PEOPLE vs PARAGSA

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-44060; July 20, 1978

Topic:  Evidence; admissions and confessions; admission by silence; (Sec. 32, Rule 130)

FACTS:

Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 ½ year old girl, Mirasol Magallanes.  The information alleged that victim was alone in her house when the Benben entered, intimidated her with a hunting knife, forced her to lie in bed and there they had intercourse.  The deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on the door of victim’s house. Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that she had seen the accused exiting the house when she came knocking.  The victim did not reveal what happened to her until 6 days after the incident. 

Accused interposed the “Sweetheart defense”.  Defense claims in effect that there was no force or intimidation involved and that what Aunt Lita saw was not the aftermath of a rape, but was rather consensual sexual intercourse.  Accused also presented witnesses claiming that they were indeed sweethearts.

The CFI convicted Benben.  CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:

The main issue boils down to the question of who is more credible, the defense or the prosecution?  Thus, whether or not the evidence justifies a conviction.

HELD:

NO.  A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. The Supreme court noted the absence of intimidation considering that the act took place in the daytime, in her house where she is surrounded by her neighbors.  The victim could also have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and not 3 days after.

Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of the allegation that the victim and accused were sweethearts.  They did not bother to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications previously.  As to this silence, the Supreme Court explained:

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth … is applicable in criminal cases provided: 1) that he heard and understood the statement; 2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.

DECISION:  Acquittal.

AMERICAN WIRE AND CABLE CO. vs. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS

 

G.R. No. L-26557; February 18, 1970

FACTS:

• Petitioner American Wire and Cable Company (American) is the owner of the registered trademark DURAFLEX and Device for electric wires. 
  
  
• On June 1962, private respondent/applicant Central Banahaw (Central) sought to register the label DYNAFLEX for electric wires.
  
  
• Petitioner opposed on the ground that Central’s use of the trademark DYNAFLEX would confuse purchasers looking for DURAFLEX.  The mark sought to be registered allegedly having practically the same spelling, pronunciation and sound, and covering the same good, but had not been in use continuously, unlike DURAFLEX  which was in use since 1958.
  
  
• Director of Patents held that DYNAFLEX was not similar to DURAFLEX, since the logo design was dissimilar, the DURAFLEX logo being in all caps while DYNAFLEX was in miniscule, and thus gave Central’s application to trademark DYNAFLEX due course.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mark DYNAFLEX and Device is registrable as label for electric wires, class 20, considering that the trademark DURAFLEX and Globe representation also for electric wires, machines and supplies under class 20, has been registered more than 4 years earlier.

HELD:

NO, the mark sought to be registered failed to “dominancy test”

The pertinent law, Republic Act 166, as amended, on registrability of trademarks, prescribes:

SEC. 4. — The owner of a trademark, trade name or service-mark used to distinguish his goods, business or services from the goods, business or services of others shall have the right to register the same, unless it:

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(d) Consists of or comprises a mark or trade name which so resembles a mark or trade-name registered in the Philippines by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to or used in connection with the goods, business or services of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the determinative factor in a contest involving the registration of trademark is whether the use of such mark would likely cause confusion or mistake on the part of the buying public. The test of “likelihood” is the “dominancy test” or the assessment of the essential or dominant features in the competing labels to determine whether they are confusingly similar.  In fact, even their similarity in sound is taken into consideration, where the marks refer to merchandise of the same descriptive properties, for the reason that trade idem sonans constitutes a violation of trade mark patents.

The court found:

The similarity between the competing trademarks, DURAFLEX and DYNAFLEX, is apparent. Not only are the initial letters and the last half of the appellations identical, but the difference exists only in two out of the eight literal elements of the designations. Coupled with the fact that both marks cover insulated flexible wires under class 20; that both products are contained in boxes of the same material, color, shape and size; that the dominant elements of the front designs are a red circle and a diagonal zigzag commonly related to a spark or flash of electricity; that the back of both boxes show similar circles of broken lines with arrows at the center pointing outward, with the identical legend "Cut Out Ring" "Draw From Inside Circle", no difficulty is experienced in reaching the conclusion that there is a deceptive similarity that would lead the purchaser to confuse one product with the other.

The Director of Patents has predicated his decision mostly on the semantic difference and connotation of the prefixes "Dura" and "Dyna" of the competing trademarks, unfortunately forgetting that the buyers are less concerned with the etymology of the words as with their sound and the dominant features of the design.

The court further explained that "unlike the pharmacists or druggists, the dispensers of hardware or electrical supplies are not generally known to pay as much concern to the brand of articles asked for by the customer and of a person who knows the name of the brand but is not acquainted with it is appearance, the likelihood of the DYNAFLEX product being mistaken for DURAFLEX is not remote."

Thus the request to register this trademark must be denied.

GROTJAHN GMBH vs. ISNANI

 

August 10, 1994; G.R. No. 109272

Topic:  Effect when no employer-employee relationship exists/issue does not involve employer-employee relationship

FACTS:

Petitioner is a multinational corporation (employer).  Private respondent Lanchinebre (employee) worked as its sales representative from 1983 to mid-1992.  Employee obtained loans and cash advances, a total of P12,170.37 remained unpaid. 

In July 1992, Employee filed an illegal suspension case with the NLRC (NLRC Case).  Employer, on the other hand, filed a case for collection of Sum of Money at the RTC (Collection Case).  Employee moved to dismiss the collection case on the ground that the case was in the nature of a claim for employee compensation (Art 217 No.4 & 6) and was under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.  The RTC under respondent judge dismissed the case.

Hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the Collection Case.

HELD:

YES.  While the loans and cash advances were contracted between employee and employer during the subsistence of their relationship, it does not follow that Article 217 of the Labor Code covers their relationship.

The SC writes:

Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement. …

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Civil Case No. 92-2486 is a simple collection of a sum of money brought by petitioner, as creditor, against private respondent Romana Lanchinebre, as debtor. The fact that they were employer and employee at the time of the transaction does not negate the civil jurisdiction of the trial court. The case does not involve adjudication of a labor dispute but recovery of a sum of money based on our civil laws on obligation and contract.

xxx

Whether or not the subject loan was incurred by private respondent as an incident to her profession, occupation or business is a question of fact. In the absence of relevant evidence, the issue cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss.

Thus the relevant test in this instance is the test of relevance.  Specifically, whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs being sought by the parties.  If none, the case may be considered as intrinsically a civil dispute.

The order of the RTC was reversed and the collection case was reinstated.