Rotea v. Halili

DOCTRINE:

Subsidiary liability of employer – In enforcing the subsidiary liability of the employer, the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case. It has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision.

Exemplary Damages; extent to employer – The rule is that exemplary damages are imposed primarily upon the wrongdoer as a deterrent in the commission of similar acts in the future. Such punitive damages cannot be applied to his master or employer except only to the extent of his participation or ratification of the act because they are penal in character. Moreover, exemplary damages may only be imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances (Article 2230, new Civil Code).

FACTS:

On August 17, 1952, a bus owned by Respondent Halili crashed and Jose Rotea was injured in the accident. The driver Angel Bascon was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. Bascon was found guilty and ordered him to pay P513, P3,000.00 as liquidated damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Because Bascon was insolvent, the liability fell upon the employer, the Respondent Halili. Rotea made demands, but Halili ignored him so he was forced to file a case against him paying for P13,513.00 as liquidated and exemplary damages, as well as P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The trial court ruled in favor of Rotea and ordered Halili to pay:

P3,513.00 – Liquidated damages

P500 – attorney's fees

The trial court did not allow the collection of exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Employer is subsidiarily liable for exemplary damages that were adjudged against his employee.

HELD:

No. The trial court was justified in not requiring appellee to pay exemplary damages there being no evidence whatever that he had any participation in the wrongful act committed by his employee. The rule is that exemplary damages are imposed primarily upon the wrongdoer as a deterrent in the commission of similar acts in the future. Such punitive damages cannot be applied to his master or employer except only to the extent of his participation or ratification of the act because they are penal in character. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, exemplary damages may only be imposed when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances,

SPS. MALLARI vs. PRUDENTIAL BANK

[G.R. No. 197861. June 5, 2013. 697 SCRA 555]

DOCTRINE:
Unconscionable interest rates – The SC has ruled in the following cases that the interest is unconscionable:  3% and 3.81% per month on a P10 Million loan (Toring vs. Sps. Ganzon-Olan, 2008); 66% per annum or 5.5% per month on a P500 thousand loan (Medel vs. Court of Appeals, 1998) and; 7% and 5% or 84% and 60% per annum (Chua vs. Timan, 2008).  The Court has also ruled affirmed in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are excessive, unconscionable and exorbitant.

Conscionable interest rates – In this case 23% per annum or 2% per month as agreed upon by petitioner and respondent bank is NOT unconscionable.  It is much lower than the above mentioned unconscionable interest rates and there is no similarity of factual milieu.

FACTS:

[Decided 2013] In 1984, Petitioner Florentino Mallari obtained a loan from respondent Prudential Bank in the amount of P300,000.00. It was subject to an interest rate of 21% per annum and, in case of default, a penalty of 12% per annum of the total amount due and attorneys fees equivalent of 15% of the total amount due. This was secured by a Deed of Assignment (DOA) over petitioner's time deposit account. In 1989, Spouses Florentino and Aurea Mallari obtained another loan from respondent for P1.7 million, stipulating interest of 23% per annum with the same penalties in case of default. This was secured by Real Estate Mortgage (REM).

Petitioners defaulted. When computed in 1992, the total debt was P571,218.54 and P2,991,294.82 for the first and second loans respectively.

Respondent tried to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. Petitioners on the other hand tried to nullify the mortgage claiming that the Bank imposed onerous terms and conditions and that the bank was unilaterally increasing its charges and interest over and above those stipulated. The Bank claimed that the basis for its computation was all written in the Promissory Notes.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent bank. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not an interest rate of 23% per annum and 12% per annum penalty is unconscionable.

HELD:

No. The Court has also ruled affirmed in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are excessive, unconscionable and exorbitant. thus, the 23% per annum interest rate imposed on petitioners’ loan in this case can by no means be considered excessive or unconscionable. And neither is the 12% per annum penalty charge unconscionable as the counrt found in DBP vs. Family Foods (2009) and Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals (2003).

Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

[G.R. No. 170732, October 11, 2012,  684 SCRA 55]

DOCTRINE:

Liquidated damages – The parties to a contract are allowed to stipulate on liquidated damages to be paid in case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to ensure performance and has a double function: (1) to provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in the event of breach. As a pre-condition to such award, however, there must be proof of the fact of delay in the performance of the obligation.

Effect of default – As long as the contractor fails to finish the works within the period agreed upon by the parties without justifiable reason and after the owner makes a demand, then liability for damages as a consequence of such default arises.

FACTS:

Respondent Herbal Cove Realty Corporation (Herbal Cove) wanted to build a a subdivision project somewhere in Tagaytay City. It hired petitioner Atlantic Erectors Inc. (Atlantic) to build the project. The Construction Contract indicated a contract price of almost P16.7Million and to finish building within 180 days. To secure payment in case of non completion of the project, the contract also provides:

ARTICLE IX

FAILURE TO COMPLETE WORK

Section 1: The CONTRACTOR acknowledges that the OWNER shall not suffer [loss] by the delay or failure of the CONTRACTOR to finish and complete the works called for under this Contract within the time stipulated in Section 6, Article IV. The CONTRACTOR hereby expresses covenants and agrees to pay to the Owner liquidated damages equivalent to the One-Tenth of One Percent (1/10 of 1%) of the Contract Price per calendar day of delay until completion, delivery and acceptance of the said Works by the OWNER to a maximum amount not to exceed 10%.

Atlantic was asked to commence construction on July 8, 1996, but eventually, it asked for an extension citing bad weather and delayed turnover of project sites which Herbal Cove granted but ultimately, Atlantic failed to deliver. Herbal Cove terminated the contract on October 3, 1997 and demanded liquidated damages. Herbal Cove also hired another contractor to finish the job. It filed a case with the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). The CIAC found in favor of Herbal Cove but did not award liquidated damages for failure to comply with 15-day notice of termination (provided for in its contract.). The CA awarded liquidated damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic is liable for liquidated damages.

HELD:

Yes. The CIAC disallowed liquidated damages because Herbal Cove failed to comply with the rule on notice. However, the contract is the law between the parties and there are provisions in the same contract which provide "the Contractor shall be required to pay the Owner the liquidated damages in the amount stipulated in the Contract Agreement, the said payment to be made as liquidated damages, and not by way of penalty. The Owner may deduct from any sum due or to become due the Contractor any sums accruing for liquidated damages as herein stated." also, "Neither the taking over by the Owner of the work for completion by administration nor the re-letting of the same to another Contractor shall be construed as a waiver of the Owner’s rights to recover damages against the original Contractor and/or his sureties for the failure to complete the work as stipulated." Thus, under the contract, Herbal Cove's right to liquidated damages is distinct from the right to terminate contract.

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corp.

G.R. No. 166744. November 2, 2006.

SCRA Citation:  506 SCRA 625

DOCTRINE: Private and public nuisance; definition – The term “nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of property, or his comfort; A private nuisance is one which violates only private rights and produces damage to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is public when it interferes with the exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public property or by causing a common injury, an unreasonable interference with the right common to the general public. In this case, the noise generated by an airconditioning system is considered a private nuisance.

Noise emanating from air-con units not nuisance per se – Noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener; Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the noise an actionable nuisance. Whether or not the noise is a nuisance is an issue to be resolved by the courts.

Test to determine noise as a nuisance – The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss [i.e. Actual Physical Discomfort]which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.

Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of pecuniary estiation – an action to abate private nuisance, even wehere the plaintiff asks for damages is one incapable of pecuniary estimation

FACTS: AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10-storey building in Makati City. Frabelle (Respondent) is a condominium corporation who's condominium development is located behind petitioner. Respondent complained of the 'unbearable” noise emanating from the blower of the air-conditioning units of petitioner.

ISSUES:

(1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings or a nuisance per se?

(2) Is an action for abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically noise generated by the blower of an air-conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays for damages, one incapable of pecuniary estimation?

(3) What is the determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint?

HELD:

(1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings; the noise is not a nuisance per se. Noise becomes actionable only whenn it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the house an actionable nuisance–– in the conditions, of present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary occupations.

(2) Yes, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money.

(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.

Vda. DE BATACLAN vs. MEDINA

FACTS:

Medina is the owner and operator of a bus. This bus, on Sept. 13, 1952 around 2:00AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite, crashed and fell into a ditch. Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-zagged and turned turtle into the ditch. Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of the passengers were able to get out, but Bataclan and 3 others were trapped. It appears that the bus drivers and the passengers who already got out did not try to help Bataclan et al get out, instead, about 10 of the locals in the area came to their aid, they were carrying a burning torch for illumination, but then a fierce fire started and engulfed the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It appears that there was a gas leak from the bus and it caught fire from the torch the would-be rescuers were using.

The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.

The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage where Medina undertook to take Bataclan to his destination safely. The trial court also found that there was negligence on the part of Medina since at the time of the blow-out, the bus was speeding. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries suffered by Bataclan and not by his death, the proximate cause of which was the fire, which was not caused by Medina.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of the bus company, which was the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan.

HELD:

Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the bus, because of the overturning, it leaked gas which is not unnatural or unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of the trapped passengers was most likely because the driver and the conductor went out looking for help. It is only natural that the would-be rescuers bring with them a torch because it was 2:30AM and the place was unlit. The fire could also be attributed to the bus driver and conductor because he should have known, from the circumstances, and because he should have been able to smell gasoline and therefore he should have warned the rescuers not to bring the torch. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

Proximate Cause – “‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.’”

RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.

Ponente: Kapunan

FACTS:

Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”

Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.

The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the comatose condition of Ramos.

HELD:

Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.

RATIO:

Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!

Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.

The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.

The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”. While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.

Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.

LRT vs. NAVIDAD

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:

Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was killed when a train came and ran over him.

The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver, (Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.

(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier.

(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code.
(3) No.  It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.

RATIO:

Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through theexercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.

Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach – How then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.  The award was deleted/\.

PENULLAR vs. PNB

No. L-­32762. January 27, 1983.

TOPIC:  Torts, Negligence

FACTS:

There was a land registration case between Cristina Penullar and Florencio Felix for the declaration of absolute nullity of judicial proceedings in a land registration case. While the case was pending, the land was mortgaged to PNB for a loan by the defendants of the case for declaration of nullity of judicial proceedings.

The CA in that case declared the judicial proceedings void and all Certificates of Title flowing from the proceedings null and void, but at the same time declared the mortgage of PNB valid on the basis of being a mortgagor in good faith.

Penullar claimed that PNB was negligent in allowing the void title to be mortgaged.

ISSUE: Whether or not PNB was negligent

HELD:

NO. PNB had a right to rely on the torrens titles presented to it, furthermore, Petitioner Penullar was also found to have been negligent, to wit:

He whose negligence had enabled a third person to cause damages shall, as between two innocent parties, bear the loss – “In the present case, [if herein petitioner] had appealed from the decision in the registration case, no certificate of Title would have been issued just like that in the name of the [petitioner] and no mortgage could have been constituted by them in favor of Bank but as it is, said [petitioner] failed to do that, instead they let the decision in the registration case gain the status of finality; allowed without prior protest, the certificate of title to be issued; did not even as early as possible, annotate an adverse claim on the titles; and they filed this case only several months afterwards, it was their negligence that permitted said adjudicatees in the said registration case to apply for and secure mortgages from the Bank.

CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996

DOCTRINE:

The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

Damnum absque injuria – There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

Article 21 – Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the principle of abuse of rights. For there to be an abuse of rights, the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

FACTS:

Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way going into their property against petitioners who built an adobe wall in their properties which thereby restricted access to the Mabasa property. Petitioners claim that they built the wall in order to protect their persons and their property from their intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless ordered that an easement be created.

Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court by awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral damages (p30,000.00) and exemplary damages (p10,000.00). Hence this petition. Damages were based on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized rentals on the property due to the adobe wall restricting access.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages.

HELD:

Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis. The mere fact of loss does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by defendant and a damage to the plaintiff resulting therefrom. Damages are merely a part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting from the injury is damage. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. In this case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of their rights as the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse of right as provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None of these requisites was present in this case.

The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances where the damage was not a result of an injury is called damnum absque injuria and the plaintiff is not normally given an award for damages.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA vs. HARPER

G.R. No. 189998. August 29, 2012

PONENTE: Bersamin

DOCTRINE:

Negligence – Article 2176 0f the New Civil Code provides “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to their persons and belongings to their guest. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business (Arts 2000-2001 New Civil Code).

Hotel owner is liable for civil damages to surviving heirs of hotel guest whom strangers murder inside his hotel room.

FACTS:

Christian Harper was a Norweigian who came to Manila on a business trip. He stayed at Makati Shangri-la Hotel, but he was murdered in his hotel room [Specifically Room 1428. His ghost can be found there].

It was found that the muderer, a caucasian male, was able to trespass into the hotel room of the victim and was then able to murder and rob the victim. The heirs of the victim blame the hotel's gross negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests.

The RTC held in favor of the heirs and ordered Shangri-la to pay damages. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON Shangri-la Hotel is liable for damages.

HELD:

Yes. Shangri-la is liable due to its own negligence.

The testimony revealed that the management practice of the hotel prior to the death of the victim was to deploy only one security or roving guard for every three or four floors of the hotel, which is inadequate because the hotel is L-shaped that rendered hallways not visible end to end. That there was a recommendation to increase security to one guard per floor but this was not followed. This ommission is critical. The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also security to their persons and belongings to their guest. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business.

Therefore, the hotel has a greater degree of care and responsibility for its guests , otherwise the hotelkeepers would just stand idly by while strangers have unrestricted access to all hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors of the guests which is absurd.

Note: The decision of the CA was reproduced in the decision to which the SC concurred. The CA discussed the test of negligence as:

“The test of negligence is objective. WE measure the act or ommission of the tortfeasor with a perspective as that of an ordinary reasonable person who is similarly situated. The test, as applied to the extant case, is whether or not [Shangri-la Hotel], under the attendant circumstances, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation.”

BACK TO SCHOOL

Classes have opened again, which means I'll be too busy to write my usual blogs.  But it also means that I'll be uploading case digests and possibly notes.  This semester, I'll be uploading a lot of Torts related cases.  So there.  Enjoy!