CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996

DOCTRINE:

The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

Damnum absque injuria – There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

Article 21 – Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the principle of abuse of rights. For there to be an abuse of rights, the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

FACTS:

Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way going into their property against petitioners who built an adobe wall in their properties which thereby restricted access to the Mabasa property. Petitioners claim that they built the wall in order to protect their persons and their property from their intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless ordered that an easement be created.

Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the decision of the trial court by awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral damages (p30,000.00) and exemplary damages (p10,000.00). Hence this petition. Damages were based on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized rentals on the property due to the adobe wall restricting access.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages.

HELD:

Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis. The mere fact of loss does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by defendant and a damage to the plaintiff resulting therefrom. Damages are merely a part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting from the injury is damage. Damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. In this case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of their rights as the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse of right as provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil Code and where the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None of these requisites was present in this case.

The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances where the damage was not a result of an injury is called damnum absque injuria and the plaintiff is not normally given an award for damages.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

USA and Bradford v. Hon. Luis R. Reyes and Montoya

[219 SCRA 192, March 1, 1993]

G.R. No. 79253

Facts:

Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner [Bradford] also worked at NEX JUSMAG as an “activity manager”. There was an incident on 22 January 1987 whereby Bradford had Montoya’s person and belongings searched in front of many curious onlookers. This caused Montoya to feel aggrieved and to file a suit for damages.

Contentions:

Bradford claimed that she was immune from suit because:

1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United States of America, a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent for the cause of action pleaded in the complaint; and

2) Defendant, Maxine Bradford, as manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG, Quezon City, is immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the performance of her official functions under the Philippines-United States Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as amended.

Montoya argued that:

(a) Bradford, in ordering the search upon her person and belongings outside the NEX JUSMAG store in the presence of onlookers, had committed an improper, unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a Filipino employee and had exceeded the scope of her authority; (b) having exceeded her authority, Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the public petitioner because her liability is personal; (c) Philippine courts are vested with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is a civilian employee who had committed the challenged act outside the U.S. Military Bases; such act is not one of those exempted from the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; and (d) Philippine courts can inquire into the factual circumstances of the case to determine whether or not Bradford had acted within or outside the scope of her authority.

The doctrine of state immunity is at the core of this controversy.

Doctrine of State Immunity:

The doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, thus:

I. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al. "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act or the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrinaire of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

In the case of Baer, etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al., it was ruled that:

There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the decision reached by this Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.

Also, in Animos, et al. vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al., we held that:

. . . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner. . . . .

The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act donewith malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

The agents and officials of the United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no exception to this rule. [footnotes omitted]

In the present case, it appears that Bradford was sued for acts done beyond the scope and beyond her place of official functions. Thus she may not avail of immunity.

She may not even avail of diplomatic immunity because Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. It reads:

1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions (Emphasis supplied).

Disposition:

Petition was dismissed.