Monday, October 22, 2018

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC. vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 194964-65, January 11, 2016

Leonen, J. Second Division

Topic: Delay; Demand; Unenforceable contract

Nature: Appeal from a Decision of the CA


FACTS:

The University of Mindanao is an Educational Institution. It was chaired by Sps. Torres in the year 1982. Before then, the Sps. Torres incorporated and operated 2 thrift banks, FISLAI and DSLAI. In 1982, BSP issued standby emergency credit for FISLAI and DSLAI. This credit was evidenced by 3 promissory notes (PNs). The University of Mindanao executed a deed of real estate mortgage over its property which served as security for the thrift banks' credit. The mortgage was signed by the Vice President of the university who presented a secretary's certificate showing that he was authorized to enter into the mortgages. FISLAI and DSLAI eventually had to enter rehabilitation and were merged into Mindanao Savings and Loan Association (MSLAI). MSLAI failed to recover and was liquidated. BSP thus informed the University of Mindanao that it would foreclose the mortgaged properties.

Thus, petitioner university filed two complaints for nullification and cancellation of mortgage: one at the RTC of Iligan and another at Davao. The petitioner claims that they never received the proceeds of any loan from BSP and that it never authorized the VP to mortgage any property. Both courts ruled in favor of Petitioner and declared the Real Estate Mortgage void. On appeal, the CA consolidated both cases and ruled in favor of respondent. The CA held that Petitioner was estopped from denying the authority of its VP, that the annotations on the titles of Petitioner’s property served as constructive notice and that there was implied ratification and that since the secretary’s certificates were notarized, they enjoyed a presumption of regularity. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:

  1. Whether or not the action had prescribed.
  1. Whether or not the petitioner had validly delegated the power to mortgage to its VP Petalcorin.
  1. Whether or not the act of mortgaging the property was ratified by petitioner.

HELD:

1. NO, the action had not yet prescribed.

Prescription is the mode of acquiring or losing rights through the lapse of time. Its purpose is “to protect the diligent and vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.” The prescriptive period for actions on mortgages is ten (10) years from the day they may be brought. Actions on mortgages may be brought not upon the execution of the mortgage contract but upon default in payment of the obligation secured by the mortgage.

A debtor is considered in default when he or she fails to pay the obligation on due date and, subject to exceptions, after demands for payment were made by the creditor. Article 1169 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.

However, the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may exist:

(1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or

(2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or

(3) When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform.

Article 1193 of the Civil Code provides that an obligation is demandable only upon due date. In other words, as a general rule, a person defaults and prescriptive period for action runs when (1) the obligation becomes due and demandable; and (2) demand for payment has been made. The prescriptive period neither runs from the date of the execution of a contract nor does the prescriptive period necessarily run on the date when the loan becomes due and demandable. Prescriptive period runs from the date of demand, subject to certain exceptions.

In this case, the running of the prescriptive period for respondent’s action on the mortgages did not start when it executed the mortgage contracts with Petitioner in 1982. In view of the termination of the existence of one of the corporations, demand was rendered unnecessary, thus prescription would start to run in 1990, the due date of the contract. Therefore, respondent had until 2000 in order to institute an action on the mortgage contract. However, under Article 1155, respondent actually interrupted, the running of the prescriptive period when it sent its demand letter to petitioner on June 18, 1999.

2. NO. The relationship between a corporation and its representatives is governed by the general principles of agency. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that there must be authority from the principal before anyone can act in his or her name. Hence, without delegation by the board of directors or trustees, acts of a person—including those of the corporation’s directors, trustees, shareholders, or officers—executed on behalf of the corporation are generally not binding on the corporation. The effect of a lack of authority is that under Art. 1317 and 1403, the contract becomes unenforceable.

In this case, the trial courts found that the Secretary’s Certificate and board resolution were either non-existent or fictitious and that a board meeting giving the powers never occurred. The court is bound by the findings of fact of the trial courts.

3. NO. Ratification converts an agents unauthorized act, into an act of the principal. It is a voluntary and deliberate confirmation or adoption of a previously unauthorized act. No act by petitioner can be interpreted as anything close to ratification. It was not shown that it issued a resolution ratifying the execution of the mortgage contracts. It was not shown that it received proceeds of the loans secured by the mortgage contracts. There was also no showing that it received any consideration for the execution of the mortgage contracts. It even appears that petitioner was unaware of the mortgage contracts until respondent notified it of its desire to foreclose the mortgaged properties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated December 17, 2009 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Courts' Decisions of November 23, 2001 and December 7, 2001 are REINSTATED.

SPOUSES JAIME AND MATILDE POON v. PRIME SAVINGS BANK REPRESENTED BY THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION AS STATUTORY LIQUIDATOR

G.R. No. 183794; June 13, 2016

Sereno. J., First Division

Topic: Contracts with a penal clause; Fortuitous Event

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CA

FACTS:

The petitioners owned a commercial building. They executed a 10-year contract of lease over building with respondent Prime Savings Bank for the latter to use it as a branch office. They agreed to a fixed monthly rental with an advance payment. The contract also provided:

Should the lease[d] premises be closed, deserted or vacated by the LESSEE, the LESSOR shall have the right to terminate the lease ...

x x x

The LESSOR shall thereupon have the right to enter into a new contract with another party. All advanced rentals shall be forfeited in favor of the LESSOR.

Three years later, the BSP placed respondent under receivership of the PDIC and eventually ordered its litigation. The respondent vacated petitioner’s building and PDIC then demanded return of the advance rentals. Petitioners refused to return the advanced rentals. Thus respondent commenced this case for rescission of contract and recovery of sum of money.

The RTC ruled in favor of Petitioners and ordered the partial rescission of the contract insofar as the advance payment was forfeited. It held that the PDIC’s closure of their business was a fortuitous event. The CA affirmed but applied Art. 1229 instead.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not respondent may avail of the remedy of rescission.

2. Whether or not the closure of respondent’s business is a fortuitous event.

3. Whether or not the forfeiture of the advance rentals was a penal clause.

4. Whether or not the penalty may be equitably reduced.

HELD:

1. YES. Respondents are entitled to rescission. The legal remedy of rescission is by no means limited to the situations covered in Arts. 1381 and 1382. The New Civil Code actually uses the term “rescission” in two different contexts. The first refers to breach of contract under Art. 1191, also known as the remedy of “resolution”; the second is rescission by reason of lesion or economic prejudice under Art. 1381. The first is a principal action based on breach of a party, while the second is a subsidiary action. From the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that respondent’s right of action rests on the alleged abuse of petitioner’s right under the contract on the theory that petitioner tenaciously enforced their right to forfeit the advanced rentals which was in bad faith since they knew that respondent was already insolvent. IN other words, respondents are seeking rescission under Art. 1191.

2. NO. The closure of respondent’s business was neither a fortuitous or unforeseen event. In this case, for it to be considered a fortuitous event, there has to be bad faith or arbitrariness on the part of the BSP. Instead, its decision to place respondent under receivership and liquidation was pursuant to R.A. No. 7653, moreover, respondent was partially accountable for closure of its banking business. Neither is this case, a case of unforeseen event under Art. 1267. After all, parties to a contract are presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable developments. It is only in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstance therefore that equity demands assistance for the debtor. In Tagaytay Realty vs. Gacutan the requisites for the application of Art. 1267 are:

1. The event could not have been foreseen at the time of the execution of the contract.

2. It makes performance of the contract extremely difficult but not impossible.

3. It must not be due to the act of any of the parties.

4. The contract is for a future prestation.

The case explains that mere inconvenience, unexpected impediments, increased expenses or even pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement will not relieve the obligor from an undertaking that it has knowingly and freely contracted. In this case, the first and third requisites are lacking. Since the lease was for 10 years, the parties should have considered the possibility of closure of business.

3. YES. The forfeiture clause in the contract is penal in nature. A provision is a penal clause if it calls for the forfeiture of any remaining deposit still in the possession of the lessor without prejudice to any other obligation still owing, in the event of the termination or cancellation of the agreement by reason of the lessee’s violation of any of the terms and conditions thereof. This kind of agreement may be validly entered into the by the parties. In this case, it is evident that the stipulation on the forfeiture of advance rentals is a penal in the sense that it provides for liquidated damages. The penalty for the premature termination of the contract works both ways. The penalty was to compel respondent to complete the 10-year term of the lease. Petitioners, too were similarly obliged to ensure the peaceful use of the building by respondent for the duration of the lease under paid of losing the remaining advance rentals paid by the respondent.

4. YES. A reduction of the penalty agreed upon by the parties is warranted under Article 1229 of the New Civil Code.

The general rule is that courts have no power to ease the burden of obligations voluntarily assumed by parties, just because things did not turn out as expected at the inception of the contract. It must be noted that this case was initiated by the PDIC in furtherance of its statutory role as the fiduciary of Prime Savings Bank. As the state-appointed receiver and liquidator, the PDIC is mandated to recover and conserve the assets of the foreclosed bank on behalf of the latter's depositors and creditors. In other words, at stake in this case are not just the rights of petitioners and the correlative liabilities of respondent lessee. Over and above those rights and liabilities is the interest of innocent debtors and creditors of a delinquent bank establishment. These overriding considerations justify the 50% reduction of the penalty agreed upon by petitioners and respondent lessee in keeping with Article 1229 of the Civil Code, which provides for an equitable reduction of the penalty in some cases.

Under the circumstances, it is neither fair nor reasonable to deprive depositors and creditors of what could be their last chance to recoup whatever bank assets or receivables the PDIC can still legally recover. Strict adherence to the doctrine of freedom of contracts, at the expense of the rights of innocent creditors and investors, will only work injustice rather than promote justice in this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 29 November 2007 and its Resolution dated 10 July 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75349 are hereby MODIFIED in that legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the monetary award computed from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

Monday, June 18, 2018

THE ROLE OF CULTURE IN SOCIAL CHANGE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Social change may be described as the development of a backward society into a more modern one.  This means that the society will develop more differentiated institutions and a more egalitarian structure.  For social change to occur, some authors believe that socioeconomic development has to happen first.  This makes the topic of social change interesting to those studying developing countries.

This essay seeks to draw the link between culture and social change and to apply it to the case of the Philippines at the macro level.  This essay will use the term modernization to describe the social change that is going on.

This essay shows that the relationship between culture and social change is a very complicated one and that it will be foolish to make the simplistic conclusion of culture as either a hindrance of a facilitator of social change.  There will certainly be some cultures that are more receptive to social change and others that are less tolerant of change.  Social change may also occur from outside the “mainstream culture”—i.e. coming from subcultures and even from diaspora communities.  Social change may even be “planned” such as when government imposes a language policy.  The main lesson this essay would like to impress is that one should never disregard culture in modernization of society.  A culture may adopt well to a modernizing environment while another culture may hinder modernization from taking place, in which case, culture and modernization must be reconciled by looking for techniques or processes that make use of the existing elements of the culture of that society.

Culture and Society

Culture may be defined as a set of values, norms, traditions and language in social structure (Geertz, 1973).  Culture also has a set of sanctions (feelings like guilt or shame for example) that provides incentives for a society’s members to act according to what the culture prescribes.

A group of people that share a similar culture is called a society.  Members of society learn this culture and then pass it down from one generation to the next in what is known as socialization.  Socialization in turn is carried out in social structures known as institutions (Schaeffer, 2006).  In the Philippines, the major institutions that carry out socialization are the family, schools and religious institutions (Wurfel, 1988).  Thus one can say that institutions are the means through which culture is transmitted and society is formed.  In this case, social change is heavily dependent on social institutions.

For this essay, I will use the term “modernization” to describe social change.  Some authors would use modernization and social change synonymously, however, there is a normative connotation with the word modernization whereas social change refers to any change whether good or bad (Haferkamp & Smelser, 1992).  A modern society must thus be described as one in which institutions have become more differentiated and specialized; human behavior becomes more rational and; society generally becomes more secular.

Social change is seen in changes in social structure and social institutions. In a traditional society, social structure places emphasis on authority. As society modernizes, it increasingly places greater emphasis on bargaining relations:  meaning that a society will, over time, come to prefer democracy over authoritarianism; gender equality over gender bias; greater value of self-expression; etc. (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

Lastly, social change occurs together with socio-economic development. This means that an increase in productivity and income has to occur before specialization, differentiation and shift in social structure takes place (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).  Thus, for a developing country, in order to have social change, it would have to uplift the lives of the majority of its people.

Culture and Modernization in a Developing Country:  Path Dependence?

Given the above relationship between culture and social change, in a developing country, we can arrive at the generalization:  “Cultural traditions are enduring”  In other words, there is such a thing as “path dependence” in social change.  In other words, a society’s culture three generations ago may still manifest itself in the present (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).  This explains why countries with the same religion one-hundred years ago, seem to share the same development history (for example, the Islamic Middle East and Roman Catholic Latin America) and even though a country becomes secularized and religion no longer plays a significant role, its influence is still seen in the values that a society holds (For example, resistance to divorce and Abortion in predominantly Catholic European countries until recent times and the role of women in the Islamic Middle East).

Traditional cultures are generally wary of innovation and tend to protect the status quo.  Therefore, the inability of some societies to cope with pressures stemming from modernization may simply be due to “culture lag” or when the non-material aspects of culture have not yet adjusted to changes in technology or other influences (Shaefer, 2006).

Thus, culture in terms of a developing country can be conceptualized as a constraint to modernization.  The solution in this case would be to work around the problem, i.e. developing production processes that use local know-how and and available raw materials such as through the making of local crafts for export, and, as in the case of the Japanese Zaibatsu, utilize pre-existing social networks in order to make enterprise work.

While cultures and traditions may be enduring, they are also subject to change.  For example, the authoritarian values that the mainland Chinese held may erode as their culture modernizes.

Modernization in the Philippines

The Philippines has its own very specific experiences in relation to culture and modernization.  In this article, we look at Philippine Language policies and the role of diaspora communities in the propagation of a “modern society.”

Language

In the context of this macro-level analysis of Philippine culture, language policy is very significant.  Language acts as the vehicle through which culture is transmitted to other members of society.  Institutions will not function without some form of language.  The institution of education will be particularly affected by any language policy.

Language is one area in which social change may be stunted or facilitated.  Depending on the context, the institution of a national language may facilitate the modernization of society through the introduction of specialized technical vocabulary and the writing of scientific literature.  One can also see what values, norms and traditions a society values by studying the vocabulary the language of that society contains.  Languages also expand their vocabularies over time in response to new developments in science, production processes and ways of life—a society’s level of advancement may be measured in terms of the number of words its language contains relating to philosophical, scientific, technical or other abstract concepts as well as the size of its literary corpus.

Throughout history, states have often embarked on language policies in order to facilitate communication throughout its territory.  Notable examples are the French who almost completely wiped out non-Parisian French and instituted the Académie Française in 1634 in order to regulate the French language and to keep it pure.  Spain also embarked on a similar policy of establishing and propagating the Castillian dialect through the Real Academia Española (founded in 1713).  Castillian Spanish was also propagated throughout its colonies and regulated by the same academy.  These measures facilitated communication within their countries and also fostered a sense of nationalism and a sense of belonging to a society and culture.  In the Philippines, when Tagalog was chosen as the national language, the Surian ng Wikang Pambansa was established and this was expected to fill the same role as the language academies of France and Spain.

To be sure, the language situation in the Philippines is less homogenous as contemporary France and Spain.  From the beginning, there were many languages and dialects spoken in pre-hispanic times.  When the Spanish came, they learned these many languages and used them to spread the gospel, and never seriously attempted to impose Spanish on the natives.  Thus, the native dialects were preserved and formalized.

When the Philippines came under American rule, English was first used as a medium of instruction and communication.  It was taught to the masses of Filipinos during the American period.  During the Commonwealth, Tagalog was chosen as the “National Language” of the Philippines.  One of the reasons for its choosing was that Tagalog had the most well developed literature and vocabulary of other Philippine languages.1  At the time the Philippines was granted independence from America in 1946 and up to today, the Philippines has underwent many different language teaching policies.  This ranged from bilingual education at all levels to Tagalog/Filipino/Vernacular education at the early grades (Asuncion-Lande, 1971).

These language policies has been linked by educators to the poor performance of Filipino students relative to other countries.  Whereas students in other countries may learn in their native language, Filipinos have to learn in a foreign language, even in their formative years.  This stunts the ability of students to think properly and to use both the mother tongue and other foreign languages.  At the present, Philippine education recognizes the educational value of local dialects in promoting “mother tongue” education in the first grade.

Therefore, culture may also be subjected to government planning, at least to the institutional level of Education (more basal institutions such as the Family maybe somewhat more difficult to penetrate and manipulate).  The effects may not be optimal, but the point is that it may be manipulated by factors external to the culture itself.

Subcultures and Diaspora

One cannot assume that a society is homogenous.  There will be those members who belong to subcultures, there will also be those who exist outside of the traditional boundaries associated with a society or diaspora.  these two divisions in culture have roles to play in social change.

Subcultures are those groups that exist within a society which distinguish themselves from that society by having “different patterns of mores, folkways, and values that differs from the pattern of larger society” (Schaeffer, 2006: 44).  In the Philippines, Wurfel (1988) lists down two major subcultures, the Chinese and the Muslim.  in the case of the Chinese subculture, they exert n influence in society disproportionate to their population and distribution by virtue of their economic power and international connections.  the Muslim subculture on the other hand is marginalized, economically and politically compared to the rest of the Philippine society.  The existence of these two subcultures seems to challenge the dominant social norms:  Muslims dream of a “Bangsa Moro,” which opposes the very idea of being a “Filipino”; while the Chinese maintain economic and diplomatic ties to Chine while contributing to social change though their efforts in economic activities.

A culture’s diaspora can also serve as a source of social change.  These groups  of people who belong to the larger society while living living in a different culture would develop a unique way of looking at the world because of their exposure to different cultures.  This diaspora may have the ability to look at the society in which they belonged and compare it to the society which adopted them.  If this diaspora returns, they can bring with them new ideas.  This is the principle underlying John Lie’s (2001) claim that nationalist movements often originate from a diaspora.  This can also apply to the case of social change, a society may apply what is learned from one culture to their own, thus bringing about social change.  This happened to the Philippines in the 1880s-1890s when the Ilustrados in Spain dreamed up the idea of a “Philippines.”  It is also expected that the current diaspora, should they return to the Philippines, bring with them what they learned from abroad.

Conclusion

One can see that social change is a complicated process.  Culture is made up of the values, norms, language and sanctions of a society.  Social change will be dependent on the conservatism or openness of that society as well as the knowledge already contained within that society.  A developing country is disadvantaged in the sense that its indigenous culture may not be open to adopting modern economic and political processes that are known to work well in other countries.  This can be solved not by adopting the process wholesale, but to adopt it in such a fashion that it is compatible with the existing culture.  Alternatively, a country can embark on cultural policies aimed at developing culture although the track record shows that this contains many uncertainties and often fails.


References

Asuncion-Lande, N. (1971).  “Multilingualism, politics and “filipinism””.  Asian Survey.  11(7), 677-692

Geertz, C. (1973).  The interpretation of culture.  New York:  Basic Books

Haferkamp, H. & Smelser, N. (1992).  “Introduction.”  In Social change and modernity.  H. Haferkamp & N. Smelser (Eds.). University of California

Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, cultural change and democracy:  The human development sequence. Cambridge

Lie. J. (2001).  “Diasporic Nationalism.”  Cultural Studies, 1(3), 355-362

Schaefer, R. (2006). Sociology Matters 2nd ed. McGraw Hill

Wurfel, D. (1988).  Filipino politics:  Development and decay.  Cornell University Press

1The selection of Tagalog is interesting in the discussion because it was selected because it was supposedly well-developed or more “modern.” Social change may be seen as the object of the propagation of a more modern culture in this case.



Sunday, May 13, 2018

GREAT PACIFIC LIFE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-31845; April 30, 1979

FACTS:

On March 14, 1957, the private respondent Ngo Hing (Hing) filed an application with Great Pacific Life (Pacific Life) for a twenty year endowment policy on the life of his one-year old daughter. Hing gave the amount of the annual premium to the Branch Manager of Pacific Life, petitioner Mondragon. A binding deposit receipt was thereafter issued to Hing, likewise the Mondragon handwrote at the bottom of the page of his insurance application a strong recommendation for approval. Then on April 30, 1957, Mondragon received a letter from Pacific Life informing him of the disapproval of the application stating that the policy is not available to persons below 7 years old and instead recommended a different policy for the approval of Hing.

Mondragon did not communicate the disapproval to Hing and instead wrote back to Pacific Life strongly recommending the approval of the policy. It was then that Hing’s daughter died because of influenza. Hing tried to collect the proceeds of the insurance, which Pacific Life refused to pay.

The CFI ruled in favor of the suit for recovery of money filed by Hing and ordered the payment of the insurance proceeds.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the binding deposit receipt constituted a temporary contract of life insurance;

2. Whether or not Hing concealed the state of health and physical condition of his daughter.

HELD:

1. NO. The fine print at the back of the binding deposit receipt provides that it only constitutes a temporary contract only when the company is satisfied that the applicant is insurable according to the standard rates or upon offer and acceptance of a different policy. Said binding deposit receipt does not bind the company if the application was eventually rejected. It is merely conditional and does not insure outright. In this case, since Pacific Life eventually disapproved the application, the binding deposit receipt in question had never become in force at any time.

As held in earlier cases, “a contract of insurance, … must be assented to by both parties either in person or by their agents….”

2. YES. The facts show that when Hing supplied the data for the insurance application, he was fully aware that his one-year old daughter was a mongoloid child—a congenital defect which could not be hidden or disguised. Nevertheless, Hing withheld such material fact from the company, which he knows he had the responsibility to disclose. The contract of insurance is one of perfect good faith (uberrima fides) meaning good faith; absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty; the absence of any concealment or deception however slight. Concealment is the neglect to communicate that which a party knows and ought to communicate. The concealment entitles the insurer to rescind the contract of insurance.

Wherefore, the Court held that no insurance contract was perfected between the parties.


ENRIQUEZ VS. SUN LIFE INSURANCE OF CANADA

G.R. No. L-15895; November 29, 1920

FACTS:

This is an action made by the adminstrator of the estate of Joaquin Herrer of P6,000.00 paid by the deceased for a life annuity on the ground that the contract for a life annuity had not been perfected.

Joaquin Herrer made an application with Sun Life for a life annuity. He paid the amount of P6,000.00 to the Manila manager who gave him a "provisional" receipt "subject to medical examination and approval of the Company's Central Office." The application was forwarded to the head office in Canada and the policy was issued on December 4, 1917 in Canada. Meanwhile, on December 18, 1917, Herrer's attorney wrote to the Manila Office stating that Herrer wanted to withdraw his application to which the office wrote a letter dated November 26, 1917 stating that the policy had already been issued. The letter was received by the attorney on December 21, 1917. Herrer had died a day earlier on December 20, 1920.

The trial court ruled that the contract had been perfected, hence this appeal.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not the policyholder had received notice of the acceptance of his policy;

  1. Whether or not the contract of life annuity was perfected.

HELD:

1. NO. The facts clearly show that Herrer was not informed of the acceptance of the policy before his death.

2. NO. The contract was not perfected. Art. 1262 provides that acceptance by letter does not bind the person making the offer except from the time it came to his knowledge. The pertinent fact is that according to the provisional receipt, the insurance company had to: 1) conduct a medical examination; 2) had to obtain the head office's approval; and 3) somehow communicate such approval. It is true that the letter notifying acceptance was deposited in the post office, but the fact of notification is a rebuttable presumption and the facts clearly show that Herrer never received the notice of the acceptance before his death.


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Monday, February 12, 2018

COULD THE DENGVAXIA TRAGEDY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED?:

What might have been had Noynoy Aquino been Impeached in 2015.


Back in 2015, nobody knew of the human drama and tragedy that was about to unfold involving some 800,000 school children and their families and of the waste of some 3.5 Billion pesos worth of taxpayer’s money.  I am of course, referring to the Dengvaxia controversy.

anti-dengue%20vaccine

(Source:  CNN Philippines)


Well documented are the meetings President Aquino and his Cabinet secretaries had with Sanofi, makers of the vaccine.  It is also clear as day that regardless of the merits of the Dengvaxia vaccine, its procurement was railroaded and implemented in record time.  The whole purchase reeks of irregularity and of an administration drunk with impunity.


The timeline for this purchase was around November 2014, when the first meeting between President Aquino and Sanofi executives took place in China. Within the year, Sanofi arranged to have the drug included in the Philippine National Formulary even if it had not undergone sufficient testing.  Then, in a blitz on December 2015, Aquino and DOH Secretary Janette Garin met with Sanofi official, submitted a proposal to the DBM for its purchase and licensed the drug as a Dengue Vaccine for “all types of Individuals from 9-45 years old living in high-risk areas.”


It is simply chilling and mind-boggling to learn that this tragedy was very nearly avoided.


We recall back in July of 2014, there was a move to impeach then President Noynoy Aquino over the Disbursement Allocation Plan (DAP) controversy.  Three complaints, one filed by Oliver Lozano, another filed by Buboy Syjuco and another filed by Neri Colmenares.  The impeachment complaint was unsurprisingly thrown out in September of that year by the highly sympathetic House of Representatives.  Had the impeachment succeeded in gaining traction, the impeachment may very well have prevented the tragedy that was to become Dengvaxia.  Worse may have been that the failure of the impeachment may have further emboldened Aquino, who, unsurprisingly, used the same DAP playbook in raising the funds for Dengvaxia.

(A news report from that time)

Some have argued that the same would have been a waste of time, as it was already the twilight of Benigno Aquino III’s administration.  We could weather whatever incompetence and “Noynoying” that was about to come right?  Political stability was the more important concern back then.


Let us mull the irony of this argument for a moment.


Of course, one shouldn’t impeach an official on the basis of preventing something he/she might do just as much as one shouldn’t withhold impeachment on the argument that his/her term is about to end.  We punish an official on the basis of what he/she has done and not on the basis of damage potential.


To Impeach or not to Impeach

The takeaway is this:  It is never too late in the day to impeach an official.  Once that person has committed an impeachable offense, it is time to let him go, regardless of the damage he might or might not do.