FUJIKI vs. MARINAY

Citation:  G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

Ponente:  Carpio; SECOND DIVISION

Doctrine: 

Recognition of foreign judgment declaring nullity of marriage – A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.  Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), a Japanese national married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on January 23, 2004.  Sadly, petitioner Fujiki could not bring respondent Marinay back to Japan and they eventually lost contact with one another.  In 2008, Marinay met Shinichi Maekara and they married without the earlier marriage being dissolved.

Marinay suffered abuse from Maekara and so she left him and was able to reestablish contact with Fujiki and rekindle their relationship.  The couple was able to obtain a judgment in a Japanese court that declared Marinay's marriage to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy in 2010.  Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled:  “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”.  In this case, petitioner prayed that:

(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it did not meet standing and venue requirements as prescribed on the Rule on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), specifically, only the spouses (i.e. Marimay or Maekara) may file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.  Petitioner in a Motion for Reconsideration claimed that the case should not be dismissed as the above rule applied only to cases of annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and not in a petition for recognition of a foreign judgment.  Notably, when the Solicitor General was asked for comment, it agreed with the Petitioner stating that the above rule should not apply to cases of bigamy and that insofar as the Civil Registrar and the NSO are concerned, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed.  Lastly, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that “[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

HELD:

YES.  Firstly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.  Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.”

The Supreme Court further held that:

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

x x x

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

x x x

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.  Article 26 of the Family Code further confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.”

Petition was granted and the RTC was ordered to reinstate the proceedings.

BUNAGAN-BANSIG vs CELERA

A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014; PER CURIAM; EN BANC

FACTS:

This is a petition for disbarment by complainant Bunagan-Bansig against Respondent Atty. Celera for Gross Immoral Conduct.

Respondent was married to complainant's sister, Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), as evidenced by a photocopy of the contract of marriage dated May 8, 1997. Notwithstanding this, Respondent contracted marriage to one Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba).

ISSUE:

Whether or not gross immoral conduct of Respondent has been sufficiently proved

HELD:

YES. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.

Respondent was meted with the penalty of Disbarment.

FRANCISCO LIM vs EQUITABLE PCI BANK

G.R. No. 183918; January 15, 2014; Del Castillo; Second Division

DOCTRINE:

Marriage; Property Relations; Conjugal Property – All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.  [T]his presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to mortgage his share in a property in order to secure a loan. This first loan extended by BDO in 1989 was fully paid by Franco in 1992. However in 1996, Franco and their mother obtained another loan over the same property which they failed to pay.

Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan. Petitioner thus tried to get a TRO and for the foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the SPA executed in favor of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.

the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.

The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner’s mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized document.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Petitioner was able to prove that the SPA was forged.

2. Whether or not Respondent Bank was failed to exercise due diligence when granting the loan without the signature of Petitioner's wife in the mortgage contract.

HELD:

1. NO. Petitioner was not able to prove that his signature was forged. No evidence was ever presented to prove the allegation: the alleged forged signature was never compared with the genuine signatures of petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted.

2. NO. Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was never raised as an issue. Hence, the absence of his wife’s signature on the mortgage contract also has no bearing in this case.

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.  However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption.

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by [one spouse]. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.