Showing posts with label v.. Show all posts
Showing posts with label v.. Show all posts

Thursday, December 19, 2013

USA and Bradford v. Hon. Luis R. Reyes and Montoya

[219 SCRA 192, March 1, 1993]
G.R. No. 79253

Facts:

Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner [Bradford] also worked at NEX JUSMAG as an “activity manager”. There was an incident on 22 January 1987 whereby Bradford had Montoya’s person and belongings searched in front of many curious onlookers. This caused Montoya to feel aggrieved and to file a suit for damages.

Contentions:
Bradford claimed that she was immune from suit because:
1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America, a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in the complaint; and

2) Defendant, Maxine Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG, Quezon City, is immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the performance of her official functions under the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended.

Montoya argued that:
(a) Bradford, in ordering the search upon her person and belongings outside the NEX JUSMAG store in the presence of onlookers, had committed an improper, unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a Filipino employee and had exceeded the scope of her authority; (b) having exceeded her authority, Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the public petitioner because her liability is personal; (c) Philippine courts are vested with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is a civilian employee who had committed the challenged act outside the U.S. Military Bases; such act is not one of those exempted from the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; and (d) Philippine courts can inquire into the factual circumstances of the case to determine whether or not Bradford had acted within or outside the scope of her authority.

The doctrine of state immunity is at the core of this controversy.

Doctrine of State Immunity:

The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, thus:

I. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act or the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrinaire of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

In the case of Baer, etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al., it was ruled that:

There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.

Also, in Animos, et al. vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al., we held that:

. . . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. . . . .

The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act donewith malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. [footnotes omitted]

In the present case, it appears that Bradford was sued for acts done beyond the scope and beyond her place of official functions. Thus she may not avail of immunity.

She may not even avail of diplomatic immunity because Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. It reads:

1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions (Emphasis supplied).

Disposition:
Petition was dismissed.



Friday, December 13, 2013

TAÑADA vs. ANGARA

[272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997]

Facts:
Petitioner sought to have the agreement to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) declared unconstitutional on the grounds that: “(1) that the WTO requires the Philippines .to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products. and (2) that the WTO .intrudes, limits and/or impairs. the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to .develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods..”

Issues:
  1. Whether or not the petition presents a justiciable controversy or involves a political question.
  2. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement contravene Sec. 19, Art II and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, of the Philippine Constitution.
  3. Whether or not the Provisions unduly impair or interfere with Legislative Power.
  4. Whether or not the Provisions unduly impair or interfere with Judicial Power.
  5. Whether or not the Concurrence of the Senate with the WTO Agreement and its Annexes sufficient and/or valid.
Held:

Justiciable Controversy
There is a justiciable controversy. A part of the Court.s decision reads:
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government.s economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty “to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.”
Contravention of the Constitution
The Court held that there was no contravention of the Constitution since Art. II or the Declaration of Principles and State Policies is not self-executory. Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, on the other hand, the Court said:

Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:

Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

The Court further stated that the WTO comes with safeguards to protect weaker economies and that the Constitution does not rule out foreign competition
The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power
The court held that:

The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations.”

The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power
A portion of the decision reads:

By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue — derogation of legislative power — will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.

So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be substantial.

Validity of the Concurrence of the Senate with the WTO Agreement and its Annexes
Excerpts from the decision read:

Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes — but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services — is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate which enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate.

“A final act, sometimes called protocol de cloture, is an instrument which records the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference.” It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The text of the “Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations” is contained in just one page in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:

(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.

The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for ratification. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which provides that representatives of the members can meet “to give effect to those provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.” [Footnotes Omitted]

Disposition:
Petition was denied.

Memorandum of Ambassador Lilia Bautista

Ambassador Bautista submitted a memorandum as amicus curiae which contained a chronology of the GATT reproduced as follows:

1947 The birth of GATT. On 30 October 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed by 23 nations at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. The Agreement contained tariff concessions agreed to in the first multilateral trade negotiations and a set of rules designed to prevent these concessions from being frustrated by restrictive trade measures.

The 23 founding contracting parties were members of the Preparatory Committee established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946 to draft the charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was envisaged as the final leg of a triad of post-War economic agencies (the other two were the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction — later the World Bank).

In parallel with this task, the Committee members decided to negotiate tariff concessions among themselves. From April to October 1947, the participants completed some 123 negotiations and established 20 schedules containing the tariff reductions and bindings which became an integral part of GATT. These schedules resulting from the first Round covered some 45,000 tariff concessions and about $10 billion in trade.

GATT was conceived as an interim measure that put into effect the commercial-policy provisions of the ITO. In November, delegations from 56 countries met in Havana, Cuba, to consider the to ITO draft as a whole. After long and difficult negotiations, some 53 countries signed the Final Act authenticating the text of the Havana Charter in March 1948. There was no commitment, however, from governments to ratification and, in the end, the ITO was stillborn, leaving GATT as the only international instrument governing the conduct of world trade.

1948 Entry into force. On 1 January 1948, GATT entered into force. The 23 founding members were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States. The first Session of the Contracting Parties was held from February to March in Havana, Cuba. The secretariat of the Interim Commission for the ITO, which served as the ad hoc secretariat of GATT, moved from Lake Placid, New York, to Geneva. The Contracting Parties held their second session in Geneva from August to September.

1949 Second Round at Annecy. During the second Round of trade negotiations, held from April to August at Annecy, France, the contracting parties exchanged some 5,000 tariff concessions. At their third Session, they also dealt with the accession of ten more countries.

1950 Third Round at Torquay. From September 1950 to April 1951, the contracting parties exchanged some 8,700 tariff concessions in the English town, yielding tariff reduction of about 25 per cent in relation to the 1948 level. Four more countries acceded to GATT. During the fifth Session of the Contracting Parties, the United States indicated that the ITO Charter would not be re-submitted to the US Congress; this, in effect, meant that ITO would not come into operation.

1956 Fourth Round at Geneva. The fourth Round was completed in May and produced some $2.5 billion worth of tariff reductions. At the beginning of the year, the GATT commercial policy course for officials of developing countries was inaugurated.

1958 The Haberler Report. GATT published Trends in International Trade in October. Known as the “Haberler Report” in honour of Professor Gottfried Haberler, the chairman of the panel of eminent economists, it provided initial guidelines for the work of GATT. The Contracting Parties at their 13th Sessions, attended by Ministers, subsequently established three committees in GATT: Committee I to convene a further tariff negotiating conference; Committee II to review the agricultural policies of member governments and Committee III to tackle the problem facing developing countries in their trade. The establishment of the European Economic Community during the previous year also demanded large-scale tariff negotiations under Article XXIV: 6 of the General Agreement.

1960 The Dillon Round. The fifth Round opened in September and was divided into two phases: the first was concerned with negotiations with EEC member states for the creation of a single schedule of concessions for the Community based on its Common External Tariff; and the second was a further general round of tariff negotiations. Named in honour of US Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon who proposed the negotiations, the Round was concluded in July 1962 and resulted in about 4,400 tariff concessions covering $4.9 billion of trade.

1961 The Short-Term Arrangement covering cotton textiles was agreed as an exception to the GATT rules. The arrangement permitted the negotiation of quota restrictions affecting the exports of cotton-producing countries. In 1962 the “Short Term” Arrangement became the “Long term” Arrangement, lasting until 1974 when the Multifibre Arrangement entered into force.

1964 The Kennedy Round. Meeting at Ministerial level, a Trade Negotiations Committee formally opened the Kennedy Round in May. In June 1967, the Round.s Final Act was signed by some 50 participating countries which together accounted for 75 per cent of world trade. For the first time, negotiations departed from the product-by-product approach used in the previous Rounds to an across-the-board or linear method of cutting tariffs for industrial goods. The working hypothesis of a 50 per cent target cut in tariff levels was achieved in many areas. Concessions covered an estimated total value of trade of about $410 billion. Separate agreements were reached on grains, chemical products and a Code on Anti-Dumping.

1965 A New Chapter. The early 1960s marked the accession to the general Agreement of many newly-independent developing countries. In February, the Contracting Parties, meeting in a special session, adopted the text of Part IV on Trade and Development. The additional chapter to the GATT required developed countries to accord high priority to the reduction of trade barriers to products of developing countries. A Committee on Trade and Development was established to oversee the functioning of the new GATT provisions. In the preceding year, GATT had established the International Trade Centre (ITC) to help developing countries in trade promotion and identification of potential markets. Since 1968, the ITC had been jointly operated by GATT and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

1973 The Tokyo Round. The seventh Round was launched by Ministers in September at the Japanese capital. Some 99 countries participated in negotiating a comprehensive body of agreements covering both tariff and non-tariff matters. At the end of the Round in November 1979, participants exchanged tariff reductions and bindings which covered more than $300 billion of trade. As a result of these cuts, the weighted average tariff on manufactured goods in the world.s nine major industrial markets declined from 7.0 to 4.7 per cent. Agreements were reached in the following areas: subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, import licensing procedures, government procurement, customs valuation, a revised anti-dumping code, trade in bovine meat, trade in dairy products and trade in civil aircraft. The first concrete result of the Round was the reduction of import duties and other trade barriers by industrial countries on tropical products exported by developing countries.

1974 On 1 January 1974, the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, otherwise known as the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), entered into force. It superseded the arrangements that had been governing trade in cotton textiles since 1961. The MFA seeks to promote the expansion and progressive liberalization of trade in textile products while at the same time avoiding disruptive effects in individual markets and lines of production. The MFA was extended in 1978, 1982, 1986, 1991 and 1992. MFA members account for most of the world exports of textiles and clothing which in 1986 amounted to US$128 billion.

1982 Ministerial Meeting. Meeting for the first time in nearly ten years, the GATT Ministers in November at Geneva reaffirmed the validity of GATT rules for the conduct of international trade and committed themselves to combating protectionist pressures. They also established a wide-ranging work programme for the GATT which was to lay down the groundwork for a new Round 1986. The Uruguay Round. The GATT Trade Ministers meeting at Punta del Este, Uruguay, launched the eighth Round of trade negotiations on 20 September. The Punta del Este Declaration, while representing a single political undertaking, was divided into two sections. The first covered negotiations on trade in goods and the second initiated negotiation on trade in services. In the area of trade in goods, the Ministers committed themselves to a “standstill” on new trade measures inconsistent with their GATT obligations and to a “rollback” programme aimed at phasing out existing inconsistent measures. Envisaged to last four years, negotiations started in early February 1987 in the following areas tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical products, natural resource-based products, textiles and clothing, agriculture, subsidies, safe-guards, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights including trade in counterfeit goods, and trade-related investment measures. The work of other groups included a review of GATT articles, the GATT dispute settlement procedure, the Tokyo Round agreements, as well as the functioning of the GATT system as a whole.

1994 “GATT 1994” is the updated version of GATT 1947 and takes into account the substantive and institutional changes negotiated in the Uruguay Round GATT 1994 is an integral part of the World Trade Organization established on 1 January 1995. It is agreed that there be a one year transition period during which certain GATT 1947 bodies and commitments would co-exist with those of the World Trade Organization.

Sunday, December 1, 2013

Ang Yu Asuncion et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Buen Realty Corp.

(G.R. No. 109125, December 2, 1994)
Ponente: Vitug

Topic: Sales; Contract of sale v. Contract to sell; remedies for violation of right of first refusal

Facts:
Petitioners Ang Yu Asuncion et. al. are lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by the Unjiengs. They have been leasing the property and possessing it since 1935 and have been paying rentals.

In 1986, the Unjiengs informed Petitioners Ang Yu Asuncion that the property was being sold and that Petitioners were being given priority to acquire them (Right of First Refusal). They agreed on a price of P5M but they had not yet agreed on the terms and conditions. Petitioners wrote to the Unjiengs twice, asking them to specify the terms and conditions for the sale but received no reply. Later, the petitioners found out that the property was already about to be sold, thus they instituted this case for Specific Performance [of the right of first refusal].

The Trial Court dismissed the case. The trial court also held that the Unjieng’s offer to sell was never accepted by the Petitioners for the reason that they did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no contract of sale at all. Nonetheless, the lower court ruled that should the defendants subsequently offer their property for sale at a price of P11-million or below, plaintiffs will have the right of first refusal.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.

In the meantime, in 1990, the property was sold to De Buen Realty, Private Respondent in this case. The title to the property was transferred into the name of De Buen and demanded that the Petitioners vacate the premises.

Because of this, Petitioners filed a motion for execution of the CA judgement. At first, CA directed the Sheriff to execute an order directing the Unjiengs to issue a Deed of Sale in the Petitioner’s favour and nullified the sale to De Buen Realty. But then, the CA reversed itself when the Private Respondents Appealed.

Issues:
  1. Whether or not the Contract of Sale is perfected by the grant of a Right of First Refusal.
  2. Whether or not a Right of First Refusal may be enforced in an action for Specific Performance.
Held:
  1. No. A Right of First Refusal is not a Perfected Contract of Sale under Art. 1458 or an option under Par. 2 Art 1479 or an offer under Art. 1319. In a Right of First Refusal, only the object of the contract is determinate. This means that no vinculum juris is created between the seller-offeror and the buyer-offeree.
  2. No. Since a contractual relationship does not exist between the parties, a Right of First Refusal may not be enforced through an action for specific performance. Its conduct is governed by the law on human relations under Art. 19-21 of the Civil Code and not by contract law.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the CA could not have decreed at the time the execution of any deed of sale between the Unjiengs and Petitioners.

Other Rules, Comments and Discussion:
This case is notable because it lays down the rules on options contracts and right of first refusal as well as promises to buy and sell. First, the Supreme Court discussed the stages of the formation of a sales contract, these are:
  1. Negotiation – covers the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is concluded (perfected).
  2. Perfection – takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof. In a sales contract this is governed by Art. 1458
  3. Consummation – begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract culminating in the extinguishment thereof
Until the contract is perfected (No. 2), it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation. A sales contract is perfected when a person, called the seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another, called the buyer, over which the latter agrees (Art 1458).

Under Art. 1458, there is no perfection of a sale under a “Contract to Sell”. A Contract to Sell is characterized as a conditional sale and the breach of the suspensive condition will prevent the obligation to transfer title from acquiring obligatory force.

Promises to Buy and Sell
Unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell – As long as the object is made determinate and the price is fixed, can be obligatory on the parties, and compliance therewith may accordingly be exacted. The Right of First Refusal falls under this classification.

Accepted unilateral promise – If it specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be paid and when coupled with a valuable consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may properly be termed a perfected contract of option. This contract is legally binding. (Par. 2 Art. 1458) Note however, that the option is a contract separate and distinct from the contract of sale. Once the option is exercised before it is withdrawn, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues and both parties are then reciprocally bound to comply with their respective undertakings.

Offers with a Period
Where a period is given to the offeree within which to accept the offer, the following rules generally govern:
  1. If the period is not itself founded upon or supported by a consideration – Offeror may withdraw offer at any time before its acceptance (or knowledge of its acceptance). However, the right to withdraw must not be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily otherwise it can give rise to damages under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code
  2. If period is founded on a separate consideration – This is a perfected contract of option. Withdrawal of the offer within the period of the option is deemed a breach of the contract of option (not the sale). “If, in fact, the optioner-offeror withdraws the offer before its acceptance (exercise of the option) by the optionee-offeree, the latter may not sue for specific performance on the proposed contract (“object” of the option) since it has failed to reach its own stage of perfection. The optioner-offeror, however, renders himself liable for damages for breach of the option.”
  3. Earnest money – This is not an offer with a period. Earnest money is distinguished from the option contract if the consideration given will be considered as a part of the purchase price of the object of the sale. Earnest money is evidence of a perfected contract of sale. (Art. 1482)
Right of First Refusal
This is “an innovative juridical relation” because it is neither a perfected contract of sale under Art. 1458 nor an option contract under par. 2 Art 1479. The object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however, is dependent on the offeror’s eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms and conditions such as price. There is no juridical tie or vinculum juris.

Breach of the right cannot justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of execution under a court judgement that recognizes its existence, such as in Ang Yu Asuncion. An action for Specific Performance is not allowed under a Right of First Refusal because doing so would negate the indispensable element of consensuality in the perfection of contracts.

This right is not inconsequential because it gives right to an action for damages under Art. 19.

Other Acts that Won’t Bind
Public advertisements or solicitations – Construed as mere invitations to make offers and/or proposals.

Related Cases
The cases of Equatorial v. Mayfair and Parañaque Kings v. Court of Appeals held that if a sale happens in violation of a Right of First Refusal where the buyer is aware of the existence of that right in favor of another (such as when it is written in a lease contract), the sale may be rescinded and the seller may be forced to offer the property to the party with the Right of First Refusal.


However, the case of Ang Yu Asuncion may still be good law for cases not involving a third party buyer in bad faith.