DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. BELGIUM

CASE CONCERNING THE ARREST WARRANT OF 11 APRIL 2000

Facts:

An arrest warrant was issued in 2000 by a Belgian investigating magistrate of “an international arrest warrant in absentia” this against Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi [Mr. Yerodia], the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo [Congo], was challenged before the International Court of Justice. The warrant was issued in response to the Mr. Yerodia.s involvement in the Rwandan genocide, specifically “Mr. Yerodia is accused of having made various speeches inciting racial hatred during the month of August 1998.”

The arrest warrant was issued pursuant to a Belgian [municipal] law. The crimes with which Mr. Yerodia was charged were punishable in Belgium under the Law of 16 June 1993 “concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 Additional Thereto”, as amended by the Law of 19 February 1999 “concerning the Punishment of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” This law specifically provides that “The Belgian courts shall have jurisdiction in respect of the offences provided for in the present Law, wheresoever they may have been committed”. The Belgian Law further provides that “[i]mmunity attaching to the official capacity of a person shall not prevent the application of the present Law”. The ICJ characterized this law as a “Law of Universal Jurisdiction” In the present case, according to Belgium, the complaints that initiated the proceedings as a result of which the arrest warrant was issued emanated from 12 individuals all resident in Belgium, five of whom were of Belgian nationality. It is not contested by Belgium, however, that the alleged acts to which the arrest warrant relates were committed outside Belgian territory, that Mr. Yerodia was not a Belgian national at the time of those acts, and that Mr. Yerodia was not in Belgian territory at the time that the arrest warrant was issued and circulated. That no Belgian nationals were victims of the violence that was said to have resulted from Mr. Yerodia.s alleged offences was also uncontested.

Lastly, as a result of a change in government in the Congo, Mr. Yerodia ceased to hold any ministerial post at the time the case was decided.

Contentions:

Congo

Congo contended that Belgium had violated the “principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another State”, the “principle of sovereign equality among all Members of the United Nations, as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations”, as well as “the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State, as recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court and following from Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic Relations”.

The Congo, makes it clear that this is not an action for diplomatic protection. It maintains that it is bringing these proceedings in the name of the Congolese State, on account of the violation of the immunity of its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Congo maintains that, during his or her term of office, a Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State is entitled to inviolability and to immunity from criminal process being “absolute or complete”, that is to say, they are subject to no exception. Accordingly, the Congo contends that no criminal prosecution may be brought against a Minister for Foreign Affairs in a foreign court as long as he or she remains in office, and that any finding of criminal responsibility by a domestic court in a foreign country, or any act of investigation undertaken with a view to bringing him or her to court, would contravene the principle of immunity from jurisdiction. According to the Congo, the basis of such criminal immunity is purely functional, and immunity is accorded under customary international law simply in order to enable the foreign State representative enjoying such immunity to perform his or her functions freely and without let or hindrance. The Congo adds that the immunity thus accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs when in office covers all their acts, including any committed before they took office, and that it is irrelevant whether the acts done whilst in office may be characterized or not as “official acts”.

Belgium

Belgium sought to have the case dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The objection specifically reads:

“That, in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no longer either Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a minister occupying any other position in the . . . Government [of the Congo], there is no longer a .legal dispute. between the Parties within the meaning of this term in the Optional Clause Declarations of the Parties and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in this case.”

Similarly, Belgium also contended that in light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia is no longer a minister, the case is now without object [moot].

If dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is not available, Belgium also requests the ICJ to reject the submissions of Congo on its merits and to dismiss the case. Belgium.s objection reads:

“That, in the light of the new circumstances concerning Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi, the case has assumed the character of an action of diplomatic protection but one in which the individual being protected has failed to exhaust local remedies, and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case and/or that the application is inadmissible.”

Held:

Whether or not the ICJ has Jurisdiction

The ICJ first held that it had jurisdiction over the case. In its answer to Belgium.s contention that there is no longer any “legal dispute”, the Court says:

“[A]ccording to its settled jurisprudence, its jurisdiction must be determined at the time that the act instituting proceedings was filed. Thus, if the Court has jurisdiction on the date the case is referred to it, it continues to do so regardless of subsequent events. Such events might lead to a finding that an application has subsequently become moot and to a decision not to proceed to judgment on the merits, but they cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction”

The Court then held that the case is not an action of diplomatic protection. The Court notes that the Congo has never sought to invoke before it Mr. Yerodia.s personal rights. It considers that, despite the change in professional situation of Mr. Yerodia, the character of the dispute submitted to the Court by means of the Application has not changed: the dispute still concerns the lawfulness of the arrest warrant issued in 2000 against a person who was at the time Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo. Belgium can no longer rely on the exhaustion of local remedies.

Whether or not the immunities granted to Ministers of Foreign Affairs may be afforded to Mr. Yerodia.

The ICJ held that Mr. Yerodia is immune. The relevant part of the decision reads:

In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States. In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court must therefore first consider the nature of the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs. He or she is in charge of his or her Government.s diplomatic activities and generally acts as its representative in international negotiations and intergovernmental meetings. Ambassadors and other diplomatic agents carry out their duties under his or her authority. His or her acts may bind the State represented, and there is a presumption that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, simply by virtue of that office, has full powers to act on behalf of the State (see, e.g., Art. 7, para. 2 (a), of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). In the performance of these functions, he or she is frequently required to travel internationally, and thus must be in a position freely to do so whenever the need should arise. He or she must also be in constant communication with the Government, and with its diplomatic missions around the world, and be capable at any time of communicating with representatives of other States. The Court further observes that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for the conduct of his or her State.s relations with all other States, occupies a position such that, like the Head of State or the Head of Government, he or she is recognized under international law as representative of the State solely by virtue of his or her office. He or she does not have to present letters of credence: to the contrary, it is generally the Minister who determines the authority to be conferred upon diplomatic agents and countersigns their letters of credence. Finally, it is to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that chargés d.affaires are accredited.

The Court accordingly concludes that the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties.

Thus, a distinction between ats of a Minister of Foreign affairs in an “official” or a “private” capacity must not be permitted, “or, for that matter, between acts performed before the person concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts committed during the period of office.”

Thus, if a Minister for Foreign Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or her office. The consequences of such impediment to the exercise of those official functions are equally serious, regardless of whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs was, at the time of arrest, present in the territory of the arresting State on an “official” visit or a “private” visit, regardless of whether the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed before the person became the Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while in office, and regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an “official” capacity or a “private” capacity. Furthermore, even the mere risk that, by travelling to or transiting another State a Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or herself to legal proceedings could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the purposes of the performance of his or her official functions.

The Court noted that this immunity from jurisdiction of a foreign national court, existed even when foreign national courts exercise an extended criminal jurisdiction on the basis of various international conventions that covered the prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes. However the Court emphasized that “While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.” Relevant portions of the decision read:

The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.

Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.

First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries. courts in accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law.

Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity.

Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.

Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and the future International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention. The latter.s Statute expressly provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that “[i]mmunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person”.

Disposition:

THE COURT,

(1)

(A) By fifteen votes to one,

Rejects the objections of the Kingdom of Belgium relating to jurisdiction, mootness and admissibility;

(B) By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 17 October 2000;

(C) By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not without object and that accordingly the case is not moot;

(D) By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is admissible;

(2) By thirteen votes to three,

Finds that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, and its international circulation, constituted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed under international law;

(3) By ten votes to six,

Finds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so inform the authorities to whom that warrant was circulated;

Energy and Fuels Price Hike: Case for Vegetable Oil

As of this week, the Power Companies of the Philippines are raising the prices of electricity. The prices of fuel at the pumps have hiked twice within the week.  Same story for LPG.  Because of this, the transport groups are clamoring for a two peso increase in their fares. The Railway Transit System in the capital city is also planning to raise its prices.

All doom and gloom right? Yeah, it is.

And all of these price hikes are inter-related. The price of electricity will go up following the shut-down of the Malampaya oil fields. They power generating companies claim that the new price will account for the more expensive fuels that they will be forced to import following the closing of Malampaya. The downstream oil industry is likely to be affected by this as well since they will have to compete with the power generating companies for fuel (though I am not exactly sure if they will be competing for the same sources and kinds of fuel).

The clamor of the transport groups is legitimate. They will need higher fares if they are to keep up with the fuel price hikes. As a fellow human being my heart goes out for them. (But as a motorist who is forced to share the road with the boors, I hope they go out of business. Filipinos need to learn to walk more. Hahaha) The prices of everything will also go up to account for the increased cost in transport.

See everything is inter-related.

Now, let me take this opportunity to make a point. Its the same point I made in Yolanda and the Vegetable Oil Connection. Its that we, should learn to make use of straight vegetable oil and waste vegetable oil as a fuel. In fact we should make it a viable source. No need for all that pesky transesterification to turn it into bio-diesel. Just pump it as it is into the engine. Its only the engine that needs to adapt to the fuel and not the fuel that has to adapt to the engine.

I think that vegetable oil will be a viable source of fuel for transport. And I know that in bio-fuel circles there is such a thing as a fuel-food debate, but there are alternative sources of vegetable oil that don't necessarily have to grow on agricultural land. Jatropha for example can grow on marginal lands, and algae does not need land. In fact algae is said to be very efficient in converting the sun's energy into biomass. Here is a link to do further research. Have a nice day.

Ang Yu Asuncion et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Buen Realty Corp.

(G.R. No. 109125, December 2, 1994)

Ponente: Vitug

Topic: Sales; Contract of sale v. Contract to sell; remedies for violation of right of first refusal

Facts:

Petitioners Ang Yu Asuncion et. al. are lessees of residential and commercial spaces owned by the Unjiengs. They have been leasing the property and possessing it since 1935 and have been paying rentals.

In 1986, the Unjiengs informed Petitioners Ang Yu Asuncion that the property was being sold and that Petitioners were being given priority to acquire them (Right of First Refusal). They agreed on a price of P5M but they had not yet agreed on the terms and conditions. Petitioners wrote to the Unjiengs twice, asking them to specify the terms and conditions for the sale but received no reply. Later, the petitioners found out that the property was already about to be sold, thus they instituted this case for Specific Performance [of the right of first refusal].

The Trial Court dismissed the case. The trial court also held that the Unjieng’s offer to sell was never accepted by the Petitioners for the reason that they did not agree upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no contract of sale at all. Nonetheless, the lower court ruled that should the defendants subsequently offer their property for sale at a price of P11-million or below, plaintiffs will have the right of first refusal.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.

In the meantime, in 1990, the property was sold to De Buen Realty, Private Respondent in this case. The title to the property was transferred into the name of De Buen and demanded that the Petitioners vacate the premises.

Because of this, Petitioners filed a motion for execution of the CA judgement. At first, CA directed the Sheriff to execute an order directing the Unjiengs to issue a Deed of Sale in the Petitioner’s favour and nullified the sale to De Buen Realty. But then, the CA reversed itself when the Private Respondents Appealed.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Contract of Sale is perfected by the grant of a Right of First Refusal.
2. Whether or not a Right of First Refusal may be enforced in an action for Specific Performance.

Held:

1. No. A Right of First Refusal is not a Perfected Contract of Sale under Art. 1458 or an option under Par. 2 Art 1479 or an offer under Art. 1319. In a Right of First Refusal, only the object of the contract is determinate. This means that no vinculum juris is created between the seller-offeror and the buyer-offeree.
2. No. Since a contractual relationship does not exist between the parties, a Right of First Refusal may not be enforced through an action for specific performance. Its conduct is governed by the law on human relations under Art. 19-21 of the Civil Code and not by contract law.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the CA could not have decreed at the time the execution of any deed of sale between the Unjiengs and Petitioners.

Other Rules, Comments and Discussion:

This case is notable because it lays down the rules on options contracts and right of first refusal as well as promises to buy and sell. First, the Supreme Court discussed the stages of the formation of a sales contract, these are:

1. Negotiation – covers the period from the time the prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract is concluded (perfected).
2. Perfection – takes place upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof. In a sales contract this is governed by Art. 1458
3. Consummation – begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the contract culminating in the extinguishment thereof

Until the contract is perfected (No. 2), it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation. A sales contract is perfected when a person, called the seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another, called the buyer, over which the latter agrees (Art 1458).

Under Art. 1458, there is no perfection of a sale under a “Contract to Sell”. A Contract to Sell is characterized as a conditional sale and the breach of the suspensive condition will prevent the obligation to transfer title from acquiring obligatory force.

Promises to Buy and Sell

Unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell – As long as the object is made determinate and the price is fixed, can be obligatory on the parties, and compliance therewith may accordingly be exacted. The Right of First Refusal falls under this classification.

Accepted unilateral promise – If it specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be paid and when coupled with a valuable consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may properly be termed a perfected contract of option. This contract is legally binding. (Par. 2 Art. 1458) Note however, that the option is a contract separate and distinct from the contract of sale. Once the option is exercised before it is withdrawn, a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensues and both parties are then reciprocally bound to comply with their respective undertakings.

Offers with a Period

Where a period is given to the offeree within which to accept the offer, the following rules generally govern:

1. If the period is not itself founded upon or supported by a consideration – Offeror may withdraw offer at any time before its acceptance (or knowledge of its acceptance). However, the right to withdraw must not be exercised whimsically or arbitrarily otherwise it can give rise to damages under Art. 19 of the New Civil Code
2. If period is founded on a separate consideration – This is a perfected contract of option. Withdrawal of the offer within the period of the option is deemed a breach of the contract of option (not the sale). “If, in fact, the optioner-offeror withdraws the offer before its acceptance (exercise of the option) by the optionee-offeree, the latter may not sue for specific performance on the proposed contract (“object” of the option) since it has failed to reach its own stage of perfection. The optioner-offeror, however, renders himself liable for damages for breach of the option.”
3. Earnest money – This is not an offer with a period. Earnest money is distinguished from the option contract if the consideration given will be considered as a part of the purchase price of the object of the sale. Earnest money is evidence of a perfected contract of sale. (Art. 1482)

Right of First Refusal

This is “an innovative juridical relation” because it is neither a perfected contract of sale under Art. 1458 nor an option contract under par. 2 Art 1479. The object might be made determinate, the exercise of the right, however, is dependent on the offeror’s eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but also on terms and conditions such as price. There is no juridical tie or vinculum juris.

Breach of the right cannot justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of execution under a court judgement that recognizes its existence, such as in Ang Yu Asuncion. An action for Specific Performance is not allowed under a Right of First Refusal because doing so would negate the indispensable element of consensuality in the perfection of contracts.

This right is not inconsequential because it gives right to an action for damages under Art. 19.

Other Acts that Won’t Bind

Public advertisements or solicitations – Construed as mere invitations to make offers and/or proposals.

Related Cases

The cases of Equatorial v. Mayfair and Parañaque Kings v. Court of Appeals held that if a sale happens in violation of a Right of First Refusal where the buyer is aware of the existence of that right in favor of another (such as when it is written in a lease contract), the sale may be rescinded and the seller may be forced to offer the property to the party with the Right of First Refusal.

However, the case of Ang Yu Asuncion may still be good law for cases not involving a third party buyer in bad faith.

Toyota Avanza: A Peculiar Opportunity

Let me begin by saying that I like the Toyota Avanza. Its compact, utilitarian, durable, economical and, in its second generation at least, very pretty. Just see the picture above, I am thouroughly in-love with its looks. Now, I must admit that I have never actually driven an Avanza, but I have ridden in one a number of times thanks to its ubiquity as a taxicab and because a friend gave me a lift in one a few times. My friend commended it for its economy and nimbleness.

So what is it with the Avanza that attracted me to it? Its very concept I suppose: Its spiritual predecessor is the Toyota Kijang, as it is known in Indonesia, or Tamaraw FX in as it is known in the Philippines. This is known as the father of the Asian Utility Vehicles (AUVs): Simple, tough, durable, practical and ubiquitous. This vehicle really took the Philippines by storm, especially since Filipinos have the habit of lugging aroung their families or barkadas whenvever they go on outings.

First generation Tamaraw FX

This AUV has since been imitated by many. Some historical AUVs were the Ford Fiera, the Mitsubishi Cimmaron etc. Current vehicles of the same type include the Mitsubishi Adventure, the Isuzu Crosswind and the Carolino Supremo. The Toyota Innova is the direct descendant of the Tamaraw FX.

From right to left: old gen Toyota Kijang, 2nd gen Toyota Avanza, Suzuki APV, old gen Toyota Kijang and 1st gen Toyota Avanza. (Note: picture was taken in Indonesia)

While it is these truck-like things that inspired the Avanza, especially with their rear wheel drive (RWD) layout, the Avanza is decidedly car-like. But it is not car-like in the sense of a cross-over, which retains front wheel drive. The Avanza is RWD, furthermore, its relatively low slung and yet its very spacious inside: you barely notice the center tunnel. It runs on wheels meant for compact sedans. Lower it by an inch or two and it should be the height of a Toyota Vios.

This Avanza was modified to ride lower and its rear was chopped and doors welded to turn it ito a lowrider pick up.

As I said in the beginning, I find the Avanza very pretty. I think it has something to do with the wheel-base, the wheels are positioned as far out of the center of the car as possible, it has no overhang: it simply looks stable to me, and very sporty. The body also has soft curves. I like the headlight and grille design. I like it a lot.

 Nice curves, minimal overhang.

In contrast, I find the second generation Toyota Vios very fat and ugly (I know people voted it as the best styled compact sedan but I just don't agree). I liked the old one better. The old one had less overhang and had gentler more feminine curves. The new one looks bigger (bigger than a small-body toyota) and has too much overhang. It just feels like Toyota are wasting interior space with this one. Its really an issue where a car company takes its compact car and with every succeeding generation, it gets bigger and more decadent. Just look at the Volkswagen Golf and the Toyota Corolla.

 Look at that overhang. It looks fat and ungainly. It looks like a cockroach.

This is the idea that I want to enunciate: The Avanza is a pretty car (it definitely looks better than the second generation Toyota Vios), its rear-wheel drive, its sturdy, practical, economical and ubiquitous. So why not use it as the underpinning of a compact, practical and utilitarian RWD sedan. All that the company has to do is lower the car, cut the roofline a little and add trunk space instead of a wagon-style rear. How hard is that? I'm fairly certain that it would look more dignified than a Toyota A86, and car tuners could go mad with it. Toyota can even make a “hot-hatch”. I would definitely pick an Avanza sedan over a Vios. This might just spark a renaissance with the rear wheel drive compact car: something that we have not seen since the Boxtype Lancer went out of production.

Will be be seeing taxis powersliding the Quezon City Memorial Circle anytime soon?

Update: 10/30/14

The Indonesians sure love their AUVs and they have gone crazy for the Avanza in ways that put Filipinos to shame.  Toyota in Indonesia recently had a contest to celebrate the Avanza in a modified form.  Apparently the contest is about finding the best modified Avanza.  The contest is called "Avanza Pop You UP!" feel free to google it and enjoy the pics.

Screenshot from Toyota Indonesia Website

Typhoon Yolanda and the Vegetable Oil Connection

I was just thinking about the plight of my countrymen in the Visayas who were hit by the supertyphoon “Yolanda”, or “Haiyan” as it is known internationally. Things are well, pretty bad down there. There has been looting, people are generally without shelter and thousands have died. Villages and even cities are cut off from government help, and there are no telecommunications and electricity.

I was like a “Zombie Apocalypse” and politicians were blaming each other and some claiming that there was a “Complete Systems Failure”. But the good news is that at least the downstream oil industry remains “deregulated”, i.e. prices of petroleum shot up.

This may not be the best place therefore, to kick-start a discussion of alternative energy, but please bear with me. After seeing all these reports, I thought to myself that if I were one of the victims of this disaster and I wanted to get out, I'd “loot” some 20 liter cans of vegetable oil, pop it into my old diesel car and off I go into the sunset.

This is not as incredible as it sounds. It is generally agreed that any old indirect injection diesel car will run on vegetable oil provided that the oil is viscous enough.

I own an old car. A 1987 Mitsubishi Pajero. It hs a 4d56 naturally aspirated diesel engine. And I've run it on vegetable oil. There's also this man who owns a similar car, converted to run on vegetable oil. His name is Chips Guevarra and he's pushing that the system be installed in Jeepneys. Pretty good idea if you ask me. Better than electric/hybrid cars and biodiesel.  Here's the official website.

The problem with electricity is the batteries. It would need to be charged, they are heavy, they tend to go flat after a few years. Hybrid cars still, technically, run on fossil fuels. The problem with biodiesel is that animal and vegetable fat would still have to be chemically altered in a process called transesterification, which uses methanol.

Straight vegetable oil on the other hand does not have those drawbacks. Once you have vegetable oil, you can just pop it into the car. You don't need to waste time and resources with transesterification. Waste vergetable oil (WVO) would be the most environmentally friendly since it just uses waste by-products. The problem is that you would have to collect the vegetable oil. I've tried, I can't get anything from fast food companies since they have standard operating procedures with oil disposal and it is rather unreliable to depend on the oil coming from family restaurants. Furthermore, you'd have to try and filter the oil to make sure that only clean oil gets to your car's injectors, anything less could clog the fuel delivery system and possibly damage the engine. In short: biodiesel – wasteful; WVO – Dirty and fiddly. Thus straight vegetable oil would be the way to go in an apocalypse where there is no price or market forces whatsoever.

Back to reality. If there has been a breakdown in law and order and theres no more fuel, I'd loot some vegetable oil use it as fuel and just go. I'm honestly surprised that nobody there has tried it.