G.R. No. 119976;
September 18, 1995
Ponente:
Kapunan
FACTS:
Petitioner
Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district of
Leyte in order that she will be able to run for Congress of that district in
the 1995 elections. Her COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven
months. Private Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a
petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did
not meet the one year residency requirement as provided for in the
Constitution. In response, Marcos amended her COC changing the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood". Marcos claimed
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence." She further claimed that she is entitled to the correction of
her COC on the ground that her original entry of "seven months" was
the result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake".
The
COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos.
It held that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San
Juan, Manila, because that where she chose to live after she went back to the
Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US. It explained that
while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved
to Manila where she became a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang
Pambansa as a representative of Manila and eventually became Governor of
Manila. This, according to the COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a
resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".
ISSUE:
1. Whether
or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.
2. Whether
or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her
husband in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan.
HELD:
1. YES.
The
Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile. The decision of the COMELEC
however, shows that they confused the concept of "Domicile" with
"actual residence".
Domicile versus Residence
Article
50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and
the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their
place of habitual residence." In a past case, the Court took the
concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a
place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to
return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose
intent." Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements of:
1. The
fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and
2. Animus
manendi - the intention of returning permanently
Residence
on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an individual to
a certain place. It is mere physical presence. Residence involves
the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile;
if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. Domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for
an unlimited time.
A
person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a
single domicile. Note however, that a person may abandon a domicile in favor of
another.
Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban
Petitioner
Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. The fact that she has a residence
in Manila does not mean that she has lost her domicile in that province.
The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study
or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Applying this doctrine to the case of
petitioner, the fact that she has registered to vote and resided in Ilocos
Norte and in San Juan do not unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
domicile in Tacloban. Even while residing in various places, petitioner
kept close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in
her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her
province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot
or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These
well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore
of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were
entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC
did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
2. NO
The domicile of origin
Note
further that when petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed that
of her parents. Hence, her domicile of origin was Tacloban. Once
acquired, domicile is retained until a new one is gained. The domicile of
origin is not easily lost. To effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
1. An
actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A
bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts
which correspond with the purpose.
In
the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence
of origin should be deemed to continue.
Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin
Article
110 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the
residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A
survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile
or residence does not suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband upon marriage. This article clearly
refers to actual residence and not domicile and merely establishes the default
rule in fulfilling the obligation of the spouses "to live together"
in article immediately preceding Art. 110.
When
Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's
actual place of residence fixed by him. Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence at the time: San Juan and Ilocos Norte. Assuming that Mr.
Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner
gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her
domicile of origin.
This
rule has changed with the advent of the Family code with the introduction of
the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile". This
underscores the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the
Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term
domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning
and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes
revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years
by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the
spouses.
Even
assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her acts unequivocally show an
intent to reestablish a domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as
early as in 1992, already obtained her residence certificate in Tacloban.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses
the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET
ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the
First District of Leyte.
