BUNAGAN-BANSIG vs CELERA

A.C. No. 5581, January 14, 2014; PER CURIAM; EN BANC

FACTS:

This is a petition for disbarment by complainant Bunagan-Bansig against Respondent Atty. Celera for Gross Immoral Conduct.

Respondent was married to complainant's sister, Gracemarie R. Bunagan (Bunagan), as evidenced by a photocopy of the contract of marriage dated May 8, 1997. Notwithstanding this, Respondent contracted marriage to one Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba).

ISSUE:

Whether or not gross immoral conduct of Respondent has been sufficiently proved

HELD:

YES. In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered into a second marriage while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second marriage with Alba.

Respondent was meted with the penalty of Disbarment.

ARNAULT vs. BALAGTAS

Citation: G.R. No. L-6749; 97 Phil. 358; July 30, 1955

Ponente: Labrador

Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a person in contempt as a punitive measure.

FACTS:

This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry.

Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution states:

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.

x x x

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the information which he had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;

WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;

x x x

The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and ordered his release.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-imposed incarceration.

1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the Senate.

2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive measure.

HELD:

YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated.

1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.

There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process. The Judicial department has no right or power or authority to do this, in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.

2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive measure.

Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority.

The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? The legislative department should not be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.

The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations.

The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.

FRANCISCO LIM vs EQUITABLE PCI BANK

G.R. No. 183918; January 15, 2014; Del Castillo; Second Division

DOCTRINE:

Marriage; Property Relations; Conjugal Property – All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.  [T]his presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to mortgage his share in a property in order to secure a loan. This first loan extended by BDO in 1989 was fully paid by Franco in 1992. However in 1996, Franco and their mother obtained another loan over the same property which they failed to pay.

Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan. Petitioner thus tried to get a TRO and for the foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the SPA executed in favor of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.

the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.

The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner’s mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized document.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Petitioner was able to prove that the SPA was forged.

2. Whether or not Respondent Bank was failed to exercise due diligence when granting the loan without the signature of Petitioner's wife in the mortgage contract.

HELD:

1. NO. Petitioner was not able to prove that his signature was forged. No evidence was ever presented to prove the allegation: the alleged forged signature was never compared with the genuine signatures of petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted.

2. NO. Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was never raised as an issue. Hence, the absence of his wife’s signature on the mortgage contract also has no bearing in this case.

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.  However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption.

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by [one spouse]. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

ANALYSIS OF THE IGLESIA NI CRISTO DEMONSTRATION

RELIGIOUS, PHILSOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL BASIS? RESULT?

(Note: First posted September 4.  4 days after the end of the demonstration. Edited September 5, 2015)

This essay is anti-Iglesia ni Cristo, to INC readers, you have my permission to hate.  It doesn’t matter.  At the end of the day, reflect on what I had to say.  Much of what I wrote is based on my observations and through careful study of the law so you may have chance to cleanse your image before your countrymen.

(source: Catholic defender blog)

It is an understatement to say that when the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) massed in front of the Department of Justice building in Padre Faura on August 27 in order to demonstrate against what they thought was religious persecution, we were all caught off guard.  Then by the afternoon of August 28, we see that they have moved their rally to the busy thoroughfare of EDSA.  This truly had analysts, the press and politicians stumped.  

The backlash from social media was tremendous.  The sect was vilified by most netizens who had suffered the inconvenience of the long-weekend “Carmaggedon”.

This begs so many questions.  What were the INC trying to achieve?

When does religion end and politics begin?  It seems that the homegrown sect Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) does not know the boundaries either.

Merits of the argument for the separation of Church and State are easily dispensed with

I've been monitoring developments regarding this INC protest rally and so far none of the arguments they have posted on social media or what they have been chanting on the streets are compelling or on point. The Church leadership is very weak intellectually and rely only on the "Unity" it has demanded from its members.

From the very first argument, on the Separation of Church and State, it is clear that the DOJ investigation that triggered the protest never affected the member's religious freedom. It is completely not on point.

The claim that government should focus on Mamasapano, DAP, Yolanda, etc. only serve to muddle the issue and to garner sympathy as well as discredit the government. To be fair to Secretary Leila de Lima and to Samson, his act of going straight to the head of the DOJ is justified. The INC is a very influential sect, at the grassroots, they possess thugs and goons ready to intimidate lowly prosecutors--its very hard to get a criminal case filed if it involves the an INC member, all the more if the suspect is the Sanggunian itself. I have seen this happen personally and I'm sure that many have experienced their mafia-like way of doing things, so going to the Prosecutor's Office simply isn't enough. The Philippine Daily Inquirer editorial staff seems to agree:

But it needs to be said; precisely because the church is an influential institution, the Samson family was justified in filing the case with De Lima’s office herself, not with a local prosecutor. There is nothing unusual about this arrangement; it happens all the time. Indeed, the INC has been known to go straight to the DOJ on certain occasions, rather than to, say, the prosecutors’ office in Quezon City where its headquarters is located. No abuse of discretion; no unusual attention. It was as it should be.

Comparison to the Black Nazarene and the Papal Visit aren't on point either. These events are proper exercises of religious freedom, and in the case of the Papal visit, it may also be treated as the visit from the head of a foreign government. From a planning and execution standpoint, permits and detours had been planned well in advance giving commuters a chance to find alternate routes and be appraised of the situation.

The INC have only succeeded where they have not on the strength of their beliefs, but on the strength of their 2 million voters, the wealth of their church which could sustain moving thousands from the provinces (money which could have been better used in missionary and charitable activity) and the general low intelligence and blind allegiance of its members.

Columnist Bobi Tiglao opined that the reason why the DOJ is investigating the members of INC’s Sanggunian is because the INC has refused to support Mar. Roxas’ bid for Presidency. If this is the case then, this whole demonstration was mere Political Zarzuela.  Was freedom of religion merely invoked as an afterthought?  An attempt to pull the heartstrings of the emotional and religious Filipino?  It seems that the majority has seen through the artifice.  

The political bandwagon

A number of big name politicos have decided to place their bets on this crisis, namely;

VP Jejomar Binay - “[A] clear act of harassment and interference from the administration . . . Religious freedom is guaranteed by our Constitution. Yet the administration chose to trample on this sacred right. What we are seeing are people fighting for their faith.”

It seems that our dear Vice President and lord of Makati has been reading conspiracy theories.  Be that as it may, prosecution for crimes does not equal persecution of religion.

Sen. Grace Poe - “Huwag nating mamaliitin ang importansya ng relihiyon . . . Para sa akin, ang mga tao na yan, ang dinedepensahan nila ay ang kanilang paniniwala. Nirerespeto natin 'yan at kailangan ay pangalagaan din ang kanilang mga karapatan”

To be fair to Grace Poe and to Jejomar, they do have a point.  Everyone has a right to free speech.  Most important of this is political free speech.  As held in Reyes vs. Bagatsing:

Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

It seems that what riled people up is the seeming favoritism that was given to the INC.  The feeling that the government was not working for the common good and that the ordinary “mamamayan” was left out again.  In this case, it seems that these statements made by Sen. Grace Poe and Jejomar, while legally correct, came out as callous and insincere.

It also comes out as ironic that we must defend the right of the INC to free speech and demonstration when the INC itself does not grant the same right to its members.

Sen. Bongbong Marcos - “For justice to triumph, the DOJ must not only be impartial in its procedure and ruling; like Caesar's wife, it must also be seen as being fair to all . . . The DOJ's handling of the case leaves much to be desired. Instead of allowing the legal process to take its course, DOJ secretary Leila de Lima immediately held a press con to discuss the merits of the case. This created the impression, rightly or wrongly, of undue interest in the case.”

I expected more from you Senator Bongbong to be honest.  Though I admit that you have a point.  This war of the Zombies (see below) was a war to win the hearts and minds of the Filipinos.  It seems however that where you and the INC saw de Lima taking undue interest in the case, the majority became indignant at the self-righteous, hypocritical and iskwater act of the INC in holding the demonstration.

Secretary Mar Roxas - “While all citizens have the right to be heard and to peaceful assembly, the exercise of these rights cannot impinge on the rights of others or cause inconvenience to anyone.”

His message however was diluted by his instruction to the police to exercise maximum tolerance.

All in all, these politicians have made valid arguments.  The problem however is that the anger of the majority was running at an all-time high such that those caught defending the INC received criticism.  To be fair, the standard operating procedure of the government, when it comes to rallies from religious groups is to treat the group with kids gloves.  The practice is indeed different for militant groups who will be sprayed with water the moment they get too rowdy.  I suppose that it has to do with the high regard Filipinos traditionally place on religion.

War of the Zombies

Here, two zombie groups clashed.  On one side were the Manalo Cult Zombies: urban and provincial poor were told by their leaders to troop over to EDSA in order to defend their religion.  These people may be likened to zombies because of their seemingly blind allegiance and obedience to their leaders, many of whom, when interviewed, could not explain the reason for their demonstration.

Aftermath

The INC dispersed on August 31, Monday.  They claimed victory and their spokesperson claimed that they had come to an agreement and understanding with the government.  

The lack of details regarding this agreement has troubled the citizens, with President Noynoy Aquino once again being accused of secret negotiations.  The Palace has denied the existence of any agreement.

The victory claimed by the INC is a hollow one.  Its ability to actually deliver the bloc vote has been questioned.  Its ability to muster its members to a cause is doubted.  Reports stated that members of the INC who were against the rally have received physical threats and/or were threatened with expulsion.  It is quite possible that their flock has been diminished after this ill-advised demonstration.

The below quotation possibly sums up our impression of the demonstration:

Samson’s counsel, Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles, said the rally reeks of “irrationality and non-responsiveness” since it happened at the heels of the former minister’s decision to file a case against Santos and the rest of the Sanggunian, a council of ranking church officials, for illegal detention.

“Instead of answering the allegations at preliminary investigation, they immediately call out the Department of Justice officials as being biased, based solely on their perception that the mere docketing of the case at the main office is already proof of said ‘selective justice.’ And instead of seeking recourse with the courts, they resort to what they think will be the equivalent of public pressure,”

The political ramifications are also immense.  VP Binay and Sen. Grace Poe were both widely panned for their defense of the sect.  The government of Noynoy Aquino was once again perceived as “inutil” for want of speedy resolution of the crisis.  A movement of “reverse block voting” also seems to be brewing whereby politicians endorsed or who have sought endorsement from the INC will be boycotted.  Will this further dilute the INC’s political power?

The lesson here people is to exercise your right to suffrage properly.  And one thing's for sure, the practice of block voting must be stopped.

TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

Citation: 151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; June 18, 1987

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.

DOCTRINES:

Validity of law; title of bill – The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

Taxation; security against oppressive taxation – The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

Taxation as a revenue and regulatory measure – The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. . . . The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

Undue delegation of legislative power – The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

FACTS:

Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board".

P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and a 30% tax on the gross receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local government (Sec. 10). The rationale for this decree is set forth in its preambulatory/whereas clauses to wit:

1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes ... have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of [taxes] thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues;

2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;

3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry, ...;

5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry ..., but also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;

6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth [READ: PORN], and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;

8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people [AGAIN, READ: PORN] and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch; (emphasis supplied and certain passages omitted)

ISSUES:

The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject matter of the law.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and

HELD:

1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the law, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an activity. At the same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which the government may validly tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8, quoted in part above.

The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the law to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board (Board) has authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is an undue delegation of legislative power.

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the Board."

The petition was DISMISSED.

CONTROVERSY! CONSPIRACY!?: DID JUSTICE LEONEN LIE?

Did Associate Justice Marvic Leonen commit an act of intellectual dishonesty when he wrote his dissent in the recently promulgated decision in Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan?  Did Justice Bersamin have a point with his accusation?

Justice Leonen

(Source: Supreme Court of the Philippines)

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan is the title of the decision wherein the Supreme Court ordered the Sandiganbayan to release Juan Ponce Enrile, a detainee over a plunder charge, on bail.  In that decision the Supreme Court, through the Ponente, Justice Bersamin argued that Enrile is entitled to bail because: (1) Enrile is not a flight risk and; (2) Humanitarian considerations.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile out on bail

(source: Philippine Daily Inquirer)

As a personal opinion, I find Leonen’s dissent superior to the majority decision when it discussed the procedural grounds that would in effect cause the remand to the Sandiganbayan of Enrile’s motion for further findings of fact (read more about that here). But the dissent is, at the same time, very troubling.  Justice Leonen described the deliberations behind that decision:

When this case was called again for deliberation during the En Banc session on August 11, 2015, the member in charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of dropping all discussion on the legal points pertaining to whether bail was a matter of right and focusing the grant of bail on “humanitarian” grounds. The member in charge committed to circulate a draft for the consideration of all justices.  This member expressed that he was open to listen to all arguments.

The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the basis of the medical condition of petitioner was circulated on August 14, 2015.  After considered reflection, this member responded with a letter …

x x x

The points in my letter were raised during the deliberation of August 18, 2015.  The member in charge, however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written reflection on the points raised.  Insisting on a vote, he thus declared that he was abandoning the August 14, 2015 circulated draft centering on release on bail on humanitarian ground for his earlier version premised on the idea that bail was a matter of right based on judicial notice and the judicial declaration of the existence of two mitigating circumstances.

This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of AUgust 18, 2015. …

x x x

[Later that day] or at about 3:00 p.m., the ponente passed around a final copy of the majority opinion which was not the version voted upon during the morning’s deliberation.  Rather, the copy offered for signature was substantially the August 14, 2015 circulated version granting bail on humanitarian grounds.

x x x

Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been available to all members of the court at the time that the case was voted upon.  But because the final version for signing was not the version voted upon, … (underscoring supplied)

According to the Ponente Justice Bersamin, this is a “Gross Distortion” and an “unprecedented invasion of the autonomy” of the majority.  I agree with Bersamin.

Justice Lucas Bersamin

(Source: Wikipedia.org)

In an interview, Bersamin said:

Leonen, ..., violated the confidentiality rule on court sessions, as stated in Section 2, Rule 10, of the Supreme Court’s internal rules, when he disclosed in his dissent how the decision was reached.

Section 2 states: “Court sessions are executive in character, with only the members of the court present. Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized by the court.”

Bersamin said he felt compelled to issue his rejoinder, in self-defense, “because the comments of Justice Leonen, if left without rectification, might be held to be the truth.”

“Obviously, such comments were not the truth, but were the result of a self-righteous mindset,” he added.

“I could have tolerated the unfairness, except that the comments were published and soon unavoidably became fodder for people of closed minds and clear biases to criticize my intelligence, regionalism, loyalty and what else. In this age of the Internet, I simply cannot be tolerant but must respond,” Bersamin said. (Source: Philippine Daily Inquirer)

Even more damning, as this Philippine Star article seems to indicate is that it was Leonen who actually suggested humanitarian considerations as a basis.

He also recalled Leonen even approached him during the Baguio summer session “to suggest to limit the justification for granting bail to humanitarian grounds.”

“He should have a clear recollection of this. Hoping that the Court could be unanimous, I said then that I would give his suggestion a serious consideration,” Bersamin said.      

The takeaway is that Leonen, far from the paragon of justice and being CJ Claudio Teehankee “Reborn” acted on his political bias, politicized the deliberations on this case.  We know that Leonen has always been a diehard yellow, and like other diehard yellows, they seem to suffer some sort of “topak” that makes them think that they are are in the right no matter what they do.  To repeat Justice Bersamin: “Obviously, such comments were not the truth, but were the result of a self-righteous mindset.”

What is more troubling is the allegation that Leonen committed “Gross Distortions” in his dissent.  The layman’s term for “Gross Distortion” is lying. Nagsisinungaling siya.  All this in order to have his way.

What is Leonen’s motive? Was he acting on instructions from his Yellow boss? Was it intellectual pride?  We may never know.

No Stranger to butting heads with the SC

Justice Leonen is no stranger to butting heads with the high court.  In 2010 when he was still Dean of the University of the Philippines - College of Law, he led the faculty in a statement calling for the resignation of Justice Mariano del Castillo for [alleged] plagiarism in the comfort women case Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary.  In an administrative matter, Leonen was directed to show cause why he should not be disciplined for violation of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to wit:

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

 

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

So my dear Justice Leonen, you may have been quite the “hipster prof” back in your teaching days, but those days are over - this isn’t UP. You are a Justice of the Supreme Court now!  - It is in our country’s interest that you maintain integrity in it as an institution! - So start acting like you’re part of the team.