JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and ERASMO

G.R. No. 191970; April 24, 2012

Ponente:  Abad

Doctrine: Proof required to establish domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen running for governor of a province

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City.  He migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship.  In 2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his Australian citizenship. 

Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration.  COMELEC approved the application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list.  This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC.

Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections.  Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply with the one year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).

COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.  Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

HELD:

NO.  The COMELEC is incorrect.  Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay.

The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least one year before the elections.  For the purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile:  i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place, but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention.  To determine compliance with the residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:

   (a)               every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;

(b)               where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and

(c)               a person can have but one domicile at a time.

The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city.  When he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.  On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines.  By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother's house.  A candidate is not required to have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that place.  It is enough that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.  To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.  What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified that he was physically present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with political leaders and local and national party mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of the RTC.  The court also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay.  This, without a doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

DISPOSITIVE

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and MONTEJO

G.R. No. 119976; September 18, 1995

Ponente:  Kapunan

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district of Leyte in order that she will be able to run for Congress of that district in the 1995 elections.  Her COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven months.  Private Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one year residency requirement as provided for in the Constitution.  In response, Marcos amended her COC changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood".  Marcos claimed that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." She further claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground that her original entry of "seven months" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake". 

The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos.  It held that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila, because that where she chose to live after she went back to the Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US.  It explained that while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she became a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of Manila and eventually became Governor of Manila.  This, according to the COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".

ISSUE:

1.  Whether or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.

2.  Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her husband in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan.

HELD: 

1.  YES.

The Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile.  The decision of the COMELEC however, shows that they confused the concept of "Domicile" with "actual residence".

                Domicile versus Residence

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence."  In a past case, the Court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."  Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements of:

1.  The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and

2.  Animus manendi - the intention of returning permanently

               

Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place.  It is mere physical presence.  Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.  If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.  Domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.

A person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a single domicile. Note however, that a person may abandon a domicile in favor of another.

                Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban

Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte.  The fact that she has a residence in Manila does not mean that she has lost her domicile in that province.  The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.  Applying this doctrine to the case of petitioner, the fact that she has registered to vote and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan do not unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile in Tacloban.  Even while residing in various places, petitioner kept close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

2.  NO

                The domicile of origin

Note further that when petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed that of her parents.  Hence, her domicile of origin was Tacloban.  Once acquired, domicile is retained until a new one is gained.  The domicile of origin is not easily lost.  To effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1.  An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2.  A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3.  Acts which correspond with the purpose.

                               

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. 

                Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin

Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile or residence does not suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband upon marriage.  This article clearly refers to actual residence and not domicile and merely establishes the default rule in fulfilling the obligation of the spouses "to live together" in article immediately preceding Art. 110.

When Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. Mr. Marcos had several places of residence at the time:  San Juan and Ilocos Norte.  Assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence.  She did not lose her domicile of origin.

This rule has changed with the advent of the Family code with the introduction of the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile".  This underscores the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.

Even assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her acts unequivocally show an intent to reestablish a domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as early as in 1992, already obtained her residence certificate in Tacloban.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SOME SOUND ADVICE FOR YOUR CHOICE OF VICE PRESIDENT

The campaign is in full swing and we’ve recently just concluded the CNN Vice Presidential Debates.  And what a debate it was!  It was certainly a more provocative and intellectual discourse than the Presidential debates, and with a fair amount of politicking, considering that most of the candidates are members of the Legislature.

Vice Presidential Debates Part 2 (Audio Only)

This is also a very good time to be giving some advice when you make your choice of Vice President on the ballot.  My advice is simple:  Vote for the one whom you would most like to see sitting as President.

The reason for this is that the Vice President is considered as the “substitute President” or the “President-in-waiting”, a “spare tire”, so to speak.  The 1987 Constitution does not give the Vice President any role in government, instead it provides in Article VII:

Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.

 

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.

 

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.

 

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.

 

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.

Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

Please dwell on the phrase “...the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term”.  This phrasing means that the Vice President literally becomes the President in case of the President's death, permanent disability, removal from office, resignation or disqualification.  The Vice President becomes a President.  Additional support for this is that the Vice President shares the same age, citizenship and literacy requirements as the President.

Why is this important?

Two of our recent Vice Presidents have acted as “shields” for the President, helping to insure that they stay in office.  Noli de Castro during President Arroyo’s term and the incumbent Vice President Jejomar Binay in this present Aquino administration.  Both of the Presidents they served under have faced impeachment complaints and been asked to resign, but the intelligentsia in both cases have not supported such moves because the would-be successor was not seen as an acceptable alternative: Noli de Castro was considered weak; and Jejomar Binay is considered corrupt.  The sitting President was considered the lesser evil.  Indeed, this very situation seems so absurd, it shows great disrespect our system of Presidential succession and a failure to understand the duties of the Vice President.

Let me be clear, I do not want to see this situation happening in the next administration.  Indeed, the next administration may very well see a Vice President succeed to the Presidency.  Let us go over the candidates:

Duterte – He pledged that he will end criminality in 6 months, after which, will resign. 

Defensor-Santiago – Sick with cancer and with one foot in the grave, bless her soul.

Llamanzares – Contrary to appearances, the decision in Poe vs. COMELEC leaves a disqualification case open at the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.  She may win the elections, but she may still be disqualified.

Binay – The plunder cases filed against him may also disqualify him even if he were to win the elections.

Roxas – He is so far down in the polls that in the unlikely event he will win, it will be because of cheating and he may just get disqualified.

The Candidates

(Source: globalbalita.com)

The possibility of a Vice President succeeding to the Presidency is very real.  Vote for the one whom you would most like to see sitting as President.

ARNAULT vs. BALAGTAS

Citation: G.R. No. L-6749; 97 Phil. 358; July 30, 1955

Ponente: Labrador

Topic: Legislative investigation; may Senate hold a person in contempt as a punitive measure.

FACTS:

This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with whom he transacted business in relation to a government purchase of of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply with an order in a legislative inquiry.

Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate, obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114. The title of the resolution states:

RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L. ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.

x x x

WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L. Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the information which he had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;

WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate to conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;

x x x

The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Petitioner Arnault and ordered his release.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-imposed incarceration.

1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the Senate.

2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive rather than as a coercive measure.

HELD:

YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated.

1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the findings of the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner “has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the Senate believes that Arnault was still trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated unto itself to review such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the questions of the Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.

There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process. The Judicial department has no right or power or authority to do this, in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.

2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a punitive measure.

Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority.

The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? The legislative department should not be constrained to look to the courts whenever for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy with which it is faced.

The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial interference, except when there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations.

The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the petitioner-appellee.

ANALYSIS OF THE IGLESIA NI CRISTO DEMONSTRATION

RELIGIOUS, PHILSOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL BASIS? RESULT?

(Note: First posted September 4.  4 days after the end of the demonstration. Edited September 5, 2015)

This essay is anti-Iglesia ni Cristo, to INC readers, you have my permission to hate.  It doesn’t matter.  At the end of the day, reflect on what I had to say.  Much of what I wrote is based on my observations and through careful study of the law so you may have chance to cleanse your image before your countrymen.

(source: Catholic defender blog)

It is an understatement to say that when the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) massed in front of the Department of Justice building in Padre Faura on August 27 in order to demonstrate against what they thought was religious persecution, we were all caught off guard.  Then by the afternoon of August 28, we see that they have moved their rally to the busy thoroughfare of EDSA.  This truly had analysts, the press and politicians stumped.  

The backlash from social media was tremendous.  The sect was vilified by most netizens who had suffered the inconvenience of the long-weekend “Carmaggedon”.

This begs so many questions.  What were the INC trying to achieve?

When does religion end and politics begin?  It seems that the homegrown sect Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) does not know the boundaries either.

Merits of the argument for the separation of Church and State are easily dispensed with

I've been monitoring developments regarding this INC protest rally and so far none of the arguments they have posted on social media or what they have been chanting on the streets are compelling or on point. The Church leadership is very weak intellectually and rely only on the "Unity" it has demanded from its members.

From the very first argument, on the Separation of Church and State, it is clear that the DOJ investigation that triggered the protest never affected the member's religious freedom. It is completely not on point.

The claim that government should focus on Mamasapano, DAP, Yolanda, etc. only serve to muddle the issue and to garner sympathy as well as discredit the government. To be fair to Secretary Leila de Lima and to Samson, his act of going straight to the head of the DOJ is justified. The INC is a very influential sect, at the grassroots, they possess thugs and goons ready to intimidate lowly prosecutors--its very hard to get a criminal case filed if it involves the an INC member, all the more if the suspect is the Sanggunian itself. I have seen this happen personally and I'm sure that many have experienced their mafia-like way of doing things, so going to the Prosecutor's Office simply isn't enough. The Philippine Daily Inquirer editorial staff seems to agree:

But it needs to be said; precisely because the church is an influential institution, the Samson family was justified in filing the case with De Lima’s office herself, not with a local prosecutor. There is nothing unusual about this arrangement; it happens all the time. Indeed, the INC has been known to go straight to the DOJ on certain occasions, rather than to, say, the prosecutors’ office in Quezon City where its headquarters is located. No abuse of discretion; no unusual attention. It was as it should be.

Comparison to the Black Nazarene and the Papal Visit aren't on point either. These events are proper exercises of religious freedom, and in the case of the Papal visit, it may also be treated as the visit from the head of a foreign government. From a planning and execution standpoint, permits and detours had been planned well in advance giving commuters a chance to find alternate routes and be appraised of the situation.

The INC have only succeeded where they have not on the strength of their beliefs, but on the strength of their 2 million voters, the wealth of their church which could sustain moving thousands from the provinces (money which could have been better used in missionary and charitable activity) and the general low intelligence and blind allegiance of its members.

Columnist Bobi Tiglao opined that the reason why the DOJ is investigating the members of INC’s Sanggunian is because the INC has refused to support Mar. Roxas’ bid for Presidency. If this is the case then, this whole demonstration was mere Political Zarzuela.  Was freedom of religion merely invoked as an afterthought?  An attempt to pull the heartstrings of the emotional and religious Filipino?  It seems that the majority has seen through the artifice.  

The political bandwagon

A number of big name politicos have decided to place their bets on this crisis, namely;

VP Jejomar Binay - “[A] clear act of harassment and interference from the administration . . . Religious freedom is guaranteed by our Constitution. Yet the administration chose to trample on this sacred right. What we are seeing are people fighting for their faith.”

It seems that our dear Vice President and lord of Makati has been reading conspiracy theories.  Be that as it may, prosecution for crimes does not equal persecution of religion.

Sen. Grace Poe - “Huwag nating mamaliitin ang importansya ng relihiyon . . . Para sa akin, ang mga tao na yan, ang dinedepensahan nila ay ang kanilang paniniwala. Nirerespeto natin 'yan at kailangan ay pangalagaan din ang kanilang mga karapatan”

To be fair to Grace Poe and to Jejomar, they do have a point.  Everyone has a right to free speech.  Most important of this is political free speech.  As held in Reyes vs. Bagatsing:

Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.

It seems that what riled people up is the seeming favoritism that was given to the INC.  The feeling that the government was not working for the common good and that the ordinary “mamamayan” was left out again.  In this case, it seems that these statements made by Sen. Grace Poe and Jejomar, while legally correct, came out as callous and insincere.

It also comes out as ironic that we must defend the right of the INC to free speech and demonstration when the INC itself does not grant the same right to its members.

Sen. Bongbong Marcos - “For justice to triumph, the DOJ must not only be impartial in its procedure and ruling; like Caesar's wife, it must also be seen as being fair to all . . . The DOJ's handling of the case leaves much to be desired. Instead of allowing the legal process to take its course, DOJ secretary Leila de Lima immediately held a press con to discuss the merits of the case. This created the impression, rightly or wrongly, of undue interest in the case.”

I expected more from you Senator Bongbong to be honest.  Though I admit that you have a point.  This war of the Zombies (see below) was a war to win the hearts and minds of the Filipinos.  It seems however that where you and the INC saw de Lima taking undue interest in the case, the majority became indignant at the self-righteous, hypocritical and iskwater act of the INC in holding the demonstration.

Secretary Mar Roxas - “While all citizens have the right to be heard and to peaceful assembly, the exercise of these rights cannot impinge on the rights of others or cause inconvenience to anyone.”

His message however was diluted by his instruction to the police to exercise maximum tolerance.

All in all, these politicians have made valid arguments.  The problem however is that the anger of the majority was running at an all-time high such that those caught defending the INC received criticism.  To be fair, the standard operating procedure of the government, when it comes to rallies from religious groups is to treat the group with kids gloves.  The practice is indeed different for militant groups who will be sprayed with water the moment they get too rowdy.  I suppose that it has to do with the high regard Filipinos traditionally place on religion.

War of the Zombies

Here, two zombie groups clashed.  On one side were the Manalo Cult Zombies: urban and provincial poor were told by their leaders to troop over to EDSA in order to defend their religion.  These people may be likened to zombies because of their seemingly blind allegiance and obedience to their leaders, many of whom, when interviewed, could not explain the reason for their demonstration.

Aftermath

The INC dispersed on August 31, Monday.  They claimed victory and their spokesperson claimed that they had come to an agreement and understanding with the government.  

The lack of details regarding this agreement has troubled the citizens, with President Noynoy Aquino once again being accused of secret negotiations.  The Palace has denied the existence of any agreement.

The victory claimed by the INC is a hollow one.  Its ability to actually deliver the bloc vote has been questioned.  Its ability to muster its members to a cause is doubted.  Reports stated that members of the INC who were against the rally have received physical threats and/or were threatened with expulsion.  It is quite possible that their flock has been diminished after this ill-advised demonstration.

The below quotation possibly sums up our impression of the demonstration:

Samson’s counsel, Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles, said the rally reeks of “irrationality and non-responsiveness” since it happened at the heels of the former minister’s decision to file a case against Santos and the rest of the Sanggunian, a council of ranking church officials, for illegal detention.

“Instead of answering the allegations at preliminary investigation, they immediately call out the Department of Justice officials as being biased, based solely on their perception that the mere docketing of the case at the main office is already proof of said ‘selective justice.’ And instead of seeking recourse with the courts, they resort to what they think will be the equivalent of public pressure,”

The political ramifications are also immense.  VP Binay and Sen. Grace Poe were both widely panned for their defense of the sect.  The government of Noynoy Aquino was once again perceived as “inutil” for want of speedy resolution of the crisis.  A movement of “reverse block voting” also seems to be brewing whereby politicians endorsed or who have sought endorsement from the INC will be boycotted.  Will this further dilute the INC’s political power?

The lesson here people is to exercise your right to suffrage properly.  And one thing's for sure, the practice of block voting must be stopped.

TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

Citation: 151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; June 18, 1987

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.

DOCTRINES:

Validity of law; title of bill – The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

Taxation; security against oppressive taxation – The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the authority which exercises it. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation.

Taxation as a revenue and regulatory measure – The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. . . . The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

Undue delegation of legislative power – The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.

FACTS:

Valentin Tio is a videogram establishment operator adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board".

P.D. No. 1987 provides for the levy of a tax over each cassette sold (Sec. 134) and a 30% tax on the gross receipts of a videogram establishment, payable to the local government (Sec. 10). The rationale for this decree is set forth in its preambulatory/whereas clauses to wit:

1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes ... have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of [taxes] thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues;

2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year;

3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry, ...;

5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry ..., but also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms;

6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth [READ: PORN], and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being;

8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the people [AGAIN, READ: PORN] and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency measures must be adopted with dispatch; (emphasis supplied and certain passages omitted)

ISSUES:

The petioner, among others, raised the following issues:

1. Whether or not the imposition of the 30% tax is a rider and the same is not germane to the subject matter of the law.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of power and authority; and

HELD:

1. No, the tax is not a rider and is germane to the purpose and subject of the law.

The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.

Reading section 10 of P.D. No. 1987 closely, one can see that the foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the law, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

Aside from revenue collection, tax laws may also be enacted for the purpose of regulating an activity. At the same time, the videogram industry is also an untapped source of revenue which the government may validly tax. All of this is evident from preambulatory clauses nos. 2, 5, 6 and 8, quoted in part above.

The levy of the 30% tax is also for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the law to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

2. No. There was no undue delegation of law making authority.

Petitioner was concerned that Section 11 of P.D. No. 1987 stating that the videogram board (Board) has authority to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is an undue delegation of legislative power.

This is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the Board to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the Board."

The petition was DISMISSED.