one another.  On the day of the wedding, at the Roman Catholic Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the priest refused to marry them when he learned that the couple did not have a marriage license. Instead, the couple, already dressed in their wedding attire and with their parents and friends, proceeded to the Aglipayan church and requested Petitioner, an Aglipayan Priest to marry them to which he proceeded to marry the couple. 

An information for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, was filed against the petitioner before the MTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.

The petitioner pleaded “not guilty” and while he admitted that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of “blessing” the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.

The MTC found petitioner guilty of violating Art. 352 of the Revised Penal Code for conducting an illegal marriage ceremony.  The RTC affirmed as did the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner conducted a “blessing” and not an [illegal] marriage ceremony.

HELD:

Petitioner conducted an illegal marriage ceremony.  The crime as provided for in Art 352 of the RPC refers to the performance of marriages under Articles 3 and 6 of the Family Code which reads:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

x x x

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

x x x

Art. 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

. . .

 The Supreme Court explained that what made the petitioner's act a marriage ceremony and not just a mere blessing was that while there is no prescribed form or religious rite, all that was required was “for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.”

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of witnesses, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.  Thus, it is clear that petitioner conducted a marriage ceremony and not a mere blessing.

The marriage ceremony was also illegal.  The Supreme Court stated that:

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he conducted the “blessing” of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.

BUNAGAN-BANSIG vs CELERA

A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014; PER CURIAM; EN BANC

FACTS:

This is a petition for disbarment by complainant Bunagan-Bansig against Respondent Atty. Celera for Gross Immoral Conduct.

Respondent was married to complainant's sister, Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), as evidenced by a photocopy of the contract of marriage dated May 8, 1997. Notwithstanding this, Respondent contracted marriage to one Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba).

ISSUE:

Whether or not gross immoral conduct of Respondent has been sufficiently proved

HELD:

YES. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.

Respondent was meted with the penalty of Disbarment.

FRANCISCO LIM vs EQUITABLE PCI BANK

G.R. No. 183918; January 15, 2014; Del Castillo; Second Division

DOCTRINE:

Marriage; Property Relations; Conjugal Property – All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.  [T]his presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to mortgage his share in a property in order to secure a loan. This first loan extended by BDO in 1989 was fully paid by Franco in 1992. However in 1996, Franco and their mother obtained another loan over the same property which they failed to pay.

Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan. Petitioner thus tried to get a TRO and for the foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the SPA executed in favor of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.

the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.

The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner’s mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized document.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Petitioner was able to prove that the SPA was forged.

2. Whether or not Respondent Bank was failed to exercise due diligence when granting the loan without the signature of Petitioner's wife in the mortgage contract.

HELD:

1. NO. Petitioner was not able to prove that his signature was forged. No evidence was ever presented to prove the allegation: the alleged forged signature was never compared with the genuine signatures of petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted.

2. NO. Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was never raised as an issue. Hence, the absence of his wife’s signature on the mortgage contract also has no bearing in this case.

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.  However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption.

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by [one spouse]. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

VALINO vs ADRIANO et al.

G.R. No. 182894; April 22, 2014; Mendoza, En Banc

DOCTRINE:

• The law confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner.

• Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

• It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.

FACTS:

Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The couple had 5 children and 1 adopted child, also impleaded herein as respondents. The marriage did turn sour and the couple separated in fact, though Adriano continued to support his wife and children.

Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom he courted. Atty. Adriano died and since his immediate family, including respondent were in the United States, Valino took it upon herself to bury Atty. Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the meantime, Respondents heard about the death and requested Valino to delay the burial so they can pay their final respects, but Valino still buried the body.

Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot.

Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to be buried at Valino's family's mausoleum and that the respondent's knew that Atty. Adriano was already in a coma yet they still proceeded to the US on vacation. And that as far as the public was concerned, Valino had been introducing her as his wife for the past 20 years.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently proven.

CA reversed [explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.]

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents (wife and children of deceased Atty. Adriano) are entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.

HELD:

YES. The weight of legal provisions puts the responsibility of the burial with the respondents, to wit:

The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. (New Civil Code Art. 305)

…

Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art. 199)

…

No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles [199 of the Family Code] and 305. (New Civil Code, Art. 308)

As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.

It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.

TENCHAVEZ vs ESCAÑO

15 SCRA 355, November 29, 1965

Ponente:Reyes, JBL

G.R. No. L-19671

Doctrine: Damages

FACTS:
Not satisfied with the decision of this Court, plaintiff-appellant Pastor B. Tenchavez and defendant-appellee Vicenta F. Escaño, respectively, move for its reconsideration; in addition, Russell Leo Moran, whom said defendant married in the United States, has filed, upon leave previously granted, a memorandum in intervention.

Movant Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man (Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive act.

The award of moral damages against Vicenta Escaño is assailed on the ground that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium and desertion of her husband are not included in the enumeration of cases where moral damages may lie.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenchavez is allowed to increase the damages against Vicenta (P25,000 for damages and attorney's fees were awarded to Tenchavez in the decision).

HELD:
The argument is untenable. The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.

It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to Article 106. Appellee obviously mistakes our grant of damages as an effect of legal separation. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article 2176) expressly cited.

For analogous reasons, the arguments advanced against the award of attorney's fees must be rejected as devoid of merit.

Contrary to intervenor Moran's contention, the decision did not impair appellee's constitutional liberty of abode and freedom of locomotion, as, in fact, Vicenta Escaño did exercise these rights, and even abused them by stating in her application for a passport that she was "single", the better to facilitate her flight from the wrongs she had committed against her husband. The right of a citizen to transfer to a foreign country and seek divorce in a diverse forum is one thing, and the recognition to be accorded to the divorce decree thus obtained is quite another; and the two should not be confused.

There was a Second Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied. It concerned the jurisdiction over Vicenta's person of the court.

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA vs. HARPER

G.R. No. 189998. August 29, 2012

PONENTE: Bersamin

DOCTRINE:

Negligence – Article 2176 0f the New Civil Code provides “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to their persons and belongings to their guest. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business (Arts 2000-2001 New Civil Code).

Hotel owner is liable for civil damages to surviving heirs of hotel guest whom strangers murder inside his hotel room.

FACTS:

Christian Harper was a Norweigian who came to Manila on a business trip. He stayed at Makati Shangri-la Hotel, but he was murdered in his hotel room [Specifically Room 1428. His ghost can be found there].

It was found that the muderer, a caucasian male, was able to trespass into the hotel room of the victim and was then able to murder and rob the victim. The heirs of the victim blame the hotel's gross negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests.

The RTC held in favor of the heirs and ordered Shangri-la to pay damages. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON Shangri-la Hotel is liable for damages.

HELD:

Yes. Shangri-la is liable due to its own negligence.

The testimony revealed that the management practice of the hotel prior to the death of the victim was to deploy only one security or roving guard for every three or four floors of the hotel, which is inadequate because the hotel is L-shaped that rendered hallways not visible end to end. That there was a recommendation to increase security to one guard per floor but this was not followed. This ommission is critical. The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to their persons and belongings to their guest. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business.

Therefore, the hotel has a greater degree of care and responsibility for its guests , otherwise the hotelkeepers would just stand idly by while strangers have unrestricted access to all hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors of the guests which is absurd.

Note: The decision of the CA was reproduced in the decision to which the SC concurred. The CA discussed the test of negligence as:

“The test of negligence is objective. WE measure the act or ommission of the tortfeasor with a perspective as that of an ordinary reasonable person who is similarly situated. The test, as applied to the extant case, is whether or not [Shangri-la Hotel], under the attendant circumstances, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation.”