ORDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 92625; December 26, 1990

FACTS:

Private Respondent Gil Galang (Gil) filed a case with the Trial court of San Pablo City in order to regain custody of his minor daughter who was staying with her maternal grandparents, petitioner’s herein. Her mother had already died when the case was initiated. The Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the petitioners, Orda, had moved to Bataan, hence the court lost jurisdiction. Subsequently, Gil commenced an original action for habeas corpus with the Court of Appeals over his minor daughter. The Court of Appeals, finding that based of the arguments presented by both parties, a full blown trial is required, accordingly, the CA issued the assailed order remanding the case to the RTC of San Pablo City. The Court of appeals later clarified the order as a “referral” of the case to the RTC because it was an original case submitted to it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals may refer a petition for habeas corpus originally filed with it to the Regional Trial Court for a full-blown trial due to conflicting facts presented by the parties.

HELD:

NO. While the case requires a full-blown trial of the facts, the same should be done in the context of the special proceedings for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, and not a remand or referral of the original action for a writ of habeas corpus filed with the respondent court. Parenthetically, the proper venue in this action is the place where the petitioner therein resides.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered DISMISSING the petition for habeas corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the filing by private respondent of the appropriate special proceedings to gain custody of his minor child.

BARTOLOME vs. SSS and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES

 

Citation: G.R. No. 192531; November 12, 2014

Ponente: Velasco; THIRD DIVISION

Doctrine:

Repeal of laws

Relative; definition

Reversion of parental authority; death of adoptive parent

FACTS:

Petitioner Bernardina Bartolome (Bartolome) was the biological mother of John Colcol (John). John was a seaman and he died due to an accident while on duty. Bartolome sought to claim death benefits from the SSS as she was the sole heir and beneficiary of John.

Her request was denied. The SSS explained that she is “no longer considered the parent of JOHN as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on the documents you submitted to us.

Cornelio Colcol was John's great grandfather. The decree of adoption attained finality in February of 1985 while john was just 2 years old.

Based on these facts, the SSS claimed that Bartolome is no longer the legitimate parent of John and is thus not entitled to Employees compensation. That the legitimate parent is now Cornelio Colcol.

Respondents cite the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation which states:

RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES

SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time of employee’s death.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries; and

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the interpretation of the ECC stating that only legitimate parents may benefit from compensation is correct.

2. Whether or not Petitioner qualifies as a dependent parent notwithstanding her son's adoption by someone else.

HELD:

1. No. The interpretation is incorrect. Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code on employee's compensation provides that beneficiaries are the “dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.” The ECC on the other hand, interpreted this provision to state that only “legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support.”

This is unauthorized administrative legislation. Article 7 of the New Civil Code states that:

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law.

Guided by this doctrine, We find that the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase “dependent parents” to refer to “legitimate parents.”

2. YES. The Supreme Court also noted that three years after the adoption decree, Cornelio died while John was still a minor. John's minority at the time of his adopter's death is a significant factor because under such circumstance, parental authority must be deemed to have reverted back to the biological parent. Adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption—who was then left to care for the adopted minor child if the adopter passed away?

Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

xxx

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

xxx

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.

The Supreme Court thus ordered the ECC to release the benefits to petitioner Bartolome.

THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE DRAFTING OF P.D. NO. 1083

 

The five principles that guided the code commission in drafting of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws are:

1. Since Islamic law is already considered a complete system of laws that comprise civil, criminal, commercial, political laws, etc., only those that were fundamentally personal in nature were codified.

2. Of the personal laws, those relative to acts which are absolute duties under Muslim law are included. Those acts which are absolutely prohibited remain prohibited.

3. Where the provisions of law on certain subjects were too complicated for a code, only fundamental principles were to be stated, and the details were left to judges for implementation.

4. No precept was to be incorporated in the code where it appeared to be contrary to the principles of the Constitution of the Philippines.

5. No precept of law was to be included unless it was based on the principles of Islamic law, as expounded by the four orthodox (Sunni) schools.

 

 

Source:  Commentaries on the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines with Jurisprudence and Special Procedure (2011) by Bensaudi I. Arabani, Sr. Manila:  Rex Printing Company, Inc.