TOWARDS A PROPER CHARACTERIZATION OF ALIBI: PHILIPPINE VERSUS AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Introduction

In criminal law, the accused is armed with a vast array of defenses, both in substantive law, as well as in procedural law. In a criminal case, courts will consider all the facts, circumstances and the defenses raised by the accused and will only promulgate a judgement of conviction if it finds that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.[1] What if, however, the only defense an accused has available to him is Alibi, how must the court consider his defense? What are the procedural means which must be followed when making use of this defense?

Sadly, the law currently views alibi rather simplistically as the “weakest defense.”[2] Jurisprudence has been very consistent with this, as it has ruled in case after case that: “alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable.” [3]

In terms of procedure, no rules currently exist for its appreciation with the exception of the above pronouncements in case law.[4] In the Philippines, alibi is not considered a positive defense, neither is it considered rebuttal evidence. This characterization will have significant implications as to the appreciation of alibi during trial, and which may prejudice an otherwise innocent accused who chooses to raise this defense.

In contrast, alibi in the United States is appreciated very differently from the Philippines. There is a proper procedure for the raising of this specific defense. Furthermore, US courts characterize alibi as more or less a “complete defense.”

In this study, the author will look at the history of the alibi defense in the Philippines, and show the evolution of the defense, or lack thereof. This will be followed by a discussion of how the alibi defense is characterized in the Philippines and America. Lastly, he will discuss American procedure when raising the alibi defense and how juries are instructed to appreciate an alibi with a view to how the Supreme Court or the Legislature may be able to amend the rules on alibi in the future.

History of Alibi in the Philippines

According to the research of Bautista,[5] the first criminal case in which the alibi defense was ever raised in the Philippines was U.S. vs. Cardona,[6] however, in that case, the Supreme Court found that defense “unimportant” because the location of defendant on the date the crime allegedly occurred was not a “material ingredient” for the offense.[7] However, since this first case, the alibi in jurisprudence developed.

It was in U.S. vs. Mabanag[8] where the Supreme Court first explained the doctrine that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony. Specifically, the Supreme Court said: “The evidence produced by the defendant to prove an alibi is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of two persons who identified him as the author of the assault in question.” A few months later, in U.S. vs. Santiago, the court expounded on the weakness of the alibi defense namely that: “having regard to the facility with which such a defense may be fabricated, we cannot attach to the evidence sufficient weight to bring into doubt the positive and in all respects satisfactory evidence of the prosecution connecting the defendants with the crime.”[9] Furthermore, as to evidentiary weight, the Court has also held that the defense of alibi should not be given credence if the corroboration comes from close relatives or friends of the accused and not from disinterested persons. In People v. Sumalinog, the court very specifically explained that kinship or closeness does not automatically discredit a witness, however “if that witness testifies to support the specific defense of alibi, courts view his testimony with skepticism.”[10] The Court explained very early on that this is due to the fact that alibi is very easily fabricated and that it is very easy for the accused to have close friends or relatives corroborate his story.[11] Since these early decisions, Philippine Courts have more or less appreciated the alibi the same way.

In 2010, the case of Lejano vs. People[12] was decided. This case was about the sensational Vizconde massacre wherein Hubert Webb, a “scion of a rich, influential, and politically powerful family,[13]” was accused of having committed the gruesome crime. Among other defenses, Webb raised the defense of alibi, claiming that he was in America at the time the massacre occurred. In support of this claim, he presented witness as well as object and documentary evidence such as his travel preparations, his despedida party, his immigration checks and he gave details of his sojourn and purchases made in the US.[14] In spite of this evidence, the lower courts held that the alibi defense is weak and would not prevail over the positive identification of the prosecution’s star witness, the police asset, Jessica Alfaro.[15] The Supreme Court however, thought differently and exonerated Webb based on the evidence he presented.

The success of the alibi defense in Lejano hinged on the fact that the witness who gave positive testimony of Hubert Webb as being one of the authors of the massacre was not credible because of her history as a police asset and as a “stool pigeon” who only came forward 4 years after the massacre,[16] as well as the strength of Webb’s documentary evidence to prove that he was out of the country. However, while Lejano threatened to buck the prevailing doctrine of the alibi defense, the result nevertheless seems disappointing because the court did not take the opportunity to “judicially legislate” procedural rules for alibi defenses, in spite of a good opportunity to do so. However, the court did take the opportunity to remind the lower courts to:

[N]ot all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman’s noose in the face of a witness positively swearing, “I saw him do it.”? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, “He did it!” without blinking an eye.[17]

The Supreme Court further declared that the quantum of evidence required by the lower courts in order to prove the element of physical impossibility of being at the crime scene in the Lejano case is so high, such that the only acceptable alibi in the Philippines would be the passage of the accused “into the next life,” and because of this, the Court “must abandon this unjust and inhuman paradigm.”[18] However, several years after this pronouncement, meaningful change in the jurisprudence or procedure has yet to occur because the prevailing doctrine remains that alibi is the weakest defense.

How Alibi is Characterized in the Philippines

Although alibi is a very common defense in Philippine courts, it is confounding to note that no provision exists in our Rules of Court that deals with this defense, criteria is limited to jurisprudence,[19] and apparently, no doctrine is more jurisprudentially settled in the Philippines than that alibi is “the weakest defense,”[20] or variations of this theme, such as alibi being “inherently weak,” and which must be “brushed aside” when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused.[21]

The author believes that part of the problem has to do with the fact that the prosecution and the Courts have no guidance with respect to procedure, as well as how to appreciate the defense. In the first case, alibi is considered a mere “negative defense.”[22] Compounding the problem, aside from being defined as a defense, alibi is also defined as a form of “evidence,”[23] and is thus also considered a factual issue with its own weight and sufficiency of proof.[24] In some early cases, the court held that it should be proven by probable evidence,[25] while in many later cases, it was held that it should be proven by positive, clear and convincing evidence.[26]

In making an alibi defense, an accused more or less admits that a crime has taken place, however, the accused was simply too far away from the scene of the crime that he could not have committed it.[27] The fact that an accused admits the act or omission charged, makes alibi partake of the characteristics of an affirmative defense. However, raising this defense does not have the effect of reversing trial as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 which provides that the Prosecution shall be the first to present evidence to prove the charge, followed by the accused who shall present evidence on his defense, except when: “When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.”[28]

As mentioned, instead of treating alibi as an affirmative defense, the courts instead treat it as a negative defense, that is, the accused is merely allowed to deny the State’s claim. A desirable side-effect of this characterization is that if an accused’s alibi defense does not convince the court of his innocence, the failure of the defense alone will not convict the accused.[29]

How Alibi is Characterized in the United States

In stark contrast to Philippine jurisprudential rules on alibi, American jurisprudence has been much more accommodating on accused interposing this defense. US courts have declared that alibi, “if established, constitutes a complete, legitimate, and effective defense and precludes the possibility of guilt.[30]”

The question thus arises if whether or not alibi may be considered an affirmative defense in the US. In the United States, as in the Philippines, there is no definite pronouncement as to whether alibi is an affirmative defense or not as some American authorities consider alibi as merely a “rebuttal” defense while others consider it an affirmative defense which the accused has the burden of establishing.[31] Since it is neither an affirmative or rebuttal defense, alibi should simply be characterized as a “complete and direct denial of the state’s case,”[32] the distinction being that that an affirmative defense admits the act charged but seeks to justify the act or exempt or mitigate liability, while an alibi defense essentially denies that the accused committed the act charged.[33] In the U.S., evidence to prove an alibi is not regarded as an attempt to prove an independent, affirmative defense. The prosecution still has the burden of proving the accused’s presence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused may, by any legitimate evidence, rebut or disprove this essential factor in the case for the prosecution.[34]

Jury Instructions

In the U.S., criminal cases are tried before juries, hence Judges are tasked with giving instructions to juries as to the “burden of proof” required of the prosecution and of the accused as to their respective defenses. With regards to alibi however, Judges would often omit the phrase “burden of proof” as to the existence of an alibi.[35] And instead of focusing the attention of the jury on the question whether the alibi has been proved the Court instead regards evidence to prove an alibi in the same light as any other evidence tending to disprove guilt or to disprove the case for the prosecution, with the cumulative effect of producing reasonable doubt on the entire case, which may lead to an acquittal.[36] Indeed, it has been held that jury instructions which indicate or even suggest that the accused satisfy a higher degree of proof in establishing an alibi are improper,[37] as is an instruction where the jury may infer guilt from its disbelief of the accused’s alibi.[38] This is in stark contrast with the Philippine treatment of the defense which requires the defense to prove the alibi by clear and convincing evidence.[39]

Notice Requirement

Before an alibi defense reaches the trial stage however, some States, and Courts at the Federal level,[40] would require that the accused give notice to the prosecution of their intention to rely on an alibi defense and to specify the place where the accused claims to have been when the crime was committed and the witnesses on whose testimony they will rely on in establishing the defense.[41] Non-compliance with this requirement may bar the alibi.[42] The purpose of this notice, in view of the ease of fabricating an alibi, is to prevent last-minute surprises on the prosecution and to enable it to make a full and thorough investigation of the merits of the defense.[43]

Conclusion

The bias against the alibi defense in the Philippines is very strong. More than one hundred years of jurisprudence stating that alibi is the weakest defense, easy to fabricate and can never prevail against prevail against positive identification of the accused can potentially cause injustice against those falsely accused, but who chose to raise alibi as a defense. Part of the reason for this is the lack of procedural rules which Courts must follow when an accused raises an alibi, as well as an inherent bias and dependence on a presumption that alibi was raised for self-serving purposes. The Philippine Supreme Court and the Legislature should probably look to how their American counterparts treat the alibi defense. In contrast to Philippine rules, American jurisprudence has a much higher regard for this defense and provide proper procedural guidance for their prosecutors and their Courts both before and after a trial. Their requirement that an alibi defense must be raised at the earliest possible moment likewise confers credibility to the defense, as does the “relaxed” burden of proof requirement for proving an alibi which is more consistent with the idea that an alibi constitutes a complete, legitimate and effective defense.

---

[1] Rev. Rules on Evidence, Rule 133, sec. 2

[2] Modesto A. Ticman, Jr., Updates in Criminal Law, 4 (2016)

[3] People vs. Veloso, 690 SCRA 586 (2013); People vs. Banzuela, 712 SCRA 735 (2013);

[4] Rodolfo Pompeyo Cabrillas, Annotation, The Theory of Alibi, 54 SCRA 369 (1973).

[5] Melissa A. Bautista, Buying the Alibi: Challenging the Jurisprudential Doctrine that Alibi is the Weakest Defense, Unpublished Thesis, Ateneo de Manila Law School (2010)

[6] 1 Phil. 381 (1902)

[7] Ibid p. 383

[8] 1 Phil. 441 (1902), p. 442

[9] U.S. vs. Santiago, 1 Phil 545 (1902), p. 547

[10] People vs. Sumalinong, G.R. No. 128387, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 55 (2004)

[11] U.S. vs. De Jesus, 2 Phil. 514 (1902), p. 525

[12] 638 SCRA 104, G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010

[13] Ibid p. 248

[14] Ibid pp. 145-149

[15] Ibid p. 149

[16] Ibid p. 133

[17] Ibid p. 149-150

[18] Ibid p. 152

[19] Supra, Note 4.

[20] But see People vs. Sumalinong, Supra Note 10 p.63, where the Supreme Court stated that alibi is: “concededly the weakest defense.”

[21] People vs. Manigo, 714 SCRA 551; People vs. Las Piñas, 730 SCRA 571; People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014, 735 SCRA 687 (2014) ; People vs. Estonilo, G.R. No. 201565, October 13, 2014, 738 SCRA 204 (2014).

[22] Alicia Gonzales-Decano, Annotation, Denial and Alibi, 84 Phil Rep. Annot. 945, 951.

[23] Ibid p. 946

[24] People vs. Apa-ap, Jr. G.R. No. 110993, August 17, 1994, 235 SCRA 468 (1994); People vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, 302 SCRA 21

[25] U.S. vs. Oxiles 29 Phil. 587 (1915) 592 G.R. No. L-9999; February 23, 1915 , People vs. Cinco 67 Phil. 196 (1939) 199 G.R. No. L-46144; April 5, 1939, People vs. De Guzman 70 Phil. 23 (1940) 26 G.R. No. 47228; June 17, 1940,

[26] Supra Note 2 p. 5

[27] Supra Note 20 p.946

[28] 2000 Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 119, sec. 11

[29] Supra Note 4 p.370

[30] 21 Am Jur 2d § 220

[31] 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 951

[32] Supra Note 30

[33] Ibid

[34] 29 ALR 1127

[35] Ibid

[36] Ibid

[37] 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1065

[38] Ibid

[39] Supra Note 2 at 5

[40] Federal Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 12.1(a)

[41] 21 Am Jur 2d § 223

[42] Ibid.

[43] 21 Am Jur § 224

PEOPLE vs PARAGSA

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-44060; July 20, 1978

Topic:  Evidence; admissions and confessions; admission by silence; (Sec. 32, Rule 130)

FACTS:

Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 ½ year old girl, Mirasol Magallanes.  The information alleged that victim was alone in her house when the Benben entered, intimidated her with a hunting knife, forced her to lie in bed and there they had intercourse.  The deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on the door of victim’s house. Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that she had seen the accused exiting the house when she came knocking.  The victim did not reveal what happened to her until 6 days after the incident. 

Accused interposed the “Sweetheart defense”.  Defense claims in effect that there was no force or intimidation involved and that what Aunt Lita saw was not the aftermath of a rape, but was rather consensual sexual intercourse.  Accused also presented witnesses claiming that they were indeed sweethearts.

The CFI convicted Benben.  CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:

The main issue boils down to the question of who is more credible, the defense or the prosecution?  Thus, whether or not the evidence justifies a conviction.

HELD:

NO.  A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. The Supreme court noted the absence of intimidation considering that the act took place in the daytime, in her house where she is surrounded by her neighbors.  The victim could also have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and not 3 days after.

Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of the allegation that the victim and accused were sweethearts.  They did not bother to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications previously.  As to this silence, the Supreme Court explained:

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth … is applicable in criminal cases provided: 1) that he heard and understood the statement; 2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.

DECISION:  Acquittal.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: DIGEST AND COMMENTS

G.R. No. 213847; August 18, 2015

Ponente: Bersamin

Doctrines:

Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”

FACTS:

On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Senator Enrile

(Source: wikifilipinas.org)

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.

a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

HELD:

1. YES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the discretion of the court.

Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

2. YES.

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

-o0o-

LEONEN DISSENT

Justice Leonen

(Source: wikipedia.org)

Justice Leonen criticized the decision for having a very weak legal basis – the grant of bail over mere humanitarian grounds. He also claims that the court has no authority to use humanitarian grounds. Leonen argues that “[Petitioner's] release for medical or humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan,” nor were these grounds raised in the petition in the Supreme Court.

“Bail for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.”

Leonen theorized that the Supreme Court only granted bail as a special accomodation for the petitioner and he goes on to criticize the decision to wit:

[This decision] will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on their legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion.

x x x

Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have to decide, without guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded diseases. They will have to decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, … and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment...

Procedure for granting bail

Leonen's dissent also examines the procedure outlined for the lower courts in bail cases in order to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan did not err in denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail. In Cortes vs. Catral the Supreme Court held:

It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be besieged with a number of administrative cases filed against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them as well and be guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the Bench cannot justly be charge with a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.

Petitioner in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan grant his bail without any hearing for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong. At the Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution had no opportunity to present any evidence because of the prematurity of Petitioner's Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the dissent asserts that the Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the Motion based on prematurity.

Medical or humanitarian grounds inappropriate

Petitioner did not ask for bail to be granted based on humanitarian reasons at the Sandiganbayan. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution were able to develop their arguments as to this point to establish legal and factual basis for this kind of bail.

The dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the court to grant bail merely on the basis of the certification of the attending physician, Dr. Gonzales, stating that the Petitioner was suffering from numerous debilitating conditions. The dissent states that:

Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor's certification. In doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on petitioner's health in a hearing whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.

x x x

The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical procedures for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after petition for bail is filed by accused. The medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and heard.

asgasgf

Version of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the version deliberated upon

This section of the dissent reveals that the Justices voted to grant bail based on a substantially different version of the opinion, one which did not use humanitarian considerations as a ground for the granting of bail. The dissent explains that the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the issue of whether or not bail is a matter of right and reveals that the copy offered for signature was substantially similar to an earlier draft which used humanitarian considerations as the basis for the granting of bail. The dissent makes it clear that this was an irregularity.

The majority opinion offers no “guidance”

The dissent argues that the main opinion is unclear whether the privilege (humanitarian considerations, right to bail, etc.) will apply to those who have similar conditions. Whether or not this privilege will only apply to those undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not this privilege can be granted to those of advanced age only. “The majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.”

There is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if, when and how bail can then be canceled.

Reliance on HK vs Olalia misplaced

The reliance of the majority on the case of Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia is misplaced because this case referred to extradition cases, hence its increased emphasis on international law. As applied to crimes charged under Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding bail.

Furthermore, in the above case, the SC disposed of it by remanding the case back to the lower court for factual determination of whether or not the accused was a flight risk.

BLOGGER'S COMMENTS

The majority opinion and the dissent both make for a very interesting treatise on Criminal Procedure. These will likely be quoted again and again in bail hearings and in classrooms.

The majority opinion is very strained, it had to rely on “motherhood statements” regarding a person's right to liberty and right to bail. The decision used no compelling legal reasoning apart from our commitment to international laws.

Here comes Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, seeing himself as CJ Claudio Teehankee reborn, comes to the rescue claiming that the decision will:

will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on their legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion.

Factual Milieu is Important

We must note however the factual milieu. At the time Senators Enrile, Revilla and Estrada were charged with plunder, the public perception was that these Senators were the target of a campaign to eliminate the Administration's political enemies.

The perception of some circles critical of the current administration that these three senators, (the trio known colloquially as “Pogi”, “Tanda” and “Sexy”) were hastily charged and unfairly detained. The accusation that the administration was quick to charge its enemies while defending its allies is a valid one. No discussion of the grant of bail will overlook the highly politicized nature of the 3 Senator's incarceration.

That is not to say that this trio and particularly Enrile are innocent. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision drew a slew of criticism and a few defenders. Below are just a few links to articles criticizing or defending the decision.

Treachery at the Philippine Supreme Court

The Supreme Court Ruling on Enrile Shames the Philippines

It’s time to make a stand on Supreme Court’s Enrile ruling, says member of Cyber Plaza Miranda

Would you grant bail if it was not Enrile?

Nothing higher than liberty

In defense of Enrile bail

Ongoing discussion on pinoyexchange.com

Keep in mind that some of these articles were written before the decision actually came out.

Am I comfortable with the decision?

Justice Bersamin - Author of the main decision

(Source: wikipedia.org)

Yes. The decision re-emphasizes the right of people to bail from an ideological standpoint – politically well connected or otherwise – it serves to remind courts and prosecutors to establish probability of guilt for heinous crimes early on. For the innocent languishing in detention centers, this decision is a Godsend and can potentially speed up criminal justice.

Courts and prosecutors will have to take steps to adapt to this new environment. Needless to say, I argue that the requisites of 1. Flight risk and, 2. Strong evidence of guilt are fairly simple and reliable guidelines for the lower courts to follow. The dissent's warning of courts getting swamped with requests of accused to be released on bail and lack of guidance to lower courts is unwarranted fear-mongering.

I am uncomfortable with the dissenting opinion. While I think its arguments as to the finer points of procedure is warranted, it nevertheless casts the Supreme Court in a bad light and can serve to weaken it as an institution.