Vda. DE BATACLAN vs. MEDINA

FACTS:

Medina is the owner and operator of a bus. This bus, on Sept. 13, 1952 around 2:00AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite, crashed and fell into a ditch. Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-zagged and turned turtle into the ditch. Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of the passengers were able to get out, but Bataclan and 3 others were trapped. It appears that the bus drivers and the passengers who already got out did not try to help Bataclan et al get out, instead, about 10 of the locals in the area came to their aid, they were carrying a burning torch for illumination, but then a fierce fire started and engulfed the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It appears that there was a gas leak from the bus and it caught fire from the torch the would-be rescuers were using.

The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.

The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage where Medina undertook to take Bataclan to his destination safely. The trial court also found that there was negligence on the part of Medina since at the time of the blow-out, the bus was speeding. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries suffered by Bataclan and not by his death, the proximate cause of which was the fire, which was not caused by Medina.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of the bus company, which was the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan.

HELD:

Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the bus, because of the overturning, it leaked gas which is not unnatural or unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of the trapped passengers was most likely because the driver and the conductor went out looking for help. It is only natural that the would-be rescuers bring with them a torch because it was 2:30AM and the place was unlit. The fire could also be attributed to the bus driver and conductor because he should have known, from the circumstances, and because he should have been able to smell gasoline and therefore he should have warned the rescuers not to bring the torch. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

Proximate Cause – “‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.’”