G.R.
No. 213847; August 18, 2015
Ponente:
Bersamin
Doctrines:
Primary
objective of bail –
The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that
the accused appears at trial.
Bail
is a right and a matter of discretion
– Right
to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to
wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.”
FACTS:
On
June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder
in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile
in an Omnibus
Motion
requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3,
2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to
Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Senator Enrile
Petitioner
again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion
to Fix Bail
which was heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a)
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt
was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion
temporal,
thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his
age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUES:
1)
Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the
crime charged is punishable by reclusion
perpetua
where the evidence of guilt is strong.
a.
Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner
would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion
perpetua.
b.
Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is
strong.
2.
Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight
risk.
HELD:
1.
YES.
Bail
as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.
Article
III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by the
constitutional right to be released on bail.
The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
trial and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but no higher than what may
be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail
as a matter of discretion
Right
to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and
repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to
wit:
Capital
offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.
— No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.
The
general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense,
shall be bailable.
Exception:
Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
Thus,
denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that
the evidence of guilt is strong. Where
evidence of guilt is not strong, bail
may be granted according to the discretion of the court.
Thus,
Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail,
when discretionary.
— Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua,
or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not
transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if
the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application
for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should
the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to
continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal
under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If
the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That
he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That
he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That
he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That
the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That
there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The
appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review
the resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the
adverse party in either case.
Thus,
admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life
imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua subject
to judicial discretion. In Concerned
Citizens vs. Elma,
the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the
hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for
the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre
vs. Belmonte).
The hearing should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong.
1.
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);
2.
Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3.
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4.
If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.
2.
YES.
Petitioner's
poor health justifies his admission to bail
The
Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the
international community arising from its commitment to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process and for detainees to
avail of such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty.
Quoting
from Government
of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the
SC emphasized:
x
x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section
II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,
ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on
the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.
In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to
make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include
the right to be admitted to bail.
(emphasis in decision)
Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion
Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance
of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the
clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner.
As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
the Motion
to Fix Bail. It
acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post
bail].
-o0o-
LEONEN
DISSENT
Justice Leonen
Justice
Leonen criticized the decision for having a very weak legal basis –
the grant of bail over mere humanitarian grounds. He also claims that
the court has no authority to use humanitarian grounds. Leonen argues
that “[Petitioner's] release for medical or humanitarian reasons
was not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail before the
Sandiganbayan,” nor were these grounds raised in the petition in
the Supreme Court.
“Bail
for humanitarian considerations is neither presently provided in our
Rules of Court nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.”
Leonen
theorized that the Supreme Court only granted bail as a special
accomodation for the petitioner and he goes on to criticize the
decision to wit:
[This
decision] will usher in an era of truly selective justice not based
on their legal provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and
solely grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion.
x
x x
Worse,
it puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan that will
predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the basis of
humanitarian considerations. The lower courts will have to decide,
without guidance, whether bail should be granted because of advanced
age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded diseases. They will have to
decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and former
Presidents charged with plunder and not to those accused of drug
trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, … and other crimes
punishable by reclusion
perpetua or
life imprisonment...
Procedure
for granting bail
Leonen's
dissent also examines the procedure outlined for the lower
courts in bail cases in order to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan
did not err in denying Petitioner's Motion to Fix Bail. In Cortes
vs. Catral
the
Supreme Court held:
It
is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court should be
besieged with a number of administrative cases filed against erring
judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth of jurisprudence
on the basic principles involving bail. As a matter of fact, the
Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial Academy, has been
including lectures on the subject in the regular seminars conducted
for judges. Be that as it may, we reiterate the following duties of
the trial judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1.
In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or
require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);
2.
Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3.
Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4.
If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra)
Otherwise petition should be denied.
With
such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the Rules of Court,
trial judges are enjoined to study them as well and be guided
accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account for an
erroneous decision rendered in good faith, but this defense is much
too frequently cited even if not applicable. A number of cases on
bail having already been decided, this Court justifiably expects
judges to discharge their duties assiduously. For judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes
and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with
basic legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can
only be engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the
Bench cannot justly be charge with a deficiency in their grasp of
legal principles.
Petitioner
in this case, insisted that the Sandiganbayan grant his bail without
any hearing for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. At the Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution had no
opportunity to present any evidence because of the prematurity of
Petitioner's Motion [to Fix Bail]. Thus, the dissent asserts that the
Sandiganbayan was correct in denying the Motion based on prematurity.
Medical
or humanitarian grounds inappropriate
Petitioner
did not ask for bail to be granted based on humanitarian reasons at
the Sandiganbayan. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution were able
to develop their arguments as to this point to establish legal and
factual basis for this kind of bail.
The
dissent argues that it was inappropriate for the court to grant bail
merely on the basis of the certification of the attending physician,
Dr. Gonzales, stating that the Petitioner was suffering from numerous
debilitating conditions. The dissent states that:
Nowhere
in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail based on
judicial notice of a doctor's certification. In doing so, we
effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away with
cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales' findings on
petitioner's health in a hearing whose main purpose is to determine
whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
x
x x
The
better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our
well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical procedures for bail.
Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether the evidence of guilt
is strong. This is to be examined when a hearing is granted as a
mandatory manner after petition for bail is filed by accused. The
medical condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and
heard.
asgasgf
Version
of the decision submitted by Ponente was not the version deliberated
upon
This
section of the dissent reveals that the Justices voted to grant bail
based on a substantially different version of the opinion, one which
did not use humanitarian considerations as a ground for the granting
of bail. The
dissent explains that the Justices voted 8-4 solely on the issue of
whether or not bail is a matter of right and reveals that
the copy offered for signature was substantially similar to an
earlier draft which used
humanitarian considerations as the basis for the granting of bail.
The
dissent makes it clear that this was an irregularity.
The
majority opinion offers no “guidance”
The
dissent argues that the main opinion is unclear whether the privilege
(humanitarian considerations, right to bail, etc.) will apply to
those who have similar conditions. Whether or not this privilege will
only apply to those undergoing trial for plunder or whether or not
this privilege can be granted to those of advanced age only. “The
majority has perilously set an unstated if not ambiguous standard for
the special grant of bail on the ground of medical conditions.”
There
is also no guidance to the Sandiganbayan as to if, when and how bail
can then be canceled.
Reliance
on HK vs Olalia misplaced
The
reliance of the majority on the case of Government
of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia is
misplaced because this case referred to extradition cases, hence its
increased emphasis on international law. As applied to crimes charged
under Philippine law, the remedies under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights must be qualified by the Constitution's rules regarding
bail.
Furthermore,
in the above case, the SC disposed of it by remanding the case back
to the lower court for factual determination of whether or not the
accused was a flight risk.
BLOGGER'S
COMMENTS
The
majority opinion and the dissent both make for a very interesting
treatise on Criminal Procedure. These
will likely be quoted again and again in bail hearings and in
classrooms.
The
majority opinion is very strained, it had to rely on “motherhood
statements” regarding a person's right to liberty and right to
bail. The decision used no compelling legal reasoning apart from our
commitment to international laws.
Here
comes Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, seeing himself as CJ Claudio
Teehankee reborn, comes to the rescue claiming
that the decision will:
will
usher in an era of truly selective justice not based on their legal
provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial and solely
grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion.
Factual
Milieu is Important
We
must note however the factual milieu. At the time Senators Enrile,
Revilla and Estrada were charged with plunder, the public perception
was that these Senators were the target of a campaign to eliminate
the Administration's political enemies.
The
perception of some circles critical of the current administration
that these three senators, (the trio known colloquially as “Pogi”,
“Tanda” and “Sexy”) were hastily charged and unfairly
detained.
The accusation that the administration was quick to charge its
enemies while defending its allies is a valid one. No discussion of
the grant of bail will overlook the highly politicized nature of the
3 Senator's incarceration.
That
is not to say that this trio and particularly Enrile are innocent.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision drew a slew of criticism and a
few defenders. Below
are just a few links to articles criticizing or defending the
decision.
Keep
in mind that some of these articles were written before the decision
actually came out.
Am
I comfortable with the decision?
Justice Bersamin - Author of the main decision
Yes.
The decision re-emphasizes the right of people to bail from an
ideological standpoint – politically well connected or otherwise –
it serves to remind courts and prosecutors to establish probability
of guilt for heinous crimes early on. For the innocent languishing
in detention centers, this decision is a Godsend and can potentially
speed up criminal justice.
Courts
and prosecutors will have to take steps to adapt to this new
environment. Needless to say, I argue that the requisites of 1.
Flight risk and, 2. Strong evidence of guilt are fairly simple and
reliable guidelines for the lower courts to follow. The dissent's
warning of courts getting swamped with requests of accused to be
released on bail and lack of guidance to lower courts is unwarranted
fear-mongering.
I
am uncomfortable with the dissenting opinion. While I think its
arguments as to the finer points of procedure is warranted, it
nevertheless casts the Supreme Court in a bad light and can serve to
weaken it as an institution.
