[219
SCRA 192, March 1, 1993]
G.R. No. 79253
Facts:
Private respondent [Montoya] is an American citizen was employed as
an identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy Exchange (NEX) at
the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
headquarters in Quezon City. Petitioner [Bradford] also worked at
NEX JUSMAG as an “activity manager”. There was an incident on 22
January 1987 whereby Bradford had Montoya’s person and belongings
searched in front of many curious onlookers. This caused Montoya to
feel aggrieved and to file a suit for damages.
Contentions:
Bradford claimed that she was immune from suit because:
1) (This) action is in effect a suit against the United
States of America, a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its
consent for the cause of action pleaded in the complaint; and
2) Defendant, Maxine Bradford, as
manager of the US Navy Exchange Branch at JUSMAG, Quezon City, is
immune from suit for act(s) done by her in the performance of her
official functions under the Philippines-United States Military
Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as
amended.
Montoya argued that:
(a) Bradford, in ordering the search
upon her person and belongings outside
the NEX JUSMAG
store in the presence of onlookers, had committed an improper,
unlawful and highly discriminatory act against a Filipino employee
and had exceeded the scope of her authority; (b) having exceeded her
authority, Bradford cannot rely on the sovereign immunity of the
public petitioner because her liability is personal; (c) Philippine
courts are vested with jurisdiction over the case because Bradford is
a civilian employee who had committed the challenged act outside the
U.S. Military Bases; such act is not one of those exempted from the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts; and (d) Philippine courts can
inquire into the factual circumstances of the case to determine
whether or not Bradford had acted within or outside the scope of her
authority.
The doctrine of state immunity is at the core of this controversy.
Doctrine
of State Immunity:
The
doctrine of state immunity and the exceptions thereto are summarized
in Shauf vs.
Court of Appeals,
thus:
I. The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent, now expressed in Article XVI Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land
under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates
a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also
intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the
international community.
While the doctrine appears to
prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties.
The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state
itself although it has
not been formally impleaded.
It must be noted,
however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable
under all circumstances.
It is a different matter where the
public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was
clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of
Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.
"Inasmuch as
the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized
acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State,
and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights
have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity
of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to
act or the State, he violates or invades the personal and property
rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not
be sued without its consent."
The rationale for
this ruling is that the doctrinaire of state immunity cannot be used
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
In
the case of Baer,
etc. vs. Tizon, etc., et al.,
it was ruled that:
There should be no misinterpretation of the scope of the
decision reached by this Court. Petitioner, as the Commander of the
United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic
immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal
capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the
government which he represents.
Also,
in Animos, et al.
vs. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, et al., we
held that:
. . . it is equally well-settled that where a litigation
may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the
disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official
proceeded against not being liable in his personal capacity, then the
doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It has no
application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had
to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty
imposed by statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of
plaintiff or petitioner. . . . .
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They
state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may
not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private
and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of
law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act donewith
malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
The agents and officials of the
United States armed forces stationed in Clark Air Base are no
exception to this rule.
[footnotes omitted]
In the present case, it appears that Bradford was sued for acts done
beyond the scope and beyond her place of official functions. Thus
she may not avail of immunity.
She
may not even avail of diplomatic immunity because Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. It
reads:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy
immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the
case of:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent
in the receiving State outside
his official functions (Emphasis
supplied).
Disposition:
Petition was dismissed.
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