VICTORIANO vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZAALDE ROPE FACTORY

G.R. No. L-25246; September 12, 1974; 59 SCRA 54
Ponente: Zaldivar Sec. 18, Article II 1987 Constitution:
  "The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare."

Facts:

Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of Elizalde Rope Factory and was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union. Membership with the Union was mandatory as provided for under a collective bargaining agreement: "Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement."

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

Being a member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation with labor organizations, the Petitioner wrote a letter informing the Union of his resignation. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.

The CFI ruled in favor of Petitioner and enjoined the company from dismissing him.

In its appeal, the Union claimed that R.A. no. 3350 was unconstitutional on the ground that 1) prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto; and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious [to the] Constitution; 2) Impairs the obligation of contracts; 3) discriminates in favor of certain religious sects and affords no protection to labor unions; 4) violates the constitutional provision that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right; 5) violates the equal protection clause; and 6) the act violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice.
Issue:

Whether or not R.A. No. 3350 violates the Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their welfare notwithstanding the fact that it allows some workers, by virtue of their religious beliefs, to opt out of Union security agreements. Held:

NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.

More so now in the [1987 and past in constitutions] [...] where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. In the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.