ORDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 92625; December 26, 1990

FACTS:

Private Respondent Gil Galang (Gil) filed a case with the Trial court of San Pablo City in order to regain custody of his minor daughter who was staying with her maternal grandparents, petitioner’s herein. Her mother had already died when the case was initiated. The Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioners, Orda, had moved to Bataan, hence the court lost jurisdiction. Subsequently, Gil commenced an original action for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals over his minor daughter. The Court of Appeals, finding that based of the arguments presented by both parties, a full blown trial is required, accordingly, the CA issued the assailed order remanding the case to the RTC of San Pablo City. The Court of appeals later clarified the order as a “referral” of the case to the RTC because it was an original case submitted to it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals may refer a petition for habeas corpus originally filed with it to the Regional Trial Court for a full-blown trial due to conflicting facts presented by the parties.

HELD:

NO. While the case requires a full-blown trial of the facts, the same should be done in the context of the special proceedings for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, and not a remand or referral of the original action for a writ of habeas corpus filed with the respondent court. Parenthetically, the proper venue in this action is the place where the petitioner therein resides.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered DISMISSING the petition for habeas corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing by private respondent of the appropriate special proceedings to gain custody of his minor child.

BARTOLOME vs. SSS and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES

 

Citation: G.R. No. 192531; November 12, 2014

Ponente: Velasco; THIRD DIVISION

Doctrine:

Repeal of laws

Relative; definition

Reversion of parental authority; death of adoptive parent

FACTS:

Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome (Bartolome) was the biological mother of John Colcol (John). John was a seaman and he died due to an accident while on duty. Bartolome sought to claim death benefits from the SSS as she was the sole heir and beneficiary of John.

Her request was denied. The SSS explained that she is “no longer considered the parent of JOHN as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on the documents you submitted to us.

Cornelio Colcol was John's great grandfather. The decree of adoption attained finality in February of 1985 while john was just 2 years old.

Based on these facts, the SSS claimed that Bartolome is no longer the legitimate parent of John and is thus not entitled to Employees compensation. That the legitimate parent is now Cornelio Colcol.

Respondents cite the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation which states:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the interpretation of the ECC stating that only legitimate parents may benefit from compensation is correct.

2. Whether or not Petitioner qualifies as a dependent parent notwithstanding her son's adoption by someone else.

HELD:

1. No. The interpretation is incorrect. Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code on employee's compensation provides that beneficiaries are the “dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.” The ECC on the other hand, interpreted this provision to state that only “legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support.”

This is unauthorized administrative legislation. Article 7 of the New Civil Code states that:

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.

Guided by this doctrine, We find that the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate parents.”

2. YES. The Supreme Court also noted that three years after the adoption decree, Cornelio died while John was still a minor. John's minority at the time of his adopter's death is a significant factor because under such circumstance, parental authority must be deemed to have reverted back to the biological parent. Adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption—who was then left to care for the adopted minor child if the adopter passed away?

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

The Supreme Court thus ordered the ECC to release the benefits to petitioner Bartolome.

THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE DRAFTING OF P.D. NO. 1083

 

The five principles that guided the code commission in drafting of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws are:

1. Since Islamic law is already considered a complete system of laws that comprise civil, criminal, commercial, political laws, etc., only those that were fundamentally personal in nature were codified.

2. Of the personal laws, those relative to acts which are absolute duties under Muslim law are included. Those acts which are absolutely prohibited remain prohibited.

3. Where the provisions of law on certain subjects were too complicated for a code, only fundamental principles were to be stated, and the details were left to judges for implementation.

4. No precept was to be incorporated in the code where it appeared to be contrary to the principles of the Constitution of the Philippines.

5. No precept of law was to be included unless it was based on the principles of Islamic law, as expounded by the four orthodox (Sunni) schools.

 

 

Source:  Commentaries on the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines with Jurisprudence and Special Procedure (2011) by Bensaudi I. Arabani, Sr. Manila:  Rex Printing Company, Inc.

WAR ON DRUGS:

A GAME OF THE GENERALS

To those not familiar, Game of the Generals is a board game, which involve two players moving pieces on a board, much like the better known game of chess.  This game, unlike chess, introduces an element of deceit and “fog-of-war”.

In a “General’s” game, the player sets up his pieces in a freeform manner, and tries to protect his flag while trying to outflank his opponent and capture his “flag” unit. Each piece belongs to one of several unit types each with varying strengths with different qualities, the exact unit type is not known to the opponent as each piece is undistinguishable from another, save for markings which only the unit owner and the referee (a neutral third person) can see.  For example, a piece known as the “5-star general” can pretty much “kill” any other opposing unit, but is vulnerable to a “spy” unit; spies however, can be killed by a “private”.  The way a player arranges his pieces and how well he presents his “poker face” to the public, are factors that come into play in this game.

This war on drugs is figuratively and quite literally a game of the Generals.  Figuratively, because there is always an element of deception, and literally because of the personalities who may be involved.

Now, what I am about to say contains a lot of speculation and opinion. A lot of this is hearsay, so take this with a grain of salt, but these rumors are so widespread now that this is what the “non-chattering” public would claim to be the truth.

The Executive Department as a Neutral Referee
Quite literally, it seems that the Executive department, under the watch of President Duterte is acting as a “Neutral Referee”—the third man in a Game of the Generals match.  The referee in this case is a non player, all he does is watch the game progress and calls out which piece wins a challenge.  He lets the players have at it with one another.  In this case, he merely watches as the drug lords, their coddlers and the low level pushers make mince meat out of one another.  He is content and satisfied to watch the players destroy one another as the narcotics trade in the country implodes from within.  And, like a mischievous referee, he would sometimes drop hints about “who” these pieces on the board really are, to the glee of the captive Filipino audience clamoring for blood.

In a word, it is “masterful” 
First, it was low level pushers, the lieutenants, dropping one by one.  The public has accepted that these deaths (I dare not glorify it with the use of the term, “Extrajudicial Killing”) were perpetrated by corrupt policemen, mayors and drug lords trying to cover any evidence.  Now, the drug lords and the mayors themselves seems to be the targets—the coddlers of the low level pushers are now the targets of their coddlers.

Who are these coddlers of the drug lords?  It seems that these are people in high places.  These are your senators and generals.  Take the case of the recently slain Melvin “Dragon” Odicta.  It is widely known (rumored) that he has connections with some powerful senators.  He spoke with DILG Secretary Mike Sueno and suggested that he surrender to the police with “some conditions”.  This didn’t help him though.  The widely circulating rumor is that he was killed by some police and military men.  The lawyers who were supposed to meet him were being prevented from coming to him.  Clearly, somebody powerful and with a high position wanted him silenced.

Who killed the Dragon?

Another example is the currently at large (or should we presume him dead?) druglord Kerwin Espinosa who has supposed links with a “senator”

Rolando Espinosa:  Look at his pitiable mug. 

I wouldn’t want to be him

Given these circumstances, all I can say is "Wow".  It looks like the Executive department decided to let the drug lords and their coddlers play a game of the generals with one another and he is the referee.  Masterful.

A Word of Advice to Drug Lords and Pushers (NSFW)

You know who you are, and you know who are after you.  You weren’t born yesterday and your predicament certainly didn’t happen overnight.

Turn yourselves over to the police, tell them who and what you know.

If this doesn’t sound enticing, please, strongly consider the alternative.  Kill your coddler.  If you are a pusher, kill the mayor who coddles you.  If you are the mayor, kill the general who coddles you.  If you are the general, please kill the senator who coddles you.  Dead men tell no tales.  Kill him first, before he kills you.

Meanwhile, the common, sit glued before their TV sets and tabloids cheering on as more and more of your kind get your well-deserved deaths.

Endnote

We’ve all heard about the Davao City bombing, I just want to say that my sympathies go out to the victims and those left behind.  Terrorism, like drugs, is one of those ills which needs to be snuffed out of our country before things go out of control.

#staystrongDavao #OneNation #thearchipelago

JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and ERASMO

G.R. No. 191970; April 24, 2012

Ponente:  Abad

Doctrine: Proof required to establish domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen running for governor of a province

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City.  He migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship.  In 2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his Australian citizenship. 

Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration.  COMELEC approved the application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list.  This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC.

Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections.  Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply with the one year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).

COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.  Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

HELD:

NO.  The COMELEC is incorrect.  Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay.

The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least one year before the elections.  For the purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile:  i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place, but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention.  To determine compliance with the residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:

   (a)               every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;

(b)               where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and

(c)               a person can have but one domicile at a time.

The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city.  When he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.  On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines.  By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother's house.  A candidate is not required to have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that place.  It is enough that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.  To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.  What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified that he was physically present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with political leaders and local and national party mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of the RTC.  The court also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay.  This, without a doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

DISPOSITIVE

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and MONTEJO

G.R. No. 119976; September 18, 1995

Ponente:  Kapunan

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district of Leyte in order that she will be able to run for Congress of that district in the 1995 elections.  Her COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven months.  Private Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one year residency requirement as provided for in the Constitution.  In response, Marcos amended her COC changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood".  Marcos claimed that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." She further claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground that her original entry of "seven months" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake". 

The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos.  It held that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila, because that where she chose to live after she went back to the Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US.  It explained that while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she became a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of Manila and eventually became Governor of Manila.  This, according to the COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".

ISSUE:

1.  Whether or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.

2.  Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her husband in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan.

HELD: 

1.  YES.

The Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile.  The decision of the COMELEC however, shows that they confused the concept of "Domicile" with "actual residence".

                Domicile versus Residence

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence."  In a past case, the Court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."  Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements of:

1.  The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and

2.  Animus manendi - the intention of returning permanently

               

Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place.  It is mere physical presence.  Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.  If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.  Domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.

A person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a single domicile. Note however, that a person may abandon a domicile in favor of another.

                Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban

Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte.  The fact that she has a residence in Manila does not mean that she has lost her domicile in that province.  The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.  Applying this doctrine to the case of petitioner, the fact that she has registered to vote and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan do not unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile in Tacloban.  Even while residing in various places, petitioner kept close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

2.  NO

                The domicile of origin

Note further that when petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed that of her parents.  Hence, her domicile of origin was Tacloban.  Once acquired, domicile is retained until a new one is gained.  The domicile of origin is not easily lost.  To effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1.  An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2.  A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3.  Acts which correspond with the purpose.

                               

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. 

                Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin

Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile or residence does not suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband upon marriage.  This article clearly refers to actual residence and not domicile and merely establishes the default rule in fulfilling the obligation of the spouses "to live together" in article immediately preceding Art. 110.

When Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. Mr. Marcos had several places of residence at the time:  San Juan and Ilocos Norte.  Assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence.  She did not lose her domicile of origin.

This rule has changed with the advent of the Family code with the introduction of the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile".  This underscores the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.

Even assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her acts unequivocally show an intent to reestablish a domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as early as in 1992, already obtained her residence certificate in Tacloban.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION vs. NTC and PLDT

G.R. No. L-63318; August 18, 1984

Ponente: Makasiar

Topic:  Statutory interpretation

Doctrine:  The word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest in the law itself.

FACTS:

Respondent NTC promulgated a decision (NTC decision) dated November 22, 1982 which approved a revised schedule of rates (translation: phone bills went up) which was within the limits of P.D. No. 217, the law which regulated the telephone industry.  Petitioner, Philippine Consumer Foundation (PCF) filed this petition seeking to annul this decision. 

On November 25, 1983, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision annulling the NTC decision.  This decision interpreted the following phraseology of Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 as mandatory:

“The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose, pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated” (italics supplied).

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 is mandatory.

HELD:

The basic canon of Statutory Construction is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless the contrary intent is manifested.  The phrase “may be promulgated” cannot be construed to mean “shall” or “must”.  Section 2 must therefore be interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary and not mandatory on the part of the delegate, NTC.

What is mandatory however, is the immediate implementation of the policies declared in P.D. No. 217.

Note that both words “shall” and “may be” are used in the same section which demonstrates that the ordinary, usual or normal distinction between these words is preserved.

It must be emphasized that P.D. No. 217 [which is a special law] only repeals pertinent portions of Act 3436 and the Public Service Act [which is a general law regulating all manner of public franchises] and that the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of the NTC was adequately served by their own rules of procedure.  This meant that the acts complained of by NCF, i.e. the fixing of provisional rates without public hearing (Section 16 of the public service act), was a valid act.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF NOVEMBER 25, 1983 IS HEREBY RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE AND THE PETTION IS HEREBY DISMISSED.