Showing posts with label Evidence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Evidence. Show all posts

Thursday, May 26, 2016

PEOPLE v. QUIDATO


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR., accused-appellant.



Topic:  Disqualifications as a witness; when it applies.



FACTS:

Accused Bernardo Quidato Jr was accused of parricide.  He and two co-conspirators allegedly attacked with a bolo and iron bars hack and stab the victim, Bernardo Quidato Sr., appellant’s father and namesake, which caused the victim’s untimely demise. 



Among those presented as witness were accused’s wife and brother.  Also presented were the extrajudicial confessions of appellant’s two other co-accused.  Appellant’s wife testified that while the accused were drinking tuba she overheard them saying that they were planning to go to the victim’s house on the night of the incident in order to “get money” and that she had no idea of what later transpired. Appellant objected to his wife’s testimony as it was prohibited by the rule on marital disqualification.  Appellant likewise denies the allegations of his co-accused who in their extrajudicial confession pointed to the participation of appellant.



ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions should be given credence as they were obtained in violation of the constitutional right of appellant to confront witnesses.



2. Whether or not the testimony of appellant’s wife is disqualified.



HELD:

1. NO. They should not be given credence, and indeed, appellant should be acquitted.  The prosecution relied heavily on appellant’s co-accused’s affidavits.  However, the failure to present the affiants in the witness stand gives these affidavits the character of hearsay.  It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. “The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.”



Section 30, Rule 130 is not applicable in this case because it refers to confessions made during the existence of the conspiracy.  In this case, the conspiracy had clearly ended by the time the confession was made.



2. YES.  The testimony of appellant’s wife must be disregarded.  As correctly observed by the court a quo, the disqualification is between husband and wife, the law not precluding the wife from testifying when it involves other parties or accused, but not where the testimony will be used against the accused-husband directly or indirectly.



DECISION: 

Given the inadmissibility of accused’s wife’s testimony and the extrajudicial confession of co-accused, the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED.

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

PEOPLE vs. ACUÑA


ACUÑA, JESUS RAMOS and ANTONIO (TONY) DIONISIO, defendants.



Topic:  Qualification of adult witnesses.



FACTS: 

Defendants were charged with murder.  The complaint stated that they conspired together and assaulted the victim, Tranquilino Mariano, and while two of the accused were holding him, one was hitting him by a 2x2 piece of wood.  Then they stabbed him to death.  There were a number of witnesses who saw the beating and another who saw the accused dragging a dead body.



The RTC convicted the accused and hence this appeal.  The main issue in this appeal is the credibility of the witnesses.  Accused claim that they should have noticed the witnesses if they claim to have been there when the crime was happening, the fact that accused “did not notice the witnesses’ presence” makes their testimony incredible. The witnesses were also first cousins of the victims and they failed to report the incident immediately.



ISSUE:

Whether or not the witnesses’ testimony is incredible.



HELD:

NO.  First, where the issue is the credibility of the witness, the Supreme Court, as a general rule will not disturb the findings of the lower courts as regards to their findings of the witnesses’ credibility. 



As to the fact that accused “did not notice” the presence of the witnesses, it was correctly pointed out by the prosecution that the accused were probably too engrossed with their assault to have noticed the witnesses.  Besides, the area where the incident occurred was partly concealed by gumamela plants hence it was possible for the witnesses to see the incident without being seen.



It is also true that the witnesses were first cousins but “there is nothing in our laws that disqualifies relatives of a victim from testifying in a criminal case … so long as said relatives who were actually present at the scene of the crime, witnessed its execution.”  Furthermore, there was no showing of ill-motive.



The fact that they failed to report the incident immediately is also understandable. The accused were locally known troublemakers who would intimidate people once they fell under the influence of liquor.  The court also takes judicial notice that the witnesses were town mates and must have feared reprisals.  Such reticence has been declared as not affecting credibility.



The witness who saw the accused dragging the cadaver, likewise reported the incident 6 months after the incident.  The court held that this does not affect the credibility of the as it relates to a matter that occurred after the crime was committed and merely corroborates the testimony of two other credible witnesses (the cousins) who actually witnessed the incident.



DECISION: Guilty.

Monday, February 15, 2016

PEOPLE vs PARAGSA

 
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant.



G.R. No. L-44060; July 20, 1978

Topic:  Evidence; admissions and confessions; admission by silence; (Sec. 32, Rule 130)

FACTS:

Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 ½ year old girl, Mirasol Magallanes.  The information alleged that victim was alone in her house when the Benben entered, intimidated her with a hunting knife, forced her to lie in bed and there they had intercourse.  The deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on the door of victim’s house. Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that she had seen the accused exiting the house when she came knocking.  The victim did not reveal what happened to her until 6 days after the incident. 



Accused interposed the “Sweetheart defense”.  Defense claims in effect that there was no force or intimidation involved and that what Aunt Lita saw was not the aftermath of a rape, but was rather consensual sexual intercourse.  Accused also presented witnesses claiming that they were indeed sweethearts.



The CFI convicted Benben.  CA affirmed the conviction.



ISSUE:

The main issue boils down to the question of who is more credible, the defense or the prosecution?  Thus, whether or not the evidence justifies a conviction.



HELD:

NO.  A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. The Supreme court noted the absence of intimidation considering that the act took place in the daytime, in her house where she is surrounded by her neighbors.  The victim could also have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and not 3 days after.



Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of the allegation that the victim and accused were sweethearts.  They did not bother to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications previously.  As to this silence, the Supreme Court explained:



The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth … is applicable in criminal cases provided: 1) that he heard and understood the statement; 2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.



DECISION:  Acquittal.