FACTS:
Medina
is the owner and operator of a bus.
This bus, on
Sept. 13, 1952 around 2:00AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite, crashed and
fell into a ditch. Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-zagged and
turned turtle into the ditch. Bataclan was one of the 18
passengers. Most of the passengers were able to get out, but
Bataclan and 3 others were trapped. It appears that the bus drivers
and the passengers who already got out did not try to help Bataclan
et al get out, instead, about 10 of the locals in the area came to
their aid, they were carrying a burning torch for illumination, but
then a fierce fire started and engulfed the bus and killed Bataclan
et al. It appears that there was a gas leak from the bus and it
caught fire from the torch the would-be rescuers were using.
The
heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.
The
trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage
where Medina undertook to take Bataclan to his destination safely.
The trial court also found that there was negligence on the part of
Medina since at the time of the blow-out, the bus was speeding.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant
carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial
court argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries suffered by
Bataclan and not by his death, the proximate cause of which was the
fire, which was not caused by Medina.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of the bus
company, which was the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan.
HELD:
Yes.
In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the overturning
of the bus, because of the overturning, it leaked gas which is not
unnatural or unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of the trapped
passengers was most likely because the driver and the conductor went
out looking for help. It is only natural that the would-be rescuers
bring with them a torch because it was 2:30AM and the place was
unlit. The fire could also be attributed to the bus driver and
conductor because he should have known, from the circumstances, and
because he should have been able to smell gasoline and therefore he
should have warned the rescuers not to bring the torch. Said
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the
codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759
and 1763.
Proximate
Cause – “‘that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.’
And more comprehensively, ‘the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain
of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.’”