JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and ERASMO

G.R. No. 191970; April 24, 2012

Ponente:  Abad

Doctrine: Proof required to establish domicile of a reinstated Filipino citizen running for governor of a province

FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City.  He migrated to Australia when he was eight years old and acquired Australian citizenship.  In 2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived in Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was issued a certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration and he renounced his Australian citizenship. 

Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the registration.  COMELEC approved the application and included Jalosjos in the voter's list.  This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the RTC.

Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections.  Erasmo filed a petition to cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply with the one year residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC).

COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that when he first moved back to the Philippines, he was merely a guest or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot claim Ipil as his domicile.  Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

HELD:

NO.  The COMELEC is incorrect.  Jalosjos has successfully proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay.

The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the province for at least one year before the elections.  For the purposes of election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile:  i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place, but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention.  To determine compliance with the residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:

   (a)               every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;

(b)               where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and

(c)               a person can have but one domicile at a time.

The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city.  When he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.  On the other hand, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines.  By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother's house.  A candidate is not required to have a house in order to establish his residence or domicile in that place.  It is enough that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.  To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office.  What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified that he was physically present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with political leaders and local and national party mates, furthermore, he is a registered voter by final judgement of the RTC.  The court also noted that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay.  This, without a doubt is sufficient to establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

DISPOSITIVE

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated February 11, 2010 and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMELEC and MONTEJO

G.R. No. 119976; September 18, 1995

Ponente:  Kapunan

FACTS:

Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) in the First district of Leyte in order that she will be able to run for Congress of that district in the 1995 elections.  Her COC stated that she was a resident of Leyte for seven months.  Private Respondent Montejo, a rival candidate filed a petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos on the ground that she did not meet the one year residency requirement as provided for in the Constitution.  In response, Marcos amended her COC changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood".  Marcos claimed that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence." She further claimed that she is entitled to the correction of her COC on the ground that her original entry of "seven months" was the result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake". 

The COMELEC granted the petition to cancel the COC and to disqualify Marcos.  It held that the animus revertendi of Marcos was not Tacloban, but San Juan, Manila, because that where she chose to live after she went back to the Philippines after her well-publicized exile in the US.  It explained that while Petitioner grew up in Tacloban, after her graduation, however, she moved to Manila where she became a registered voter, became a member of the Batasang Pambansa as a representative of Manila and eventually became Governor of Manila.  This, according to the COMELEC debunks her claim that she was a resident of Leyte 1st District "since childhood".

ISSUE:

1.  Whether or not Petitioner is a resident of Leyte for election purposes.

2.  Whether or not Petitioner lost her domicile after she married and lived with her husband in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan.

HELD: 

1.  YES.

The Supreme Court declared in this case that for purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile.  The decision of the COMELEC however, shows that they confused the concept of "Domicile" with "actual residence".

                Domicile versus Residence

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence."  In a past case, the Court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."  Thus, domicile is composed of the two elements of:

1.  The fact of residing/physical presence in a fixed place; and

2.  Animus manendi - the intention of returning permanently

               

Residence on the other hand merely refers to the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place.  It is mere physical presence.  Residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.  If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.  Domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.

A person can have different residences in various places, but he can only have a single domicile. Note however, that a person may abandon a domicile in favor of another.

                Domicile of Petitioner is in Tacloban

Petitioner Marcos' domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte.  The fact that she has a residence in Manila does not mean that she has lost her domicile in that province.  The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence.  Applying this doctrine to the case of petitioner, the fact that she has registered to vote and resided in Ilocos Norte and in San Juan do not unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile in Tacloban.  Even while residing in various places, petitioner kept close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

2.  NO

                The domicile of origin

Note further that when petitioner Imelda Marcos was born, her domicile followed that of her parents.  Hence, her domicile of origin was Tacloban.  Once acquired, domicile is retained until a new one is gained.  The domicile of origin is not easily lost.  To effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1.  An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2.  A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3.  Acts which correspond with the purpose.

                               

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. 

                Effect of marriage as to the domicile of origin

Article 110 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to this article or to the concepts of domicile or residence does not suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband upon marriage.  This article clearly refers to actual residence and not domicile and merely establishes the default rule in fulfilling the obligation of the spouses "to live together" in article immediately preceding Art. 110.

When Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. Mr. Marcos had several places of residence at the time:  San Juan and Ilocos Norte.  Assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence.  She did not lose her domicile of origin.

This rule has changed with the advent of the Family code with the introduction of the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile".  This underscores the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.

Even assuming that Petitioner's domicile was lost, her acts unequivocally show an intent to reestablish a domicile in Tacloban, Leyte because Petitioner, as early as in 1992, already obtained her residence certificate in Tacloban.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION vs. NTC and PLDT

G.R. No. L-63318; August 18, 1984

Ponente: Makasiar

Topic:  Statutory interpretation

Doctrine:  The word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest in the law itself.

FACTS:

Respondent NTC promulgated a decision (NTC decision) dated November 22, 1982 which approved a revised schedule of rates (translation: phone bills went up) which was within the limits of P.D. No. 217, the law which regulated the telephone industry.  Petitioner, Philippine Consumer Foundation (PCF) filed this petition seeking to annul this decision. 

On November 25, 1983, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision annulling the NTC decision.  This decision interpreted the following phraseology of Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 as mandatory:

“The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose, pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated” (italics supplied).

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Section 2 of P.D. No. 217 is mandatory.

HELD:

The basic canon of Statutory Construction is that the word used in the law must be given its ordinary meaning, unless the contrary intent is manifested.  The phrase “may be promulgated” cannot be construed to mean “shall” or “must”.  Section 2 must therefore be interpreted in its ordinary sense as permissive or discretionary and not mandatory on the part of the delegate, NTC.

What is mandatory however, is the immediate implementation of the policies declared in P.D. No. 217.

Note that both words “shall” and “may be” are used in the same section which demonstrates that the ordinary, usual or normal distinction between these words is preserved.

It must be emphasized that P.D. No. 217 [which is a special law] only repeals pertinent portions of Act 3436 and the Public Service Act [which is a general law regulating all manner of public franchises] and that the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of the NTC was adequately served by their own rules of procedure.  This meant that the acts complained of by NCF, i.e. the fixing of provisional rates without public hearing (Section 16 of the public service act), was a valid act.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF NOVEMBER 25, 1983 IS HEREBY RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE AND THE PETTION IS HEREBY DISMISSED.